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ABSTRACT

This study discusses the ability of the Summer Work Travel Program (SWTP)

to meet the objectives outlined in its authorizing legislation, the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. These goals include educational exchange
between participants and the U.S. community, cultural exchange between

participants and the U.S. community, and the promotion of peace exemplified by
SWTP operators and the U.S. community.

The study adopts agency and transaction cost theory to guide its discussion

of the administrative relationship between the U.S. State Department and those
designated as Summer Work Travel Sponsors. This study’s findings include

instances of informational and preference asymmetry between administrative

actors. The use of intermediary placement agents by SWTP sponsors was found to

be a source of opportunism. Policy and program recommendations are presented to
realign the actions of the SWTP administrative actors with respect to accountability
and effective methods of contracting.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Each year hundreds of thousands of foreign student visitors enter the United

States via the Summer Work Travel Program (SWTP) promulgated in 1961 under
the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, commonly known as the

“Fulbright-Hays Act (Pub. L. 87-256).” The Summer Work Travel Program is
operated by the U.S. State Department, which oversees program guidelines,

operations, and the J-1 cultural visas participants are issued allowing residency in
the USA for a period of four months. The purpose of the Summer Work Travel
Program is to:

“…Enable the Government of the United States to increase mutual
understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other
countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties
which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and
cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United
States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful
and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote
international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus
to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations
between the United States and the other countries of the world (Pub.L. 87–256,
75 Stat. 527).”
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Those eligible to participate in the Summer Work Travel Program are

students enrolled in Universities or similar tertiary educational programs during

their summer or winter academic break. The Summer Work Travel Program invites

these students to work in the United States for a period of three months, and affords

students an additional month for cultural exploration and travel in the USA. Summer
Work Travel Participants typically find employment in low-skilled, temporary, or
seasonal areas of work. These include resorts used for seasonal activities such as

winter sports (skiing), summer employment opportunities such as restaurant-based
positions at eateries in beachfront towns, or employment in year-round theme
parks, the largest employer being the Disney owned resorts in Florida. Other

participants have reported employment in packaging facilities, seafood processing
plants, fast-food chains, and convenience stores, all in the name of cultural and
educational exchange.

The Summer Work Travel Program constitutes what the Center for

Immigration Services has termed a “$100 Million Dollar Industry (CIS 2011).” This

“industry” represents a number of components, including recruitment services that
determine students’ placements with employers and similar services that revolve
around the influx of over a hundred thousand seasonal workers visiting the USA
each year. The nexus of financial concerns and considerations includes the costsaving opportunities enjoyed by SWTP sponsors, the employment concerns of

domestic workers who feel impacted by employers who utilize SWTP participants,
and the numerous economic opportunities the operation of the SWTP creates for
2

placement agents around the world. This has positioned the Summer Work Travel

Program as a focal point for discussions of the effectiveness of such public programs
as participation numbers reached all-time highs in 2011 (SEVIS 2011).

The U.S. State Department has outsourced a majority of Summer Work Travel

Program operations and responsibilities to agencies located both domestically and

internationally. The largest international group responsible for an integral function

of the SWTP are the hundreds of entities this paper terms, “intermediary placement
agents,” or those responsible for the recruitment of students from foreign nations

and the pairing of students with domestic SWTP employers. The State Department

has outsourced the responsibility of program operations and adherence to program
rules to those it designates as Summer Work Travel Program “sponsors,” or those

organizations that are eligible to employ J-1 visa holders participating in the SWTP
for a period of three months.

While some have praised the SWTP for its diversity and its exposure of U.S. cultural

ideals and practices to the foreign nations of its participants, recently the SWTP has
garnered criticism regarding its lack of oversight and regulation. Critics claim the

State Department has allowed the SWTP to spin out of control. In some cases to the

extent participants fall into the hands of abusive employers, unscrupulous sponsors,
and predatory third-party agencies (Costa, 2014; Mohr, Weiss, & Baker, 2010; Mohr
& Weiss, 2011; Preston, 2012). Others complain SWTP participants displace low-

skilled U.S. workers that depend on seasonal jobs as sources of primary income
(Lofholm, 2011; Seasonal Staffing Solutions, 2014; Stewart, 2014).
3

Statement of Problem
The problems publically associated with the Summer Work Travel Program

encompass the two specific research questions of this study. The first problem this

study addresses is the degree to which the Summer Work Travel Program achieves
the objectives set forth in its authorizing legislation. Three specific objectives are
chosen from the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: the

promotion of peace and democratic ideals, cultural exchange among participants
and between participants and U.S. citizens, and educational exchange among

participants and between participants and U.S. citizens (Pub. L. 87–256, 75 Stat.
527).

The second problem addressed in this study is the effect of the delegation of

administrative control from the principal administrator, the U.S. State Department,

to its agents, SWTP sponsors on the SWTP’s ability to meet its legislative objectives.
Using agency theory to describe the relationship among “agents” and the SWTP

“principal,” the U.S. State Department, the study focuses on the outsourcing of the

recruitment and determination of placement to “intermediary placement agents,” or
third-party vendors, located outside of the USA. The paradigm through which this

delegation of responsibility is addressed is that of “asymmetry,” popularly defined
by Holmstrom and Shavell as occurring in two distinct forms, that of “preference
asymmetry” and “information asymmetry (Holmstrom & Shavell 1979).”

4

The specific subset of problems chosen for this study are from a larger

discussion about the effectiveness and existence of the Summer Work Travel

Program in the public policy sphere. The program’s objectives are not monetarily

valuable to the general public, but only to those employing sponsors. The delegation
of Summer Work Travel Program’s administrative responsibility without effective

monitoring procedures or methods has been a concern mentioned during hearings
regarding the role of the State Department (GAO-06-800T). The State Department

has admitted they have become so detached from their responsibilities, “they (have)
became purveyors of J-1 visas, leaving the actual program administration to third

parties (Fed. Reg. 4-26-11).” These third parties are the sponsors who employ the

participants. This links the employer’s bottom line with its selection and

recruitment of participants. An example of special interest “capture” are those

sponsors that the State Department must oversee to deter opportunistic actions at
the expense of program effectiveness. These are the entities referred to as having

been left with the task of program administration, essentially policing themselves

with little or no verification of performance. This led to participants being subjected
to various forms of exploitation occurring before travel to the USA in the form of
overinflated travel and living costs/fees paid up front to sponsors (CIS 2011).

Further instances of opportunism have been found after participants arrive in the

U.S., where the Department of Homeland Security reported increases in, “incidents
involving criminal conduct among SWT participants” (Fed. Reg. 4-26-11). These

instances of asymmetry between the U.S. State Department’s preferences for SWTP
5

operation and the reality of how the SWTP program is conducted by SWTP sponsors
illustrates areas of concern this study specifically addresses in its data analyses.
Purpose of Study

The purpose of this dissertation is to use economic incentive structures

developed by Holmstrom and Shavell (Holmstrom & Shavell, 1979) and Eisenhardt’s
agency theory to examine the SWTP’s administrative relationship with the U.S. State
Department, which regulates the J-1 visa, and the program sponsors who employ
the approved SWTP applicants. The study also uses transaction cost theory as

applied to contract design and the reduction of asymmetries among administrative

actors to frame the analysis regarding two key incongruences between the principal
and agent: information asymmetry and preference asymmetry (Holmstrom 1979,
Shavell 1979).

The first purpose of this study is to present a method by which to measure

the degree to which the Summer Work Travel Program meets the objectives of its

authorizing legislation. As the Summer Work Travel Program is a unique program

not directly impacted by political pressures present in many studies of government

undertakings, a second purpose is to highlight analyze the effect of the environment
in which the program operates.

This study begins by addressing the objectives of the Mutual Education and

Cultural Exchange Act, the Summer Work Travel Program’s authorizing legislation.
It seeks to provide participant satisfaction data as a method of evaluating program
6

effectiveness with respect to the legislative goals of educational exchange, cultural
exchange, and the promotion of peace. As these sponsors are responsible for all

program operations including the recruitment of participants, sponsors are charged

with a high degree of responsibility for satisfying the program’s legislative goals, yet
presented with no clear incentives to focus on activities not congruent with its

profit-maximizing, efficiency-oriented, operations or repercussions for failing to do
so.

The second purpose of this paper is to address the components of Summer

Work Travel Program participants that affect the ability of the program to meet the
goals of its authorizing legislation. These effects are defined using agency theory’s
adoption of “asymmetry” between the actions preferred by the U.S. State

Department (termed the “principal” in agency literature) and those actions actually
taken by SWTP sponsors (defined as “agents”). In order to determine levels of

asymmetry present in the administration of the SWTP, satisfaction scores and

interviews from SWTP participants were used to construct two forms of asymmetry,
popularly defined in agency literature, “information” asymmetry between the SWTP
administrators, and “preference” asymmetry between the SWTP administrators.
The final purpose of the study is to provide policy recommendations to

improve the Summer Work Travel Program. These recommendations are derived
from the analyses conducted in this study and serve as a springboard for future

research. It is the objective of this study to present testable conclusions such that
more research can positively impact the Summer Work Travel Program. It is the
7

purpose of this study to present an entry point for discussion regarding

administrative operations of the Summer Work Travel Program and similarly

structured programs that are not widely discussed in public policy or political
science literature in conjunction with agency theory.

Research Questions
The following research questions will be addressed in this study:

1.

“Does the Summer Work Travel Program meet the objectives of its authorizing
legislation?”

1.1 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to educational exchange during their participation periods?”
1.2 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to cultural exchange during their participation periods?”
1.3 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to the promotion of peace during their participation periods?”
These research questions address the primary concern of this dissertation, the

degree of success or failure of the Summer Work Travel Program to meet the
objectives outlined in its authorizing legislation, the Mutual Educational and

Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. It divides those objectives of the MECE Act into three
categories; educational exchange, cultural exchange, and the promotion of peace.
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2.

“What aspects of the Summer Work Travel Program participants affect program
success?”

2.1 “How do the identified participants’ aspects affect Summer Work Travel Program
success?”
The second research question seeks to determine whether any components

of the Summer Work Travel Program affect the ability of the program to meet is

legislative goals. These components were selected during the methodological design
of the study, implemented into both qualitative interview designs and quantitative

survey construction, and were then tested against satisfactions scores to determine
any significance. To determine the effects of the intermediate placement agents the
criteria of “asymmetry” is used for this study’s analyses. Two components of

asymmetry as presented by Eisenhardt are measured, information asymmetry and
preference asymmetry (1985). Therefore the following research questions are
presented:
2.1a

“Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate information asymmetry
between the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program
sponsors?”

2.1b

“Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate preference asymmetry between
the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program sponsors?”

9

Significance of Study
Each year over one hundred thousand foreign students enter the United

States to participate in the Summer Work Travel Program. These individuals come
from institutions of higher education to further their studies while engaging in

cultural exchange activities for a period of three months. They are recruited by

independent placement agents hired by SWTP sponsors to fill staffing requirements.

Once approved for SWTP participation and granted a J-1 visa, participants pay travel
costs either directly to the SWTP sponsor or the independent placement agent. They
arrive in the United States where sponsors provide or outsource the provision of

housing, utilities and amenities, transportation, even groceries at predetermined

rates offered to SWTP participants. These non-negotiable rates are either billed to

the student or simply deducted from the participant’s paycheck. The SWTP sponsor

that provides these accommodations are the same that must place the participant in
a position wherein they would engage in mutually beneficial cultural and
educational exchange with others both within the program and the local

community. Although the SWTP constitutes the largest foreign workforce in the
United States, the U.S. State Department oversees all labor aspects of the SWTP

program, which it has in turn delegated to the sponsors themselves, essentially

requiring profit-seeking organizations to determine the degree to which they satisfy
the SWTP’s legislative goals at expense to their bottom lines. Therefore it is

important the employing sponsors of the SWTP are held accountable for the
10

program’s success by the U.S. State Department, yet there are many reasons why the
two administrators may differ in their desired operation of the program.

The two groups of administrative actors operating the Summer Work Travel

Program, the State Department and the sponsors and recruiters, differ greatly in

many respects, leading to the adoption of agency theory to frame the administrative
relationships in this study. The use of agency theory to discuss the differences

among SWTP administrators is unique to this dissertation, as are its data sources.

This dissertation is the first to reflect the feedback of the participants both during
and shortly after their participation in the SWTP. The study’s approach to

integrating participant interviews and quantitative survey data is also unique

among reports concerning the SWTP. The study’s main importance is to address the
ability of the SWTP to meet its legislative objectives. While previous studies have
highlighted instances of program abuse or the effects of the program on the U.S.

workforce, few studies have addressed the root of the program’s problems - the
fundamental differences in goals and information among these two groups of
program administrators.

This study is significant due to its use of agency theory, its data sources, and

its focus on integrating participant feedback into the measurement of SWTP sponsor
performance and overall program success. It moves further than reports

highlighting the effects of the SWTP and presents policy recommendations following
the data analyses. This study is conducted such that the Summer Work Travel

Program can present the opportunity to its participants envisioned by the creators
11

of its authorizing legislation. As the program continues to grow in participation, and
thus its impact on U.S. cultural and educational exchanges with nations around the
world, the program should not center upon the satisfaction of its sponsoring
employers, but rather those participants the program was created for. This

perspective reflects the spirit of this dissertation as shown by its methods and data
analyses- that participants’ experiences should be more than publicized

afterthoughts and should instead be a tool by which the performance of SWTP
sponsors and the success of the SWTP overall are measured.

12

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The Summer Work Travel Program (SWTP) is one of sixteen Exchange

Visitor Programs operated by the U.S. State Department. The Summer Work Travel
Program has regularly been referred to as, “a cornerstone of U.S. public diplomacy

efforts for nearly 50 years (76 Fed. Reg. 23177).” Its primary purpose is to, “increase
mutual understanding” and “strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations
(22 C.F.R. 62.2).” The Summer Work Travel Program is largest of the Exchange

Visitor Programs whose participation is regulated using the J-1 cultural exchange

visa. The SWTP represented almost half of the 300,000 Exchange Visitor Program

participants in 2010. The SWTP invites foreign students to work inside the USA for a
period of three months (with an additional month allowed for travel) if in a foreign
University or equivalent institution and on academic break. Students interact with
other participants from various culture as well as U.S. citizens through their work

placements, and after employment for three months are allowed to travel for the
final month of their stay to further their cultural and educational studies.

The Summer Work Travel Program has a number of proponents and

detractors. Those that support the program, including its former top administrator,
then Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, cite the tremendous opportunities it

provides for those who may otherwise not be able to visit the United States. The
SWTP directly impacts those students abroad who are able to participate in the
13

program by immersing them in the culture of the USA and those cultures of their
fellow participants. It presents participants with an unbiased opportunity to
experience the democratic values and peaceful practices that accompany

constitutional pillars such as the first amendment. Indirectly, the program allows
the United States to promote democracy and the promotion of peaceful ideals to
those associated with SWTP participants as participants return and share their
experiences (Pub.L. 87–256). For those who employ SWTP participants, the

program provides a dependable labor pool for employment in seasonal positions.

Many sponsors employing participants cite the positive attitudes of students, their

work ethics, and beneficial cultural exchanges that the program provides. Employer
Hugh Fuller has hired foreign students at his Purple Parrot Grill restaurant in

Rehoboth Beach for at least 15 years to supplement his 72-person seasonal staff.

“I’m very proud of my international students,” he said, adding that for some
positions, such as preparing food, he doesn’t get too many local applicants
(Klimasinska 2013).

The Summer Work Travel Program has a number of detractors that question

the true motives of the program. As the program has grown over the years it has
become the largest source of foreign workers in the USA, yet the program is not

administered or coordinated with the U.S. Department of Labor. This has caused
many to accuse the SWTP of displacing U.S. citizens from potential jobs as

employers can hire SWTP participants and pay less money in wages while receiving

tax breaks for participating in the SWTP (Costa 2011). Others cite the placements of
14

SWTP participants as not consistent with its authorizing legislation, placing

students in dangerous or even illegal work positions in the sex industry (Preston

2011). While many agree with the objectives of the SWTP, they criticize its results,

as participants have reported unsuitable housing and work conditions or exorbitant
costs that leave them little money to take home after participation (Costa 2009).

Among those that have published reports citing lack of adequate regulations include
the State Department itself, the Economic Policy Institute, and the Government
Accountability Office.

This literature review begins with the historical context of a shift in the

administration and provision of some public services from the public domain to the
private. To frame this study’s focus on successful methods of contracting public
administrative functions to private entities, this literature review identifies the

issues in and examples of contracting from the perspective of various academic

disciplines including public management, public administration, economics, political
science, and public policy studies, ranging from broad examples of government

contracting to specific issues of effective contract design and management, including
post-contractual concerns. While pre-contract design is concerned with
determining the most effective methods of the division of services and

administration and the specificity of the contract, post-contractual concerns are

related to curtailing opportunism due to goal and preference asymmetry (Shavell
1979).

15

This study uses principal-agent theory to guide its analysis of the theoretical

issues most relevant to the Summer Work Travel Program’s administrative

relationships and program objectives (Shavell 1979; Jenson & Mecking 1976). While
principal-agent theory is well suited to addressing the conflicting goals of the

participating entities, transaction cost theory is helpful in determining the most

efficient method of providing administrative functions (Williamson 1975, 1985).
This study uses transaction cost theory to analyze issues of contract design with

respect to costs of monitoring and evaluation in a principal agent setting and agency
theory to highlight post-contract implementation concerns relevant to the Summer
Work Travel Program operations. Transaction cost theory is used to determine the
most suitable methods for the U.S. State Department to adopt and present to

potential SWTP sponsors. This approach lays out the theoretical and practical
foundation for the methodology section, in which measures of participant

satisfaction are used to assess the administrative balance between public and
private agencies in the Summer Work Travel Program.
Privatization – Historical Overview
A brief historical overview of recent trends in the public/private dichotomy

that has characterized governmental service production and distribution will

provide a context for the privatization of the Summer Work Travel Program. While
scholars such as political philosopher Norberto Bobbio have traced the

public/private dichotomy to Byzantine’s Code of Justinian (A.D. 529), this work
16

begins with the public/private distinction that has characterized the United States
economy since the twentieth century (Bobbio 1989). This overview begins with

contemporary policymaking utilization of the private sector to conduct operations

traditionally carried out in the public domain. Much of the recent literature reflects
the neoliberal policy shift toward greater use of market mechanisms for

government service production and delivery. For this purpose, the focus is on those
methods through which this takes place – those specific actions under the
nomenclature “privatization” (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998).

Following the Great Depression, all indicators reflected a public distrust in

private enterprise because of the perceived inability of private enterprises to
provide necessary goods such as milk and coal before and during the Great

Depression (Hamilton & Wright, 1928). Thus, the administration of Franklin D.

Roosevelt and implementation of his presidential agenda started a movement in the
opposite direction towards trust in the public sector and public program expansion
(Minow 2005). A tremendous expansion of public provision of services took place,

entitled the “New Deal Reform” under Roosevelt (1933). Among these services were
public welfare reform (Social Security and Aid to Dependent Children),

infrastructure programs such as the Public Works Administration, Works Progress
Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, public planning such as the

National Resources Planning Board, and the public ownership of some utilities

reflected in the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act in 1933(16 U.S.C. §
831) and the Rural Electric Administration in 1935 (7 U.S.C. § 901).
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Following this expansion of government, there was a swing away from “big

government” to a more efficient government, characterized by a reduction of

peripheral services (Freedman 2006). The outsourcing of government services by
contract started the move back towards a trust in the private sector in modern

decades. Thus the recent growth of privatization can be explained as a somewhat

naturally occurring shift away from the growing public administration of programs
emerging from the New Deal (Horowitz 1987) and a reflection of distrust of “big

government.” Administrations starting with Ronald Reagan have sought to create a
more agile or lean government that is more flexible and efficient to counteract that
distrust. Efforts to explore better management practices include the Reagan

presidency’s Grace Commission, the National Performance Review under the Clinton
presidency, and the President’s Management Agenda under the presidency of
George W. Bush (Freeman 2006).

Mutual exclusivity between the public and private spheres is not the only

option. Quasi-public/private entities are another options; they have existed as
providers of government services and include the Federal Land Bank, port

authorities, sports authorities, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (Radford
2003).

During the Clinton administration, the initiative of “reinventing government”

sought to integrate government contracting in an effort to improve the ability of the
procurement system to meet its goals, or as stated in the Federal Acquisition
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Regulation, “to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the

customer (FAR 1.102, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,732).” This initiative can be seen as a response
to economists’ argument that government agencies are insulated from the pressures
of competition and behave like protected monopolies comprised of “so-called public
servants [who] have a captive market and little incentive to heed their putative
customers” (Savas 1983). The Federal Acquisition Regulation and National

Performance Review, under the Clinton Administration, called for “services for goal
obtainment” to be carried out, “while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling
public policy objectives” as part of Clinton’s “reinventing government” program
(FAR 1.102).

One example of using privatization to improve efficiency and control costs

that took place during the Clinton administration involved the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) programs. These programs were burdened with
cost overruns for routine space operations. Under the Space Flight Operations
Contract, the Clinton administration began outsourcing the management and

running operations of shuttles to the contract winner, the United Space Alliance. The
$10 billion contract outsourced essentially all operations, from astronaut training to

system assembly to the management of launch and recovery, resulting in what many
have characterized as a fragmented system that has failed to uphold the successes of
its predecessor (Romzek & Dubnick 1987).

The presidency of George W. Bush initiated increased administrative

outsourcing compared to previous administrations. The President’s Management
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Agenda adopted the policy of “competitive sourcing.” During his campaigning, G.W.
Bush stated, “Government should be market-based—we should not be afraid of
competition, innovation, and choice. I will open government to the discipline of

competition” (OMB FY 2002). The underlying idea behind competitive sourcing was
neutrality between commercial and government service providers, so that

government providers competed alongside private entities for the provision of

services that could be supplied by private firms. The Agenda justified this policy by

claiming that public agencies were insulated from pressures to innovate and change
and had become complacent due to a lack of competition. As an increasing number
of potential service providers for government tasks were readily available in the

private sector, “competitive sourcing” moved these tasks into the public or private
sector as determined through classic “make or buy” analyses.

Following G.W. Bush’s adoption of “competitive sourcing,” the rate of

outsourcing continued to grow in response to the terrorist attacks occurring in

2001, the subsequent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the natural
disaster Hurricane Katrina. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and

government response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the limited ability of

government agencies to respond quickly to emergencies or crises, establishing the
need for improved “first responses” to such crises (Minow 2005). The increased
scope of military operations and political pressures has also highlighted the

usefulness of non-governmental military organizations to operate alongside and in
conjunction with public military operations.
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These administrative agendas reflect a shift in public sentiment away from a

focus on the evils of private sector profiteering through exploitation to the perils of
a slow-moving, overly bureaucratic big government. Yet, as indicated above, the
public and private administration or provision of traditionally public functions
should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. Seeking the appropriate balance

between the two sectors is a good foundation on which to base decisions about

service production and provision. It is at this intersection that this study finds its

roots, as the classic “make or buy” decision has produced results and performances
that can be utilized to judge its merits. In the case of the Summer Work Travel

Program (SWTP), this study evaluates (using satisfaction indicators to judge the

program in terms of effectiveness) the decision to externalize parts of the program’s
administration while retaining other functions in the public sector.
Contracting
The term “outsourcing” denotes the act of contracting for a service. In

governmental services, outsourcing indicates the retention of the ownership and
control of the production/distribution function by the government while the

contracting private entity operates or staffs the respective function. In its simplest
form, it is a short-term business relationship based on a competitive process to
fulfill a goal or mission, typically to fill a gap in knowledge or skill in order to
increase productivity and/or efficiency. Outsourcing can be contrasted with

“privatization,” wherein the private sector invests capital in assets (either new or
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existing) and thus retains some degree of ownership of the asset or function.

Privatization allows the establishment of a long-term relationship dependent upon
the performance and adherence to negotiated terms and conditions of the

production function. Privatization can also be contrasted to outsourcing in terms of
the transference of risk – the private sector assumes a portion of the risk in

exchange for the hope of the establishment of a long-term contract (Ross 1973;
Williamson 1975).

This study focuses on the U.S. State Department’s outsourcing of

administrative functions in the Summer Work Travel Program. The previous section
has described the historical shifts between the public and private domains. This
section focuses on specific contracting between private entities and the U.S.

government. It details both the positive and negative aspects of government

contracting as developed in academic literature, and a discussion of the challenge of
measuring governmental contracting success.

Outsourcing has undeniably grown steadily since 1990 (Minow 2005). In

2006, federal agencies spent roughly $400 billion on the acquisition of goods and

services from private firms, a 90 percent increase over the 2000 figure. As indicated
by the Federal Procurement Data System, the fastest-growing component of federal
discretionary spending is the use of contracts (FPDS 2000-2006). The growth in
contracting is augmented by the increased opportunities to provide what has

traditionally been termed “core government services,” such as the operation of
prison systems or schooling.
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As Harvard scholar Martha Minow states, “We live in an era of pervasive

government outsourcing – what we call government by contract” (Minow 2005).

Since the Reagan Administration, the U.S. government has increasingly relied on the
private sector to provide public goods and functions, specifically regarding national
security, intelligence gathering and monitoring operations, warfare, and disaster
relief. While government contracting for national defense services is not a

particularly new trend, the degree to which the contracts authorize private
involvement has grown far beyond the traditional procurement of military

weaponry (Minow 2005). In Minow’s “Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military
Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy,” these more indepth functions that have been outsourced today include “sensitive functions”
previously thought to be exclusively the responsibility of government. These
functions include military target selection, border control, interrogation of

detainees, and the control of the collection of confidential information gathered

during military operations. Through contracting, the private sector has played a
significant role in both the planning and operational aspects of national defense
(Minow 2005; GAO-06-800T).

While many attribute this increase in outsourcing to the terrorist attacks of

September 11th, 2001, other major focusing events over the last two decades have
included the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as natural disasters such as

Hurricane Katrina and more recently Hurricane Sandy. While these events have
drawn attention to the ways in which the private sector can perform more
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effectively and efficiently in service delivery and faster response, the events are

embedded in a larger trend toward government outsourcing of what is termed “the
basic work of government,” including agency budget determinations, the provision
of social services, delivering foreign aid, and even managing nuclear weapons sites
(Guttman 2003). While these focusing events have led many to conclude that the
government is ill-equipped to meet the demands of rapid service deployment in
response to natural disasters or possess the equipment and human capital

necessary for intelligence operations on a large scale, critics of government

contracting cite the lack of transparency that often accompanies government

outsourcing (Dickenson 2005). This lack of transparency has frequently resulted in

a rise in opportunistic behavior among those winners of private contracts who seek
to satisfy personal agendas rather than fulfilling contractual obligations (Jenson

1983). Thus the debate over the true costs and benefits of government outsourcing
has become central to policymaking theories and procedures.

There are two distinctions regarding the selection of services for

outsourcing. The first is the distinction between “core” and “peripheral” services.
While services to military personnel such as health services, food services, and
housing are easily classified as peripheral rather than core functions, the
government’s increased proclivity to contract has led to private sector

encroachment of services usually thought to be solely in the government’s domain.
For example, when the NSA decided to focus on its “core” objective of intelligence
gathering, outsourcing contracts for the maintenance and development of its
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computer networks and security infrastructures increased steadily after 1990

(Romzek, B & M. Dubnick 1997). During the contracting competition however, the

NSA decided not to simply replace those who had begun infrastructure development
but rather to stipulate that the affected workforce be offered positions in the

selected company. The existing workforce in the NSA was an asset to be utilized by
the contract winner, preserving the current technological capacity of the NSA and
augmenting it with highly skilled private workers (Freedman 2006).

The second distinction is that of “mission focus.” While also reflective of

efficiency concerns, the federal government had very limited ability to compete with
private entities to acquire personnel with specific skill sets in high demand in both

private and public sectors around the world. As Soloway and Chvotkin state, “facing
seminal changes to the economy and to the role and ownership of technology, a
generally losing competition with the broader private sector for talent, and a
significantly graying workforce, agencies have had little choice but to turn

increasingly to the private sector” (Soloway & Chvotkin 2009). In these instances
government entities are presented with the choice of risking mission success by

using an antiquated or under-skilled workforce or paying a higher price to recruit
those with proper skill sets who typically remain in the private sector due to its

ability to pay in proportion to the global demand for the respective skill set. With

increasing need for the government to modernize, this use of outsourcing to attract
those with highly desired skill sets complements the motives of focusing on core
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tasks and achieving “mission success” (quality), rather than simply operating
efficiently.

Case Studies of Government Contracting
Examples of government contracting can be found on all levels. Regardless of

the scale or level, outsourcing embraces the common theme of contracting for

increased efficiency or for “mission success.” Examples of government contracting
include contracting for waste disposal on state and local municipal levels, the

contracting of military operations, and the privatization of correctional facility

operations. These examples will be provided in a broad context to establish the
scope through which government outsourcing by contract takes place.

The first example is environmental cleanup for sites classified as

“brownfields.” A brownfield is “a property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse
of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant (epa.gov).” As of 2012, the estimated number

of “brownfields” in the United States exceeded 450,000” (epa.gov 2012). The stateadministered cleanup projects were seen as reflecting the slow-moving nature of

government due to the number of permits and project approval processes needed

before projects began. In an effort to address the need for increased efficiency, the
state of Massachusetts implemented private consultants (LSPs – Licensed Site
Professionals) to independently regulate site cleanups. These independent

regulators were placed in charge of supervisory activities including the assessment
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of cleanup needs, a presentation to the client of potential cleanup options, and final
evaluation of cleanup efforts, wherein LSPs would sign off on completed projects if
found to be in accordance with state regulations (Mass. Reg. Code 310, 40.0). The
use of an independent third party to supervise the aspects of brownfield cleanup
efforts was proposed to circumvent the bureaucratic red-tape characteristic of

government agencies. Yet when final site audits were reviewed, in many instances
large degrees of opportunism had resulted in suboptimal conditions. LSPs were

found to often recommend particular services or cleanup methods that directly or
indirectly benefited them financially. Sites were rarely found to be in accordance
with environmental specifications even after LSP inspection (Minow 2005).
The apparent conflicts of interest, the wide range of management

procedures, the lack of disciplinary actions, and the lack of oversight regarding LSPs
all led to increased risk-taking in project operations in the form of LSPs suggesting
suboptimal methods that benefited them directly rather than more effective

methods not directly benefiting LSPs financially. LSPs also approved suboptimal

performances after project completion to keep costs low (Seifter 2008). A review of
LSP audits shows that between the years 2001-2005, sites received a “follow-up

required” grade were 50%, 65%, 71%, 70%, and 71%, respectively (Mass. DEP

2001-2005). Sites with violations that resulted in the retraction of a “completed”

status ranged from 5% to 21% over the same five-year period. Thus LSPs represent
a form of “capture” due to their ability to be dominated by the very entities they
regulate (Posner 1974).
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The second example of government contracting is perhaps one of the most

prevalent since the 1990s, the outsourcing of national defense activities to private
military firms. It is estimated the Department of Defense (DOD) spends nearly 75

billion dollars each year buying goods and services from the private sector (Nichols

& Phillips 2005). As reported by Nevers and Avant, nearly one-half of the personnel
deployed by the United States since 2003 have been contractors (Singer 2003;
Stanger 2009). Yet the Department of Defense also contracts for services

domestically such as computer support, intelligence gathering operations, and jobs
as minute as the maintenance of printers and copiers in various domestic facilities.

As a result of this growing trend of outsourcing, numerous examples of an abuse of
power by these firms can be found, specifically in international settings (Radford
2003). The State Department’s Personal Protective Services contract with the

private contractor Blackwater during the Iraq war provided contractors with

private weapons and helicopters, resulting in the infamous shootout in Nisoor

Square, exemplifying Blackwater’s overtly aggressive policies (Priest 2004). During
the withdrawal of troops in Iraq, private contractor DynCorp provided police and

security training to the Iraq policy force, including help in constructing compounds
and prisons. The Iraqi army was then trained by U.S. contracted private

organizations Vinnell Corporation, MPRI, and USIS (Avant 2006). However, the legal
framework governing non-combatant yet often armed private contractors had not
been revised to address the atrocities exhibited in the Blackwater shootout or the
prisoner abuses documented in U.S. run prisons in Abu Ghraib (WP, 2004).
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Two main conclusions can be drawn from the extensive literature on military

contracting. First, there is a lack of competition among private contractors

necessary to foster efficiency and accountability. Second, there is a lack of legal

oversight. U.S. Harvard legal scholar Martha Minow states, “Military training, unit
discipline, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and international legal standards

governing war and armed conflicts ensure accountability for the military, but not for
private corporations and their employees engaged in military work. Serious

questions have been raised about whether Congress can use its oversight of the

military on private contractors” (Minow 2005). As U.S. global operations continue to

grow in size and scope, the structure of government contracting must account for its
diversity through oversight and feedback and should be reflected in subsequent
contract negotiations.

A third example is contracting of U.S. prison and correctional facility

operations to private firms. Vice President Donald Hutto of Corrections Corporation
of America (CCA), the largest private company to run U.S. prisons, states, “Every

time you want something, you have to go through a complex political process (Pulle
2006).” The privatization of prisons is seen as a more efficient method of operating
a traditionally state-owned responsibility, subject to competitive bidding that
theoretically produces higher quality services at lower costs than state-run

operations. Now managing more than 67 facilities that house more than 93,000
prisoners, CCA has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency regarding

prisoner treatment, the falsification of prison records, and a 2012 deadly riot in a
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Mississippi prison (Boone 2013). Privatization of prisons also represents a case of
goal incongruence. Private companies benefit financially as more prisoners are

brought into their complexes, but public agencies responsible for prisons do not

benefit financially in terms of the size of the prison population, and is thus prefers
lower usage levels. The privatization of prison complexes provides incentives for

companies to lobby for increased use of prison capacity whether in terms of longer
prison sentences or more crimes punishable through jailing. This example of

privatization reflects a degree of regulatory capture, wherein public agencies are

less concerned with the humanity of methods utilized in correctional facilities and
more concerned with results such as less violence occurring inside prisons.

Lobbying efforts of CCA have repeatedly defeated legislation that would have

limited private entrance into correctional facility management, spending $17.4
million lobbying the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigrations and

Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Office of Management and Budget, the Bureau of

Prisons, both houses of Congress, and others between 2002 and 2012 (Pulle 2013).
Privatization of the management of correctional facilities would need to include

transparency clauses in contract design to ensure the maintenance of both health

and safety standards. Additionally a truly competitive bidding process is needed in
order to ensure high quality service delivery, an objective difficult to achieve given
the size of CCA and its much smaller competitors.

Additional examples of public and private contracting in the United States

include contracting for health care services, educational endeavors, and aeronautic
30

services as public agency size and scope continues to decline in the name of efficient
governance and reductions in public budgets. As outsourcing continues to grow, the
public sector needs to develop the necessary mechanisms to control opportunistic
tendencies of profit-seeking organizations. These mechanisms include

accountability requirements in political, legal, professional, and bureaucratic forms
to manage expectations and curtail opportunism. The institutional and

administrative components of measurability (and thus accountability) are central in
contracting efforts between public and private organizations. While many

peripheral activities are outsourced to a variety of private firms, the responsibility
of delivered services and end results remains with public governments to reduce

governmental strain and size without a loss of effectiveness or regulatory control.
This is specifically exemplified in the utilization of independent environmental
cleanup managers (LSPs) in Massachusetts where a shift in responsibility to

alleviate demand on public agencies ultimately resulted in more work for the
government due to improper regulation over independent managers.
Contracting Theories
The following two sections discuss contracting concerns with respect to the

Summer Work Travel Program (SWTP) using a principal-agent framework to model

actions among SWTP administrators and transaction cost theory to specify

contractual aspects for consideration during the contracting process. This process
includes the contracting efforts of the U.S. State Department when selecting
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employment organizations to be designated as SWTP sponsors, allowing them to
employ J-1 visa holders. While a secondary level of contracting between SWTP

sponsors and third party vendors who recruit foreign students for SWTP is an issue,
this study focuses on the contracting between designated program administrators.
As this study uses participant satisfaction as integral to measuring sponsorship

status, it is posited that effective contracting between primary administrators will
have a trickle-down effect concerning opportunism exhibited by SWTP sponsors

with other entities. Following the discussion of both theories and the administration
of the Summer Work Travel Program, this study presents a discussion of those main
components that should be addressed through contracting both prior to program
operations and the monitoring and governance mechanisms that enforce
contractual agreements and determine degrees of contracting “success.”
Principal Agent Theory
Principal Agent Theory (PAT) in its modern form can be traced back to the

administrative guidelines of Max Weber (1922). Weber based his argument on a
situation with two entities, one with power and authority, and the other with

informational advantages. Weber sought to address the impact on performance and
efficiency when the entity with authority was separated from the entity holding
expertise. In later scholarly reviews this dichotomy was termed the “Weberian

asymmetry” (Miller 2005). Among the relationship described by Weber, two roles
were distinguished, that of “principal,” or the person in authority, and the “agent,”
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whose actions determine the payoff to the principal. The principal may attempt to
motivate the agent’s behavior with incentives or may through inaction allow the

agent to determine its actions from a wide set of choices that affect the principal’s

payoff. This classic arrangement introduces the idea of “agency costs,” or those costs
of trying to ensure the agent will act in the manner the principal would act if the
principal was able to undertake the action.

The central questions of agency theory explore the motivations and methods

the principal can adopt and implement in order to control agent behavior, best

characterized as “the principal’s problem” (Ross 1973). The principal’s problem can
be found in economic literature beginning with Spence and Zeckhauser (1971). The
examination of insurance literature offers a simple illustration of the problem, with
the companies providing automobile insurance (principals), and the clients or

drivers who take out policies (agents). Ideally, the agents would behave in the same

manner as the principal would if operating the automobile. The principal in this case
must develop a contract that motivates the agents to exercise caution. Some actions

the agent may adopt will increase the risk incurred by the principal, perhaps driving
under or over the speed limit or eating while driving. Such actions are termed

“moral hazard” (Spence Zeckhauser 1971). The principal (the insurance company)

can create incentives that reduce moral hazard, including low deductibles and safe
driving discounts that would be lost if a claim is made that involved negligent
behavior by the insured. A second form of moral hazard occurs when inferior

services are bought or sold due to information disadvantages. In the insurance
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example provided above, the driver may possess information that should lead to a
higher premium plan but, by omitting information, is able to receive a lower

premium plan. In this example, the insurance company would mitigate said risk by
asking many questions or performing background checks prior to offering the

insurance plan to minimize information asymmetry. The incongruence among the

two parties is often greater when one party is a public agency concerned with public
objectives of not only providing quality service, but doing so in addition at

determined service levels, whereas a private company may choose to sacrifice
quality to reduce costs.

S. A. Ross (1973) explicitly defined the concept of principal and agent in a

context of Pareto optimality representing the beginning of a shift from the classic

treatment of the firm as “black box.” Ross wrote of the internal dimensions of firms
that involve various relationships, conflicting interests and goals, and limited

information among actors that make it difficult to obtain such optimality. Ross
produced a series of equations that formally express the principal-agent

relationship (Ross 1973). Subsequent papers in economics outlined the tenets of
what is defined as the principal-agent model (Holmstrom 1979, Shavell 1979).

These include agent impact, information asymmetry, preference asymmetry, an

initiative that lies with the principal, ultimatum bargaining, and backward induction
based on common knowledge between both parties. Agent impact reflects the
situation in which actions by the agent determine the payoff to the principal.

Information asymmetry is the proposition that differences in information between
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the principal and agent lead to agent opportunism and difficulties in contract design
as the principal does not have access to the same information as the agent.

Preference asymmetry is incongruity in goal alignment between the principal and

agent, resulting in a need for monitoring or incentive use by the principal in order to
constrain opportunism. Both kinds of asymmetry are important for this study of the
Summer Work Travel Program.

The fourth component of the principal-agent model is the ability of the

principal to move first by offering a contract to the agent. This condition is

associated with the next component, ultimatum bargaining, or in contractual terms,
a contract offered to the agent on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.

The final component is backward induction based on common knowledge.

This component states that the principal and agent are both aware of the associated
costs, potential outcomes, and various parameters of the game. Thus, in contract

negotiations, the principal is able to determine the best possible outcome of agent
behavior among the agent’s capabilities and can design the contract to entice the

agent to maximize their efforts. Similarly, backwards induction allows the principal
to mitigate opportunities for agent opportunism, as the principal is aware of the
actions possible of the agent.

Eisenhardt made several major contributions to the development of

principal-agent theory. Eisenhardt (1958) provided a clear distinction between the
integrated organization and the principal-agent model based on the criteria of

measurability of outcomes and behaviors. Using data gathered from small retail
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chain stores, Eisenhardt focused on control and use of incentives. She distinguished
between behavior-based and outcome-based incentive systems and identified four

primary differences between principal-agent structures and more traditional

hierarchical structures. These differences included:

1) The link between structure and performance in principal-agent structures
compared to the more implicit and less performance-based traditional
structure;

2) A higher cost of measurement in traditional structures compared to
principal-agent structures;

3) Preference divergence in the principal-agent structure, compared to

preference convergence in a traditionally structured organization; and,

4) Information in principal-agent organizations that varies in detail with

respect to the number of actors and degree of inquiry, versus the simplistic
view of traditional structures as containing only a singular level of
information.

Eisenhardt’s second contribution (1989) was a summary of the literature

concerning principal-agent theory. Eisenhardt distinguished between two lines of

development in agency theory, a positivist approach and a principal-agent approach.
Positivist works are those that have identified situations in which the principal and
agent are likely to have conflicting goals but are less mathematically rigorous and
focus on the alignment of interests (Eisenhardt 1989). The work of Jensen and
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Meckling (1976) regarding ownership of the corporation and the alignment of

interests of managers and owners is considered influential in the positivist stream.
Fama (1980) addressed utilization of capital/labor markets as information

signaling mechanisms to control self-interest of executives. Using the work of

Alchian and Demsetz to frame the firm as a set of contracts, Fama drew a distinction

between risk-bearing and management as carried out by separate actors rather than
the classic “entrepreneur” that would own everything and also manage the firm,

thus policing shrinking out of his own self-interest. In doing so Fama presented the
firm as representative of multiple managers who, “face both the discipline and

opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside of
the firm (Fama 1980)." Jensen, Meckling, and Fama all focused on the corporate
structure to identify mechanisms that address the principal-agent problem in a

market context. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 60) develops an important proposition from
this line of inquiry; when the Principal-Agent (PA) contract is outcome-based or

when the principal has information to gauge agent behavior, the agent is more likely
to behave in the interests of the principal.

The second line of agency theory development concerns the selection of the

ideal contract with respect to behavior versus outcome based design options. Using
the assumptions of goal conflict, a measurable outcome, and a risk-averse agent,

Eisenhardt developed eight propositions, of which four are applicable to this work

(Eisenhardt 1989). The first relevant proposition is that informational systems are
positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome37

based contracts. This means that, when faced with lack of information regarding

agent actions, the principal may either invest in information gathering or employ a
contract based on the outcomes of the agent’s actions. The same can be stated for

outcome uncertainty, as when the agent is faced with high degrees of uncertainty an
outcome-based contract is preferred to behavior-based incentive contracts. The
second proposition is that as the principal becomes more risk-averse, it is

increasingly desirable to pass this risk onto the agent in the form of an outcome-

based contract. Thus risk aversion of the principal tends to result in outcome-based
contracts rather than behavior-based contracts (Eisenhardt 1989). The third
proposition is that goal conflict between principal and agent and the ease of

measurability of by which the principal may gauge the actions of agents are both

negatively related to behavior-based contracts and positively related to outcomebased contracts. When the principal is faced with uncertainty of the outcomes of
agents’ actions or these outcomes are difficult to measure, an outcome-based
contract is more effective than behavior-based contracts. Lastly, Eisenhardt

proposes that the length of the PA relationship is positively related to behavior-

based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. This proposition
rests upon the assumption that the principal is able to increase knowledge

pertaining to the agent’s actions with respect to time, so that agent behavior is more
easily determined, eliminating the need for outcome-based contracting as agent

performance is more predictable to the principal and thus using an incentive-based
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contract is preferred versus an outcome-based contract used when uncertainty of
outcomes is high Lambert 1983; Eisenhardt 1989).

As the principal-agent model moved from economics to political science

there has been an extension of the theory to discuss interactions between various
types of actors. It is the administrative relationship between public and private

entities that is relevant to this study. In terms of the Summer Work Travel Program
the “principal” is the U.S. State Department, a public entity, and the “agents” of

interest are both private third-party placement firms (located both domestically and
internationally) and the SWTP sponsors, (work organizations employing

participants). The application of principal-agent theory to the public-private

dynamic is an extension of work from Downs and Rocke, who first applied the

theory in a political science context. Framing the chief executive of the government,
the President, as an agent beholden to the constituency (the principal) he/she

serves and represents, sanctioned only in terms of removal from office, Downs and
Rocke describe the “agent” in this model as having unobservable behaviors but

measureable outcomes in terms of the success of the executive’s decision-making.
The principal should contract in terms of outcomes rather than behavior because
measurability of agent behavior is low. The authors cite the example of

“punishment” or the act of voting the executive out of office if well intentioned plans
result in failure, even if this action makes both parties worse off. This punishment is
intended to ensure that future executives are not incentivized by moral hazard
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problems while operating under the same outcome-based contract with information
asymmetry (Downs & Rocke 1994, p. 373).

Two extensions of principal agent theory conclude this literature overview of

agency theory and its move from economics to political science. One is an analysis of
the Federal Trade Commission by Weingast and Morgan in 1983 and the second is

an analysis of the Securities and Exchange Commission by Weingast in 1984. Other
scholars, including Eisenhardt (1989) and Miller (2005), believed that Weingast’s
focus on the implications of information asymmetry for these regulatory agencies

resulted in the application of agency theory to Congressional oversight operations
as well as bureaucratic politics. While Congressional oversight was traditionally
seen as ineffective, Weingast reformulated this ineffectiveness as a lack of

monitoring rather than a lack of control. In the analysis of the FTC, the authors state
that Congressional committees “possess sufficient rewards and sanctions to create
an incentive system for agencies” (Weingast, BR & Morgan 1983, p. 768). They

suggest the desirability of a shift in focus of such committees to outcomes rather

than an examination of inputs. In the SEC paper, Weingast is more direct about the

specific incentives influencing regulatory agencies. He defines them as bureaucratic
competition for budgetary appropriations, Congressional influence on bureaucratic
appointments, and the threat of ex-post sanctions in the form of hearings and
investigations (Weingast 1984).

A summary of principal agent literature produces a number of considerations

that are directly applicable to the modeling of the actions of administrative actors in
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the Summer Work Travel Program. These include the influential variables that

determine the nature of both the input (contract design and its governance) and

output (the experience of SWTP participants) between the principal and agent(s).
Among these variables are goal alignment, asset specificity, moral hazard,

information and preference asymmetry, incentives and coercive actions, and

monitoring. These variables all determine the costs to the principal as well as the

best formation of a contract to align the actions of the agent(s) with the goals of the
principal.

Transaction Cost Theory
To apply these insights to the Summer Work Travel Program, a second line of

inquiry in the economics of contracts was used (Williamson 1975, 1985). How can

the contract between the principal and agents be designed in a manner that
minimizes transaction costs regarding the Summer Work Travel Program’s
administration and/or operations?

The focus in principal-agent theory is on the relationship between two or

more parties who enter into an agreement for the provision of goods and services.
The principal-agent relationship is governed by a contract between these two

entities such that the agent is driven to perform as the principal would if able to

conduct all tasks itself. This study focuses on analyzing the existing administrative
structure of the Summer Work Travel Program using the principal-agent model

based on certain criteria by which such contracting should be designed (or
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redesigned if necessary). An initial criterion is the ability to create an effective longlasting relationship between the employing sponsor and U.S State Department for

Summer Work Travel Program that benefits the participants in terms of cultural and
educational exchange. An additional primary criterion is the minimization of

transaction costs, or those costs associated with economic exchange, exhibited in
the works of Oliver Williamson (Wiliamson, 1975,1985) and his mentor, Ronald
Coase (Douma & Schreuder 2010).

John Commons introduced transaction costs, defined as the costs of

participating in the market, in 1931. Commons identified transactions as “the

alienation and acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of property and liberty
created by society, which must therefore be negotiated between the parties

concerned before labor can produce, or consumers can consume, or commodities be
physically exchanged” (Commons, 1931, p. 649). According to Williamson,

transaction-cost economics treats the transaction as the unit of analysis and regards
governance as the means used to achieve order with respect to potential conflicts

that may “undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains” (Williamson, 1998,

p.22). Here the focus is on those transaction costs associated with contract design
and negotiations between the government and third parties. While Williamson

began focusing on the application of transaction costs to the classic “make or buy”
decision of the firm, this study assumes the “buy” decision as its starting point for
discussion.
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Transaction cost analysis originally focused on the decision to internalize or

externalize production among private sector entities, but the transaction costs logic
can be applied to similar issues facing governments (Williamson 1985). While
governments are perhaps more complex, more restricted in decision-making

options and processes, and typically have ambitious goals that are not always
congruent with those of their external agents, governments are nonetheless

purposive organizations that seek to reduce uncertainty risks (Rainey 1991, p.73).
Transaction cost theory is utilized in congruence with agency theory in this

study to determine the costs of monitoring, evaluation, and forms of supervision to
be determined by the U.S. State Department and specified in contracting between

Summer Work Travel Program administrators. While agency theory is used to frame
the points of discussion in this study, transaction cost theory provides a set of
criteria for measurement and selection among various options. The contract

between sponsors and the U.S. State Department is the vehicle through which the

detrimental effects of uncertainty and asymmetry in preferences and information
are to be minimized. The study of transactions costs can identify some of the less
costly ways of producing desired outcomes.

Transaction cost analysis examines: (1) service-specific characteristics such

as asset specificity and service measurability; (2) goal conflict and information

asymmetry; and, (3) shirking problems, including ex-ante concerns of measurement,
and contract design and intent, as well as ex-post concerns of moral hazard, all of

which affect the costs of monitoring and contract outcomes. This discussion helps to
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identify governance options regarding contract adherence and mechanisms
available for agent monitoring.

Service-Specific Characteristics
Asset specificity and service measurability are service-specific characteristics

covered extensively by Williamson in Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1981).

Asset specificity can be defined here as the transferability of assets that support a
given transaction. Asset specificity has been refined to three forms of specificity,

including human specificity, physical specificity, and procedural specificity (Grover,
2003). Human specificity such as the training of personnel to carry out or produce

the asset is of particular interest in this study of the Summer Work Travel Program.

The “training” of personnel to accommodate those international students in terms of
orientation to work and cultural practices among their new settings is a behavior
desired but difficult to measure or identify. Physical specificity, the investment of

capital in physical structures or items relevant to the transaction, is not particularly

relevant to the Summer Work Travel Program as investment in physical assets is not
a major consideration. Procedural specificity, wherein parties develop specific

actions unique to the relationship, reflects the disadvantage of the State Department
in future rounds of contracting with SWTP sponsors. When sponsors are able to

determine the practices of monitoring and evaluation of the State Department, they
may relax or ignore orientation and accommodation support (not measured by the
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State Department) that participants find helpful, presenting increased opportunities
for potential non-compliance.

With respect to the Summer Work Travel Program, the asset contracted for is

sponsorship designation and subsequent employment of foreign participants. As the
construction of job placements in cultural and educational exchange are beyond the
purview of the U.S. State Department, it can be concluded there is a low degree of

asset specificity. Brown and Potoski (2003) posit that greater asset specificity in the
production of a good or service increases the government’s reliance on internal
service production.

The second service-specific characteristic is that of service measurability.

Measurability itself is a core component of principal-agent models. Services that are
easily measured are contracted for between parties in terms of performance

measures. If service measurability is low, the ability to specify contractual objectives
and expectations becomes increasingly difficult (Praeger, 1994). Similarly, when
measurability of the quality of services is low, the risk of opportunism of agents

under contract increases. Service measurability directly relates to the frequency of
monitoring and enforcement undertaken by the principal. When outputs or

monitoring practices are frequent, the degree to which the principal can determine
the desired methods that produce positive outputs can be more effectively

determined. When output or monitoring is infrequent, the inputs that determine the
service alignment with the principal’s desires are more difficult to specify both in

initial contracts and in subsequent negotiations. Here the distinction must be made
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between service measurability in terms of required inputs for effective service

delivery (such as educational and cultural exchange) versus the measurability of

service inputs. As inputs may vary and do not directly produce desired outcomes,

contractual design must be less concerned with the requirement of inputs and more
concerned with the measurement of outcomes when determining contract
effectiveness.

As there is no definitive system of measurement to determine the desired

degrees of cultural and educational exchange, output in the study presented in this
dissertation is measured using participant feedback. Thus, when designing the

contract between the principal and agents in the Summer Work Travel Program, the
value of the service (both quantity and quality) is best measured by its output.
Satisfaction survey data was collected in this study to determine the quality of

service outputs produced by the agents. Brown and Potoski observed, “As services
become more difficult to measure, governments produce more services through
joint contracting (joint contracting rather than internal production)” (Brown &
Potoski, 2003, p.445).

Goal Conflict and Information Asymmetry
The second set of criteria under transaction costs theory are those related to

goal conflict or goal incongruence. In Managerial Dilemmas: The political economy of
hierarchy, Miller (1992) describes principal-agent theory as the cousin of

transaction cost theory, because it focuses on situations where principals direct the
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behavior of agents. This includes information asymmetries and goal incongruence
between principals and agents that increase the cost of monitoring and

measurement in order to see if goals are being met. Private firms, unlike public

agencies, may deliver a lower-quality service in order to reduce their costs and raise

profits (Cohen 2003; Light 2000). When the goals of the contracting parties are
similar, the degree to which a contract must be specific regarding detailed

procedures, expected outcomes, and other characteristics is lower. When the goals
of the two parties conflict, however, the degree of contract specificity must be

higher in order to prevent exploitation, or with respect to principal-agent theory, to
minimize actions taken by the agent that are inconsistent with the way in which the
principal would act if it would conduct the activities itself.

The combination of goal incongruence and information asymmetry increases

the transactions costs of contract design, monitoring and measurement. In the case
of the Summer Work Travel Program, the amount of information the employing
sponsors have access to regarding the recruitment practices of third party

placement organizations, the efforts undertaken to achieve program goals, and

participants’ experiences, is far greater than the information the State Department

has concerning the selection of SWTP participants. Similarly, the information about

program operations once participants arrive in the U.S., particularly with respect to
the mutual exchange of cultural values and educational ideals, is unknown to the
State Department, which mainly derives its information retroactively after

complaints are made public. The degree of information asymmetry partially
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determines the degree of preference asymmetry or goal conflict. When the

preferences of private firms in the SWTP may result in a lower quality of services
provided than those the principal would prefer, a higher degree of detail and
specificity of contracting between the two parties is required. Thus goal

incongruence is a major determinant of transaction costs in the Summer Work

Travel Program administrative actors and contract design between the two entities.
The administrative relationships in the Summer Work Travel Program are

undoubtedly characterized by a large degree of information asymmetry and goal

conflict, as the U.S. State Department and those employing sponsors differ greatly in
mission focus. Mission focus, a descriptive of goal conflict or preference asymmetry,
is used here as an overarching term for differing foundational natures of a public
entity and a private firm. The private firm, the SWTP sponsor, is an entity based

around efficiency and profit-seeking behaviors. The public organization, the U.S.
State Department, is concerned with effectiveness due to its public nature. As a

governmental entity overseeing all SWTP operations, its focus on effectiveness is

related to the degree of risk and accountability for program successes and failures,
despite the identity of the true culprit. Thus, while cost-saving measures are a

concern, they are not as important to the State Department as administering an
effective program that meets its legislative goals, without exploitation that may

result in reputation damage of the government as the purveyor of public programs.
This degree of difference in mission goals, preferences, or objectives is quite vast.
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Shirking and Opportunism
A noteworthy concept in agency theory germane to the discussion of

transaction costs with respect to contracting is that of moral hazard. As economist

Paul Krugman defines it, “Moral hazard refers to any situation in which one person

makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost
if things go badly” (Krugman 2009, p.3). Moral hazard reflects agent proclivities to
shirk responsibility after the contract has been finalized. Augmented by a lack of

governance and monitoring by the principal, moral hazard situations in the Summer
Work Travel Program have festered over the years as sponsors have become more
familiar with the program’s operations and the U.S. State Department’s limited

monitoring/governance activities to ensure contract adherence. Another definition
given by James Glassman is helpful; ‘What moral hazard means is that, if you

cushion the consequences of bad behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior.
The lesson of moral hazard is that less is more (Glassman 1996, p. 269).” Moral

hazard calls for a reflection on the type of contract chosen to govern administrative
relationships in the Summer Work Travel Program, as the contract specifies the

methods of observing agent behaviors or outcomes and the mechanism through

which they occur. Given the growth in participation of the SWTP, it is important to
minimize the “encouragement of bad behavior” as the program’s capacity grows.
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Contract Design
Contracting literature concerning government actions has largely focused on

the neoclassical “make or buy” determination. In this study, the SWT Program’s

organizational structure is rigid due to the nature of its objectives – the placement of
individuals in opportunities for employment that expose them to mutual

educational and cultural exchanges. Due to the necessary integration of private

employers, the make or buy decision with respect to the legislative objectives of the
SWTP results in the “buying” of services through contracting with private sponsors.
These designated sponsors then contract out recruitment services to third party

placement agents to access international communities. This study’s focus is on the

contract between the U.S. State Department and those employing entities that wish
to become Summer Work Travel Program sponsors, a contract that specifies the

terms and conditions under which the program is to be carried out. In designing and
critiquing the contract between the government and SWTP sponsors, it is first

helpful to establish the criteria of the relationship that must be addressed with
respect to the objectives of the relationship.

It should first be established that a contractual relationship between the

State Department and employment entities is necessary to achieve the objectives of
the SWTP. Educational exchange, cultural exchange, and the promotion of peace

through work in the USA, are key objectives of the Summer Work Travel Program’s
underlying legislation, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.

To achieve these objectives, the State Department’s Bureau of Cultural Affairs offers
50

sponsorship status to employing organizations that qualify (by filling out required

paperwork) for designation. The act of offering sponsorship is the point at which the
contractual analyses of this study beings. The following sections address the content
and implementation of the contract. The first section considers those concerns that
must be specified in the contractual agreement ex-ante. The second focuses on the

enforcement of the contract’s implementation, or those concerns that can be labeled
ex-post.

Ex-ante Concerns

Ex-ante contracting concerns are those defined as concerns prior to the

occurrence of the event. In the SWTP agreement, the ex-ante concerns are the

arrival and placement of the Summer Work Travel Program participants. These

experiences or “outputs” of participation while employed with the sponsor are also
ex-ante concerns, as their measurement must effectively provide insight related to
sponsor performance. Specifying the methods and frequencies of such evaluative

methods is an integral part of initial contract design, specifically when establishing
criteria for future rounds of contracting. A number of aspects must be considered
before the design of a contract between the U.S. State Department and potential
SWTP sponsors.

We have already considered the following ex-ante primary concerns in the

prior discussions of principal-agent and transaction cost theories: asset specificity,

service measurability, information asymmetry, goal conflict (mission focus

asymmetry), opportunism, and moral hazard. The next section discusses additional
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concerns of contract design: the scope and scale of specified arrangements, the
organizational structure of the SWTP, competition for contracts, and the
measurement of outcomes and agent behaviors.

The scope and scale of the project are important concerns in contract design

between multiple parties. The scope of the contract for Summer Work Travel

Program includes the recruitment and employment of international students who
qualify for the J-1 visa for a period of four months. The scope of the contract

embraces a number of activities contracted out to SWTP sponsors, including a

variety of activities of the employing entity that are focused on profit maximization

which they may not be equipped to handle. These SWTP sponsors have an incentive
to engage in further rounds of contracting with outside parties to fill gaps in their
service delivery capacities. When inputs cannot be detailed, the specification of
services expected when inputs cannot be detailed can establish concretely the
expectations of the principal. This ability to detail the desired outputs but not

necessarily inputs leads to contract design that focused on outcome-based reward

structures.

The second aspect of contract design concerning SWTP administrators is that

of scale. Certain activities may be cost prohibitive to the sponsor to offer or conduct
independent of outside help. For example, when SWTP participants first arrive in

the United States, sponsors must arrange for their transportation and orientation.
The personnel of the employing SWTP sponsor may not have the expertise

necessary to introduce foreigners to the United States, particularly when faced with
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language difficulties. A third party may more effectively conduct this activity with

higher degrees of specialization regarding these required actions. As the principal
offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the agent, the principal must determine the
manner in which such services should be conducted. Otherwise there is a risk of

underperformance if SWTP sponsors are left to determine methods of introduction
of foreign students to the United States based on cost-saving calculations that may
result in ineffectiveness.

Inherent in the discussion of the proper division of services is the

organizational structure of the Summer Work Travel Program. The structure is

hierarchical in nature, with the principal, the U.S. State Department, at the top of the
structure and the SWTP participants at the bottom. The organizational nature of the
program positions a number of entities between participants and the U.S. State

Department, which may distort or mismanage feedback information that could be
useful in making program improvements or modifications. It is the outsourcing of
SWTP responsibilities to the various entities that distances the State Department

from those most adept to evaluate its successes or failures, suggesting a necessary
correction in the reporting/feedback organizational structure. Feedback is one

component that should be outlined prior to contracting. As cited In the Department

of Defense and presidential “competitive sourcing” agendas, the distinction between
core and peripheral services presents a method by which the principal can specify
directions for services not vital to core operations of the SWTP sponsor. As these

sponsors are primarily profit-seeking organizations concerned with efficiency, their
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ability to find quality housing and other accommodations may be compromised by
their business orientation regarding cost-effectiveness.

By determining through contracting which activities are core versus

peripheral, the principal may be better able to specify what services the sponsors
may contract out and those services they must perform internally to fulfill their
obligations. In its current form the SWTP leaves all contracting decisions to the

sponsors, producing mixed results as sponsors choose the quality and providers of
services using their own criteria and discretion. Thus the core versus peripheral
distinction is a helpful tool for not only future SWTP administrative alignment

overall, but also for the specification of necessary services participants must receive,

and which entity (internal producer or external organizations) is best suited in
meeting the needs of the participants. A consideration of the organizational

structure and capacity of administrators In the Summer Work Travel Program

constructively prompts questions such as, “Should the employer who operates a
restaurant also be the procurer of housing and laundry services for SWTP

participants, and if this decision is left to sponsors’ discretion, is this in the best
interest of the participants?”

The degree to which competition is present when agents are selected for

contracting is another component that may determine transaction costs. When large
numbers of potential sponsors for the SWT Program are present and desire to

contract with the U.S. State Department, a competitive process for contracts can

produce desirable results for the principal. Entities wishing to enter into the SWT
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Program would theoretically examine the services they offer in order to provide a
case for their selection versus other “bidders.” If potential sponsors operate in an
environment in which others are willing to take over their responsibilities if

necessary, an added performance incentive is present. Furthermore, when multiple
“bidders” are present, the principal can learn more about the inputs that are

required for service provision using comparative methods. When competition for
contracts is non-existent, the opposite outcome can be hypothesized. Without

concern for other sponsors supplanting their place, agents may initially falsely

advertise their capabilities resulting in poor agent selection by the principal, or may
gain the contract yet put forth only the least amount of effort necessary to honor its
obligations in order to maximize profits. In the Summer Work Travel Program, this
form of exploitation may be the simple use of participants as employees without
concerns for the objectives of the Summer Work Travel Program.

Perhaps the most relevant point regarding the Summer Work Travel

Program and competition is the way in which contracts are offered to potential

sponsors. Absent any competition from other potential sponsors, organizations

apply for sponsorship status and are required to simply pay a fee if approved for

entrance into the program. Thus, the selection process of the U.S. State Department
negates the potential advantages of competition for Summer Work Travel Program

sponsorship. The current process of sponsor designation and the automatic renewal
of sponsorship status is as simple as giving automatic approval upon the absence of
any negative feedback, a procedure that offers no incentive to provide participants
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with a good experience. Thus, as organizations become embedded in program

operations, they become increasingly able to put forth a minimum effort while
avoiding detection. The introduction of competition into the contract bidding

process would require a method of measurability In the Summer Work Travel
Program that is not presently available.

Ex-Post Options & Determinants
This section details ex-post contracting concerns and their relationship to the

type of contract design selected. Contract design influences the mechanisms
available for the measurement process, methods of governance for contract

enforcement, and subsequent rounds of contracting with Summer Work Travel

Program sponsors. A concern of the principal in agency theory is its ability to select

the best product when faced with limited information. These “products,” in terms of
the Summer Work Travel Program, are the employing sponsors chosen by the U.S.
State Department to implement the SWT Program (who subsequently select
placement agents to recruit students for employment).

When sponsors are under-monitored and improperly governed to manage

potentially opportunistic behavior, the appropriate selection of sponsors is difficult

to determine (Fama & Jenson 1983). This form of behavior can take place before the
contract is signed between the State Department and the sponsor as well as

afterwards when contracts are renegotiated. Absent information about the quality
of services provided, the principal has no definitive method of measuring agent
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performance. Once the agent is aware of the monitoring practices of the principal,
the agent’s intentions may be made more difficult to determine. The more

embedded the agent becomes in the program, the greater is the importance of
contract design and its governance in order to minimize moral hazard. The

measurement aspect of contracting includes two important aspects, the ability to
gauge performance and the contract design through which measurement
mechanisms are detailed.
Measurement
While the nature of measuring the service in the SWTP has been covered

previously under the service-measurability section of service-specific

characteristics, the methods undertaken must be specified prior to the completion
of contracting so that both principal and agent are aware of both the criteria by
which agents are evaluated and also the methods by which such criteria is

ascertained. Monitoring and governance are two popular approaches to assessing
agent results (Williamson 1985).

Monitoring may be physical or technological in nature, either conducted

through field visits or the establishment of a third party to address the task

independently of both principal and agent. Technological monitoring may include
the input by sponsors or participants of actions, conditions, and general feedback

regarding their experiences with respect to a number of aspects. Currently a form of
technological monitoring exists for the SWTP in the form of the SEVIS database;
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however, it is not used for monitoring purposes. Containing the location and

background information of the participants, SEVIS does not detail specific work

placements or actual jobs undertaken, the quality of services provided, or any form
of post-participation feedback. It instead consists entirely of information

determined prior to the SWTP participants’ arrival. After the experience, distinction
of core versus peripheral services and possible subsequent rounds of contracting,
the common denominator in all activities (the SWTP participants themselves)

should be interviewed. Although they are directly impacted in every aspect of the
program detailed thus far, currently no method of accessing this population for
information of any kind has been implemented.
Contract Design
The second aspect of contract measurement is the type of contract offered to

agents by the principal. The contract type varies greatly among different types of
firms. PepsiCo, with an entrepreneurial style of decision-making, relies upon

incentive- based contracts. General Motors adopts a more bureaucratic approach,
where employees have less incentive to take risks and rely more on established

procedures presented by the authority figures or supervisors. Southwest Airlines,

which emphasizes a teamwork or collaborative relationship, presents a mixture of
both incentive and bureaucratic contracting examples (Miller 2005).

In the principal agent literature, solutions to overcoming the agency dilemma

include “buying-in” options where the reward to the agent is linked to the goals of
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the principal through profit sharing or stock distribution. Linking agent

performance to overall organizational performance reduced the incentive to shirk

because it is counterproductive to the agent’s profit-seeking objectives (Eisenhardt
1989). This “buying-in” option resolves the need for precise input measurement;
however, initial requirements for linkage to overall organization performance

requires a more cumbersome entry examination of the agent’s abilities to minimize
the possibility that the agent under-performs while part of the organization.

A second solution to the agency dilemma is to provide incentives to the agent

to undertake actions similar to those the principal would take if it had complete
control (Eisenhardt 1988). This solution focuses more on the measurement of
inputs. The use of desired inputs is rewarded, while using those inputs not

preferred induces sanctions or absence of incentives. This contract design requires

definitive determinations of goals, objectives, and most importantly, a clear picture
of the proper means to achieve the determined goals. This form of contract is used
when the agents’ actions are easily determined as potentially yielding positive or
negative results, and is most appropriate when such behaviors are not

commonplace (and thus trust is lower than in an outcome-based contractual
relationship).

In light of the difficulty in determining the inputs for satisfying the objectives

of the Summer Work Travel Program, it appears the incentive-based contract would
not adequately curtail opportunism. The principal in the SWTP, the U.S. State

Department, is unable to monitor the efforts undertaken by each agent, a SWTP
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sponsor. Instead the outcome-based contract design seems more suitable, given that
outcomes are measured objectively and independently for reference against other

agents’ performances, thus providing the principal a degree of measurement to use
in future rounds of contracting for SWTP sponsorship.
Summary
This literature review has addressed the theoretical constructs that guide the

design and analyses of this study. The literature review began with a brief

introduction to the SWTP and the sentiments of its detractors and supporters. It

next moved from general discussions of the history of privatization to the growth of

contracting in the United States. To highlight the growth of government outsourcing
by contract, the case study of environmental cleanup in Massachusetts, the growth
of contracting to provide national defense services, and finally the growth of

privately run prison systems were presented. The literature review also discussed

the contributions of two contracting theories, Agency theory and Transaction-Cost

Theory. The administrative dynamic of the principal and its agent provided two key
concepts that lead to opportunism discussed later in this study’s analyses:

information asymmetry and preference asymmetry. Transaction Cost Theory
presented a foundation for contract design considerations between two

administrative entities and the methods by which monitoring and measurement of
agent actions and performance could take place. The final portion of the literature
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review presented considerations with respect to before and after a contract is

implemented to govern the actions of two parties. The ex-ante concerns included

the scope and scale of the program, the organizational structure of the program, and

the degree of competition present. Ex-post concerns included methods of measuring
adherence to the contract and how its design dictates the available tools to measure
performance. These concepts are applied to this study’s approach to examine the

administrative relationships of the Summer Work Travel Program and its ability to
meet its legislative objectives.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter presents the research design and processes used to answer the

research questions of this study. This chapter describes the research methodology
of the sample and the sample selection process, the procedures and instruments
used for data collection, and the statistical procedures used for data analyses.

It is important to begin by highlighting the issues encountered concerning

access to SWTP data sources. This study found the controlled release or limited

authorization to the SEVIS database to be a serious obstacle to academic research
and analyses. Without rigorous academic analysis and research using statistical
inferences for past data trends, only cross-sectional studies with low levels of

reliability can be conducted. Contact with the program participants was also nearly
impossible due to the lack of access to data regarding their time of entry or the

location of their placement. Even designated sponsor locations/contact information
are not released for earlier years and can only be accessed through an interactive
map of the United States provided on the State Department’s J-1 visa “Facts and

Figures” website (http://j1visa.state.gov/basics/facts-and-figures/).

Thus, the research design used for this study was determined after various

alternative data collection techniques were considered and found unfeasible. In

attempts to gather Summer Work Travel Program data regarding participants, eight
total requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) were submitted to the
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State Department requesting records indicating where the participants were placed
after arrival to the United States. Additional requests were made to the State

Department in the form of FOIA requests and direct correspondences with program
officials appealing for limited access to the SEVIS database. The results of the FOIA

requests and individual correspondences led to two conclusions. The first was that
there is a gap in the data available before the 2003 implementation of SEVIS when
records were digitized and aggregated as well as a gap in variables collected after
the creation of SEVIS. Variables of significance missing from datasets include any
data collected in the form of feedback after the participant’s stay is over, data

related to academic study and relativity to work placement, and data regarding

participant placement categorized by U.S. State of employment for years prior to

2012. All FOIA requests made for the purposes of this study, including requests for
data from previous years displayed on the J-1 Visa website for 2012, were denied.
Research Design
This study uses a quasi-experimental cross-sectional mixed-methods

research design. Mixed methods research designs include both quantitative and

qualitative forms of inquiry in tandem so the overall strength of a study is greater

than either qualitative or quantitative research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). This
study used both qualitative and quantitative forms of analyses, and “triangulation,”
as a component of the research design (Creswell 2009). Also referred to as

“confirmation,” “disconfirmation,” “cross-validation,” or “collaboration,” this
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approach draws conclusions using both quantitative and qualitative methods first

individually, collecting and analyzing data respectively, and then comparing results

from each form of analysis to determine any convergences, differences, or

combinations of both (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Morgan, 1998; Steckler,

McLeroy, Goodman, Bird, & McCormick 1992). Triangulation in this study included

the use of quantitative survey data, qualitative individual and group interviews, and
secondary sources from academic, educational, government and non-government
organizations, as well as popular news sources, to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the study’s research questions.

The employment of a mixed method research design reflects a pragmatic

research philosophy. As stated by many researchers, a pragmatic research approach
arises out of actions, situations, and consequences, and is prescriptive

(Cherryholmes, 1992; Patton, 1990). Of particular note are the writings of

Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), who convey the importance of focusing attention on
the research problem in social science research and then using pluralistic

approaches to derive knowledge about the problem (Morgon 2007). The use of a
mixed-methods research design is used in this study to gather as much data as

possible about the participants’ Summer Work Travel Program experiences. This
data was analyzed independently to draw conclusions from the three distinct

approaches used in data collection and for analyses. This presented an opportunity
to compare the conclusions from each data source to confirm or disconfirm the
individual findings.
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Triangulation
The concept of “triangulation” is an integral part of this study’s research

design. The term “triangulation” can be traced to a 1959 article where social

scientists Campbell and Fiske introduced the idea of triangulation and that of
“multiple operationalism,” the idea of using multiple methods to strengthen

research conclusions (Campbell & Fiske 1959). Their approach was further detailed
in 1966 by Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest, who defined multiple

operationalism as using multiple methods that are, “hypothesized to share in the
theoretically relevant components but have different patterns of irrelevant
components (Webb et al, 1966).”

Jick states, “The most prevalent attempts to use triangulation have been

reflected in efforts to integrate fieldwork and survey methods (Jick 1979:1).” The
viability and necessity of such linkages have been advocated by various social
scientists (Vidich and Shapiro, 1955; Reiss, 1968; McCall and Simmons, 1969;
Diesing, 1971; Sieber, 1973). This study utilizes Denzin’s (1978) definition of
triangulation as, “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same

phenomenon.” Denzin is also credited with differentiating between “within-methods
triangulation,” wherein differing methods are used in qualitative or quantitative

research designs, and that of “between-methods triangulation,” in which varying
research methods among both qualitative and quantitative research are used

(Denzin 1978:41). With respect to Denzin’s distinctions, this study has adopted a

triangulation method best described as “between-methods” as it uses quantitative
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and qualitative research techniques as well as “within methods” as it uses more than
one qualitative and quantitative research approach in its triangulation design.

This study uses the research approach of triangulation to strengthen the

validity of concurrently generated results through the mixed methods of data

collection. By designing this study’s data collection procedures such that each data
source can be analyzed to confirm or disconfirm the results of one another’s

conclusions, the conclusions presented are strengthened in terms of their validity,
reliability, and overall quality. Furthermore the reliability of the study’s methods
and analyses are easily determined by replicating the analysis of the three data

sources used in this study; quantitative data, qualitative data, and secondary-source
data.

Research Questions
This study uses a mixed-method research design to address the study’s first

objective of determining the success of the Summer Work Travel Program in

achieving its authorizing legislative goals regarding mutual educational, cultural

exchange, and the promotion of peace. It is also used to address the second research
question that seeks to determine the aspects of the Summer Work Travel Program
participants that affects program success.

This study was guided by the following research questions:
1.

“Does the Summer Work Travel Program meet the objectives of its authorizing
legislation?”
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1.1 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to educational exchange during their participation periods?”
1.2 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to cultural exchange during their participation periods?”
1.3 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to the promotion of peace during their participation periods?”
2.

“What aspects of the Summer Work Travel Program participants affect program
success?”

2.1 “How do the identified participants’ aspects affect Summer Work Travel Program
success?”
2.1a

“Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate information asymmetry
between the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program
sponsors?”

2.1b “Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate preference asymmetry between
the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program sponsors?”

Hypotheses
The following hypotheses are tested to answer the second research question,
“Does the Summer Work Travel Program meet the objectives of its authorizing
legislation?”

To answer this question the following hypotheses were developed to answer
individual research questions 1.1-1.3:
1. HO: The mean satisfaction score for Overall SWTP is greater than or equal to
3, “Average/Neutral.”
HA: The mean satisfaction score for Overall SWTP is less than 3,
“Average/Neutral.”
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1.1 HO: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Educational Exchange is greater
than or equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.”

HA: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Educational Exchange is less than
3, “Average/Neutral.”

1.2 HO: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Cultural Exchange is greater than
or equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.”
HA: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Cultural Exchange is less than 3,
“Average/Neutral.”

1.3 HO: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Promotion of Peace is greater
than or equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.”

HA: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Promotion of Peace is less than 3,
“Average/Neutral.”

The following hypotheses are tested to answer the second research question,

“What aspects of the Summer Work Travel Program participants affect program
success?”
The second research question seeks to determine whether participants’

demographic characteristics are statistically significant in determining satisfaction
scores. This research question is answered by developing the following testable
hypotheses:
2a.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for university placements than independent placements

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for university placements than independent placements
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H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for government placements than independent placements
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for government placements than independent placements

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for sponsor-direct placements than independent
placements
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for sponsor-direct placements than independent
placements

2b. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for males than females.
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for males for females.

2c. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those with no prior knowledge of the SWTP versus
those with prior knowledge of the SWTP.
HA Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those with no prior knowledge of the SWTP versus
those with prior knowledge of the SWTP.

2d. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those at middle of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those at middle of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those in the end of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those in the end of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.
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2e. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those with no contacts in the USA than those with
contacts in the USA.

2f.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those with no contacts in the USA than those with
contacts in the USA.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for age group 21-23 than age group 18-20.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for age group 24-23 than age group 18-20.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for age group 24-27 than age group 18-20.
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for age group 24-27 than age group 18-20.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for age group >=28 than age group 18-20.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for age group >=28 than age group 18-20.
The following hypotheses are tested to answer the research question,

“How do the identified participants’ aspects affect Summer Work Travel Program
success?”
It does this using the following research questions,
2.1a

“Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate information asymmetry
between the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program
sponsors?”

2.1b

“Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate preference asymmetry between
the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program sponsors?”
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The use of agency theory presents the concepts of informational asymmetry

and preference asymmetry between the U.S. State Department and Summer Work
Travel Program sponsors. The operationalization of the “information” and

“preference” composite variables are described in table 3.2. The following

questions addressed the second research question and were used to develop the
following hypotheses:
2.1a

H0: Intermediate placement agent choice exemplifies no informational
asymmetry between Summer Work Travel Program sponsors and the U.S.
State Department as determined by satisfaction scores.
HA: Intermediate placement agent choice exemplifies informational
asymmetry between Summer Work Travel Program sponsors and the U.S.
State Department as determined by satisfaction scores.

2.1b H0: Intermediate placement agent choice exemplifies no preference
asymmetry between Summer Work Travel Program sponsors and the U.S.
State Department as determined by satisfaction scores.

HA: Intermediate placement agent choice exemplifies preference asymmetry
between Summer Work Travel Program sponsors and the U.S. State
Department as determined by satisfaction scores.
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Operationalization of the Research Variables
The operationalization of variables to determine the satisfaction of the

legislative goals of the Summer Work Travel Program reflects the measuring of

“satisfaction.” To determine the degree each legislative goal is met, participants
were asked to determine how “satisfied” the program adequately reflected its

legislative goals during their experience in the SWTP. Possible responses included

ordinal selections from 1 to 5, where 1= extremely unsatisfied, 3= average/neutral,
and 5= extremely satisfied. Program goals were considered to be met if averaged

satisfaction scores produced results higher than “average/neutral,” and not met if
averaged satisfaction scores produced results lower than the score of “3,” or,
“average/neutral.”

To describe whether any aspects of Summer Work Travel Program

participants predict higher or lower satisfaction scores, those variables with the

demographic questions of the survey were utilized. Demographic characteristics of

SWTP participants include age range, gender, prior knowledge of the Summer Work
Travel Program, contact with any USA resident or family member in the USA,

progress towards degree completion, and the type of intermediary placement agent
used to enter the SWTP. Potential responses for the six demographic variables are
provided in table 3.1, “Research Question 2 Variables.”

The operationalization of the independent variables for the second portion of

the second primary research question components (2.1a, 2.1b) includes a
distinction brought from agency literature, that of “principal” and “agent”
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administrators, and a focus on the delegation of responsibility and interactions

between administrative actors. Utilizing the principal agent framework, the second
research question includes the operationalization of two components found in

principal-agent literature; information asymmetry and preference asymmetry.

The independent variables for the second set of research questions are the

utilization of intermediary placement agents chosen by Summer Work Travel
Program sponsors. These intermediary placement agents are categorized as

independent, university-affiliated, government-affiliated, or affiliated directly with
the employing SWTP sponsor. These independent third parties, such as travel

agencies or academic departments in foreign universities, may present the Summer
Work Travel Program in any respect. The four types of intermediary placement
agents are as follows:

The first independent variable is “Independent Placement Agent.” This term

refers to the intermediary placement agents used by sponsors to recruit and present
participants for employment. “Independent Placement Agents” are those agents that
have no affiliation with any university, government agency, or directly with the
sponsor. They are often organizations such as travel agencies that present the

Summer Work Travel Program as a “travel-abroad” opportunity or a trip to explore
the USA (CIS Report 2011).

The second independent variable is the intermediary agent best described as

“University Affiliated.” This intermediary agent is in some way affiliated with a

University and often recruits participants using University distributed materials or
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university postings such as billboards in certain departments. The “University

Affiliated” agent does not reflect any formal recognition from the university it is
affiliated with and can therefore be associated either formally or informally.

The third intermediary placement agent is best described as “Government

Affiliated.” These placement agents often operate as government agents who recruit
participants through government-related distributed materials or state travel
agencies. “Government affiliated,” indicates any degree of responsibility or

endorsement by the country’s government that indicates the placement agent has

ties to government entities in such a manner quality of participation would in some
manner reflect governmental direction or authority. The final agent type can be

identified as “Sponsor –direct.” These intermediary agents are less intermediary
agents than simply extensions of the sponsor themselves. This placement group
includes sponsors who directly recruit students or lend their

title/brand/sponsorship to intermediary agents who recruit solely on the sponsor’s
behalf.

The dependent variables used to answer the second research question are

composite variables used to represent “information,” and “preferences.” These

composite variables were created by distinctly categorizing survey questions that

reflected themes of informational flows or examples of preference asymmetry. The
resulting list of variables is represented in table 3.2 for “information asymmetry,”
and table 3.3 for “preference asymmetry.” Once both composite variables were
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created, they are tested for statistical significance against the dependent
intermediary placement agent variables described above.

Table 3.1 Research Question 2 Variables
Research Question 2 – Aspects of SWTP Participants & Program Success
Composite Variable –
SWTP Components
Age Range
Gender
Prior Knowledge of SWTP
Degree Completion
Contacts/Family in USA
Placement Type

Variable Type
Ordinal
Nominal
Nominal
Ordinal
Nominal
Nominal

Possible Responses
18-20. 21-23,24-27,28+
Male, Female
Yes, No
Beginning, Middle, End, Other
Yes, No
Independent, University,
Government, Other

Table 3.2 Research Question 2.1a Variables

Research Question 2.1a – IPAs and U.S. State Dept. – Information Asymmetry
Composite Variable“Information
Symmetry”

Variable Type
*Likert Scale (1-5)
1=lowest, 5=highest

Travel Costs

Ordinal*

Expectations vs. Reality

Ordinal*

Travel Info

Quality of Living –
Housing

Quality of Living – Costs
All Costs

Ordinal*

Ordinal*
Ordinal*
Ordinal*
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Variable Description
Costs Associated with
Prearranged Travel
to/from USA
Information regarding
Travel Opportunities
Expectations of SWTP
versus Reality of SWTP
Experience
Conditions of Housing
during SWTP
Costs of Housing during
SWTP
Overall Costs of SWTP
Participation - Travel

Table 3.2 (Continued)
Supervisor 1

Ordinal*

Feedback All

Ordinal*

Supervisor 2

Ordinal*

Ability to Report to an
Immediate Supervisor
Ability to Report to any
Secondary Supervisor
Ability to Issue Feedback
During/After SWTP

Table 3.3 Research Question 2.1b Variables

Research Question 2.1b – IPAs and U.S. State Dept. – Preference Asymmetry
Composite Variable“Preference Symmetry”

Variable Type
*Likert Scale (1-5)
1=lowest, 5=highest

Level of Pay

Ordinal*

Placement Methods

Ordinal*

Work Conditions

Travel Ability

Workplace Experience
Work / School

Educational Diversity
Educational Opps

Cultural Exchange Direct
Cultural Diversity

Ordinal*

Ordinal*
Ordinal*
Ordinal*
Ordinal*
Ordinal*
Ordinal*
Ordinal*
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Variable Description
Level of Pay Received

Conditions of SWTP
Workplace
Methods Used to
Determine SWTP Sponsor
Placement
Ability to Travel During
Final Month of Visa
Experiences Within
SWTP Work Placement
Applicability of Education
to SWTP Work Placement
Diversity of Educational
Backgrounds in SWTP
Opportunities for
Educational Exchange
Cultural Exchange from
Formal SWTP Events
Cultural Diversity
Experienced

Research Population & Sample
The sample identified for this study were participants in the Summer Work

Travel Program between the years of 2012 and 2013. Due to the specific focus on
the program experiences the participants were asked to complete surveys only if

they had completed at least two months in the Summer Work Travel Program in the
United States, and had reached the halfway mark of program participation. The

sample design for the population was a clustering sampling design. The selection
process used reflects a nonprobability sample (or convenience sample) as
respondents were chosen based on their availability (Babbie, 1990).

To identify the population, sponsors were chosen using the most recent list

available from the U.S State Department of the Summer Work Travel Program

sponsors. From this database a list was constructed comparing the current sponsors
with previously sanctioned sponsors to determine all of the potential sponsors.
Once this list of 48 sponsors was established, 45 were considered to be viable

sources for data after the initial outreach methods such as emails, postal mailings,
and phone calls were factored into determining those sponsors were still actively
participating in the Summer Work Travel Program. Of the 45 active sponsors,

survey access data was provided by 40 of the sponsors. Using a standard sample
size formula with a confidence interval of 5 and confidence level of 95% it was
determined that the number of sponsors was adequate (Fowler, 2002).
Participants were recruited through electronic mail and posted

announcements at their places of employment, any housing identified for Summer
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Work Travel participants, and through agency staff such as program administrators.
Participants were directed to a website where a digital survey was offered in their

respective native language. One hundred and seventy-eight individuals completed

the survey responses and were received during the open submission period. Follow-

up information indicated on the completed surveys allowed for interviews that took
place during six predetermined time periods, resulting in one hundred and thirteen
qualitative entries consisting of both group and individual responses.
Research Instruments
The purpose of this section is to detail the methods of data collection such

that the study may be replicated. The instruments used for this study included a
questionnaire survey, interviews using internet social chat clients, focus-group

interviews using digital meeting rooms, and interviews conducted both in person
and with internet chat clients utilizing webcams. The instrumentation section for

this study is categorized by the type of instrument that was used to collect data. This
section details those instruments used for data collection for quantitative analyses,
qualitative analyses, and those instruments used to collect data from secondary
sources.

Quantitative Instruments
For the quantitative portion of the data collection procedure a sponsor list

was downloaded from the U.S. State Department’s J-1 visa website for the years
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2005-2010. This list was then merged to form the most recent list of 45

participating sponsors. Sponsors were then contacted using a variety of methods

including electronic mail, postal mail, telephone calls, and site visits to gain access to

administration in contact with Summer Work Travel Program participants. Notice of
surveys for SWTP participants and the opportunity to win Amazon gift cards were
dispersed by determining housing institutions, community centers, and work
locations where flyers, electronic discussion board posts, and mailings were
distributed to all SWTP participants who would spread awareness to other
participants.

A survey consisting of thirty-six questions was created by the investigator to

address the areas for this study and would address the two research questions. The

survey was designed and administered online over a period of three months during
which data collection took place. The questions were both nominal and ordinal in

nature with responses structured using a Likert scale. The survey instrument used
to collect data was an online survey tool modeled after the commercial product

“SurveyMonkey.” The instrument was posted online and presented to the user in the

form of radio buttons to click to indicate their satisfaction level for each question. All
of the questions were presented in the same order to each participant. The website
was created using HTML and CSS coding techniques by the investigator. The

participants responses were automatically transcribed into excel tables for analysis.
Prior to the launch of the survey the website was extensively tested using a

number of different Internet browsers, participants with varying degrees of English
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proficiency, and methods of access. The survey was pilot-tested using ten volunteers
over a period of two weeks to test the functionality of the website. Graduate

students at American University were used to clarify points of confusion concerning
the ordering of the questions and the wording. Survey questions were written in
Spanish, English, German, Portuguese, Chinese, Italian, and French language

formats, all of which were verified by native speakers from the American University
in Washington, D.C. and offered as options to the survey participant for each
question.

Survey questions were developed to determine satisfaction scores related to

the conditions and experiences in the Summer Work Travel Program with respect to
the legislative objectives of educational exchange, cultural exchange, and the

promotion of peace. All questions were developed used a closed-response format
with Likert scale ordinal responses ranging from one to five. Thirty-six questions
were developed including six demographic related questions, eleven questions

regarding educational exchange, ten questions regarding cultural exchange, five

questions regarding the promotion of peace, and a final four questions regarding
overall conditions encountered while participating in the Summer Work Travel
Program. The questionnaire is available in Appendix A. A sample question is
included for reference:

“Please indicate your level of satisfaction regarding the pay you received while
working in the Summer Work Travel Program.”
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Click the response which best describes your satisfaction level.
-

Extremely Unsatisfactory

⊙

-

Average – Suitable

⊙

-

Somewhat Unsatisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Extremely Satisfactory
N/A

⊙
⊙
⊙
⊙

As each survey was completed, responses were automatically scored using

translation software coded in Java. The survey responses were coded using dummy
variables and binary data. Each response was given a score of 1 to 5 where 1 was

coded for “extremely unsatisfactory,” 5 for “extremely satisfactory,” and 6 if a “N/A”
response was given. Data was verified by two independent sources to check for any
data conversion errors. The data was then analyzed using those procedures

specified in the section entitled, “Data Analyses Procedures,” found later in this
chapter.

Qualitative Instruments
The qualitative component of this study includes a set of questions designed

by the investigator, related to the themes established for the construction of the

survey questionnaire so the results would confirm or disconfirm those identified
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through the quantitative analysis. The study’s research questions for interview

question were used as a guide for the interview question construction. The two

main themes discussed were the ability of the Summer Work Travel Program to
meet its goals or legislative objectives, and the aspects of Summer Work Travel

Program participants that were statistically significant regarding satisfaction rates.

All of the questions were presented in a straightforward manner determined during
a pretest period where the questions were read aloud and amended for clarity
before the final interviews were carried out with SWTP participants.

In accordance with the research design, the participants were asked the

questions following the same outline as the order presented in the quantitative

survey. The interviews were conducted using three primary mechanisms: Internet

chat clients, Internet group meeting software clients, and video chat clients. These
chat clients included Yahoo Messenger, Google Hangouts, Skype, MSN Messenger,

and AIM chat software were all used for individual interviews. The group-oriented

Internet chat clients used for the two focus group interviews were Google Hangouts,

Adobe Connect, and Skype. The study allowed each subject to choose their preferred
chat client.

The interviews consisted of twenty questions for both the group and

individual interviews. These questions are presented in Appendix C. The

interviewees were instructed to answer by describing only their own experiences
and were instructed to stop the interview at any time a question or concept was

unclear. Participants were also informed they were not required to answer any of
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the questions asked. For the focus group and individual interviews, participants

were asked to indicate their opinions and any additional reflections at the end of
each question. When participants needed additional probing for answers, the
strategies identified by Michigan State University were utilized

(michigan.gov/msu/interview09.html). This included asking about variations over
the time and how it may affect the participant’s response, reviewing all possible

influences regarding why participants felt a certain way, employing counterfactuals
to clarify the respondent’s position or attitude, asking how the question made them
feel or their thoughts on the question itself, simply asking for more details after a
given answer, and finally repeating and clarifying the participant’s response
(McIntre & Miller, 2005).

The interviews followed established and well-publicized guidelines that

included a checklist for preparation, logistical considerations, the protocol for the

interview, and report writing ensuring participant confidentiality. All interview
procedures were verified to be in accordance with guidelines outlined by the

Institutional Review Board under DHHS regulations for the Protection of Human

Subjects (45 CFR 46). An interview protocol was developed and used as a guideline
during the interview and analysis portions of the qualitative data collection and all

participants signed the consent form reproduced in Appendix B before any data was
collected. The data was recorded using video file formats and consulted during data

transcription. Interview transcription software including Naunce Dragon

transcription programs were used to transcribe captured audio to word documents
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for future reference. Interview themes were developed by reviewing the word

documents and scored focus-group responses using the procedures detailed later in
this methodology section. No names were collected with specific interviews to
protect participant confidentiality.

The questionnaire and the interviews were collected after approval from the

Institutional Review Board was received and the interview design was found to be
acceptable. The quantitative and qualitative themes developed during the data

analyses were collected using Internet grouping software, or software programs

where group meetings may take place digitally so that participants were not limited
by their physical location if Internet accessibility was feasible. The two group

interviews were coordinated using software from Google, “Google Hangouts.”

Participants were able to join the group as registered users or guests via a password
and IP address provided to the email addresses provided from the surveys

indicating follow-up interview interest. Participants were able to communicate

using their preferred method. For instance, they could type responses or speak and
be seen using webcam audio and video interaction. For personal or individual

interviews, a variety of chat or interactive Internet tools were used depending on

the participant’s level of comfort. Users were able to indicate prior to the interview
their preferred method of communication, which ranged from text-based Internet

chat (messenger services such as Yahoo Messenger, Google Chat, IMO, AIM, etc.) to

video chat tools such “Skype.” All interviews, both group and individual, were timed
and recorded (either text or audio) depending on participant approval.
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All interviews were conducted anonymously, and only sponsorship location

was provided to verify participation. Language-based limitations were overcome

using translation services provided by Google for those interviewees who were not
comfortable using English during interviews. The method of transcription to

Microsoft Excel tables was verified to function properly by conducting pilot studies

with students at American University before presenting the website to interviewees.
Appendix D indicates the dates and times of data collection for both individual and
group interviews. Eighty-four individual interviews were conducted over nine

Internet sessions where participants were able to log in using their preferred

communication mediums. Another 29 interviews took place during two focus group
sessions, one at the beginning of the data collection period and the other at its end.
Secondary Sources
The secondary sources used for this study include numerous forms of media

such as newspaper and magazine articles, electronic websites, government reports
and studies, congressional and committee hearings, third-party independent

organization reports, and university research. The key search terms used were:

“Summer Work Travel Program,” “J-1 visa,” and, “Exchange Visitor Program.” After

these initial searches the criteria for refinement was the term “Summer Work Travel
Program” and the publication date was narrowed to items published between the

years 2000-2010. An exception was made for official government agency reports

that dated back to the legislation’s introduction. To provide a holistic representation
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of the data about the Summer Work Travel Program, the final sources used included
both minor and major newspapers, formal and informal travel blogs, official

government or agency reports, legislative amendments, and website transcriptions.
These sources were gathered in the form of digital media by utilizing a number of
Internet databases that offer scholarly publications, governmental and non-

governmental reports, popular news sources, and federal registry entries, public

notices, and other governmental public reports. These items were obtained by using

the ProQuest Congressional Database for all federal actions, notices, and comments.
JSTOR, Academic OneFile, Google Scholar, and EBSCOhost databases were used to

retrieve the articles published in scholarly journals. ProQuest and LexisNexis online
judicial databases were used to provide the legislative history of the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act. In total, 22 newspaper articles, 11

governmental reports, 7 legislative documents, 37 informal media articles, and 52

promotional websites were found using the aforementioned search engines. These
sources were used in the triangulation process to analyze the general themes

related to the research questions of this study. These sources were categorized by
type and reviewed in chronological order. The identified themes are provided to

independently confirm or disconfirm the results of the quantitative and qualitative
analyses.
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Data Analyses
The data analyses to analyze this study’s research questions are described in

this section. The structure of the following section follows the order of the research

questions. The specific statistics used to conduct the data analyses for each research
question is outlined. The data analyses section focuses only on the methods and
procedures used to analyze the collected data.
Research Question 1
The first procedure described is the analyses conducted to address the first

primary research question, “Does the Summer Work Travel Program meet the
objectives of its authorizing legislation?”

Using the data collected from the survey questionnaires, 36 variables were

constructed to reflect the overall sentiments towards each survey question using a
ordinal response scale of 1-5, where 1= “Extremely Unsatisfactory,” 3=

“Average/Neutral,” and 5= “Extremely Satisfactory.” When appropriate, a sixth

option was offered so the participants could respond that the question was not
applicable to their SWTP experience.

To answer the first research question, survey variables that corresponded

with each respective legislative objective were identified such that four variables

were utilized – satisfaction scores indicating levels of educational exchange, cultural
exchange, the promotion of peace, and overall Summer Work Travel Program
experience. These variables were used to conduct a descriptive analysis that
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described the overall distribution of scores. Additional analyses included using
mean variance tests such as one sample t-tests.

To confirm or disconfirm the results of the descriptive analyses, qualitative

and secondary source data were used independently to review conclusions to

strengthen or weaken the resulting quantitative themes. The interview data were

categorized by legislative objective and then evaluated to determine if the responses
indicated negative or positive feedback. These responses were tallied and reviewed
to produce an overall theme for each respective objective: educational exchange,
cultural exchange, the promotion of peace, and the overall SWTP experience. A

similar approach was taken with the secondary source data. Secondary data sources
were consulted to provide a comprehensive review of the program using both

formal and informal publications. These sources were categorized and the reports
summarized so themes could be identified. Themes from the qualitative and

secondary source analyses are presented in the data analyses section following the
quantitative results as a component of the triangulation process.
Research Question 2
A second set of procedures were used to address the secondary primary

research question, “What aspects of the Summer Work Travel Program participants
affect program success?”

These procedures began with the isolation of the demographic variables.

These six components were presented in Table 3.1, “Research Question 2 Variables.”
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These demographic variables were regressed using a principal factor analysis and
used to predict the composite variable representing each respective theme.

Following an ordered logistical regression to determine statistical significance of
any demographic variable and satisfaction scores, the components that affect
program success were isolated for further analyses.

The following procedures were used to address the second portion of the

second primary research question, “How do intermediate placement agents affect
Summer Work Travel Program success?”

As described in the operationalization of variables section, two measures of

asymmetry between administrative actors as concepts from agency theory were

measured, “information asymmetry,” and, “preference asymmetry.” This subset of
research questions asked, “Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate

information asymmetry between the U.S. State Department and Summer Work
Travel Program sponsors?” as well as, “Do the identified participants’ aspects

indicate preference asymmetry between the U.S. State Department and Summer
Work Travel Program sponsors?”

To construct measurements of these two concepts, applicable survey

questions were categorized for analyses to construct composite variables. These

composite variables were constructed using Levene’s test for equality of variances

and t-tests for equality of means among survey questions identified as representing
informational flows between the U.S. State Department and SWTP sponsors, as well
as those survey questions that address preference diversity that may exist between
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SWTP sponsors and the U.S. State Department. A principal factor analysis was
conducted to construct two composite variables to represent information

asymmetry and preference asymmetry. The two variables were regressed using a

logistical regression with Summer Work Travel Program participants’ demographic
variables to determine any statistical significance.

The role of qualitative and secondary data sources in confirming or

disconfirming the quantitative results for the second research question required a
more in-depth analysis than conducted to answer the first research question of

legislative goal satisfaction. While conducting qualitative data collection operations,
students were asked to indicate their impressions of both preference and

information asymmetry between how the U.S. State Department would prefer the
SWTP to be operated and the reality of how the program is operated by SWTP

sponsors. This data was used to determine qualitative themes corresponding with
the two measures of asymmetry, which were compared to the quantitative
measures and results. For an analysis of secondary sources pertaining to

information and preference asymmetry, the number formal responses in the form of
government and independent third-party reports provided detailed information of
preferential and informational flows since the year 2003. These reports were
compared to relevant informal media pieces, generating the overall themes

regarding information and preference asymmetry between the principal (the U.S.
State Department), and the agent (SWTP sponsors). The overall themes from

secondary data sources as well as those themes generated through qualitative
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analyses were further refined to determine instances that correspond with any

aspects of the SWTP that were found to affect program success during quantitative
analyses.

Validity and Reliability
The validity of the quantitative survey component of this study was

addressed to reflect the three traditional forms of validity as outlined by Humbley &
Zumbo: content validity, predictive or concurrent validity, and construct validity
(1996). Content validity is defined as, “the systematic examination of the test

content to determine whether it covers a representative sample of the behavior
domain to be measured (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997 p.114).” Content validity was

addressed by pretesting the survey questions for clarity and applicability to the
concepts sought to measure by using a conceptual map to organize survey and

interview design. Content validity was also addressed by obtaining a representative

sample from the population as described in the “Population & Sample” section of
this dissertation.

Concurrent validity is defined as, “a type of evidence that can be gathered to

defend the use of a test for predicting other outcomes (McIntre & Miller, 2005:122).”
Concurrent validity concerns were addressed by wording all questions using similar
formatting and presenting the questions in a straightforward manner to the

participant. Each data collection method was designed to illicit similarly structured
responses between measurements to increase the validity of the triangulation
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design. As indicated in the research methodology section, the procedures and

analyses undertaken were clearly specified so this study can be easily replicated.

Construct validity is the extent to which operationalizations of a construct

actually measure what the theory states. In this study these operationalizations are
the composite variables used to describe the legislative objectives of the SWTP as

well as agency’s theory’s concepts of informational and preference asymmetry. To

address this concern the individual variables measured to construct each composite
variable are clearly presented in table format in the methodology section. These

variables were also confirmed as representative of the overarching concept by two
independent researchers at American University, who reviewed the study’s

methodology for clarity of purpose and links within the methodology and data

analyses to the core concepts developed in the literature review. The reliability of

this instrument was also reinforced by its adoption by other researchers conducting
similar studies (Gibbs, 2007; Zumbo, 1996).

Qualitative validity and reliability is distinct from validity and reliability in

quantitative research (Gibbs, 2007). To reinforce the reliability of the qualitative

findings, all transcripts were checked by secondary and tertiary reviewers for any

errors made during transcription. In determining the themes, satisfaction levels, and
conclusions from the interviews, all data was interpreted independently and cross-

referenced for inconsistencies. As data from qualitative notes were coded, statistical
software in STATA was used to identify any redundancy errors. All input data were
then checked independently for any errors in data input/analysis.
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To reinforce the validity of the qualitative methods, a number of “validity

strategies” as identified by Creswell (2006) were utilized. These included the

concept of “triangulation,” which is a central pillar of this study’s research design,

member checking to verify conditions and reports given in the survey, establishing
and minimizing observer bias during the data collection and interview process by
wording and speaking questions in a neutral manner, and by using an external
auditor. The external auditor used for this study was a doctoral student from

American University who was unfamiliar with the project, the investigator, or the

directions of the study. All interview and survey questions as well as the research

design was evaluated by the external auditor to determine any bias present as well
as to provide clarity in question wording, accuracy in coding methods, and overall
consistency of questions asked.
Summary
The research methods chapter provided an overview of the research design

of this study, procedures used for data collection, analytical and statistical

techniques used to operationalize variables and interpret the data, and concluded
with the study’s validity and reliability concerns. The chapter concluded with a
section detailing validity and reliability concerns. This section focused on the

methods undertaken to address three validity concerns including content validity,
concurrent validity, and construct validity. Chapter four will present the results of
this study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of this study. The results are presented for

each main research question. The quantitative results are presented first followed
by the qualitative results and then the secondary source results. The independent

results from each source are compared in accordance with its triangulation research
design to present an overall summary of all results. Results for quantitative data are
presented in summary tables with a discussion of these results. Qualitative results
are presented as those themes were found to reoccur throughout the interview

process. Secondary data source analysis includes citations of key reports and those
themes found to reoccur in studies pertaining to the research questions.

The first section presents this study’s findings that seek to determine

whether the Summer Work Travel Program satisfies its legislative objectives. The
quantitative data section presents descriptive summary statistics regarding the
survey satisfaction data and the individual SWTP components of educational

exchange, cultural exchange, and the promotion of peace. The qualitative results
section details those interview themes identified from the structured interview

questions. These questions were designed to gauge responses about educational

benefits of the SWTP, the degree of cultural exchange and diversity in the SWTP, and
the participants’ interpretations of the promotion of peace. The results of the

secondary source analysis are presented with respect to the themes of educational
exchange, cultural exchange, and the promotion of peace.
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The second portion of the results section examines the aspects of the SWTP

participants that affect Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores. These

results are presented with quantitative results, qualitative results, and secondary

source results discussed respectively. The results include an analyses using agency

theory’s contribution of “preference” and “information” asymmetries to characterize
the administrative actor relationships. These results include discussions about the

statistical regressions performed, resulting themes from qualitative interview data,
and those themes generated from secondary source data. The results from each of

the data sources’ analysis are compared and contrasted to confirm or disconfirm the
research questions and hypotheses.

The conclusion of the results section presents a discussion of all results to

confirm or disconfirm the results from each method of analysis used. The degree of

continuity among results is then highlighted in the final chapter of this study where
recommendations are presented with respect to other publications regarding the
Summer Work Travel Program and both agency and transaction cost theory.
Question 1 – Overall Goal Satisfaction
Quantitative Results
The first research question, “Does the Summer Work Travel Program meet the
objectives of its authorizing legislation?”
To answer the question three refined research questions were developed:
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1.1 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to educational exchange during their participation periods?”
1.2 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to cultural exchange during their participation periods?”
1.3 “Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to the promotion of peace during their participation periods?”

The results of the data analyses to answer the specific research questions of

individual objective satisfaction shall follow those that indicate overall sentiments
towards the Summer Work Travel Program.

Table 4.1 Overall Satisfaction – Summer Work Travel Program
SWTP Overall
Least Satisfied
1

Most Satisfied
5
Totals

2
3
4

Frequency
73

Percent
41.01

178

100.00

49
41
10
5

27.53
23.03
5.62
2.81

Cumulative
41.01
68.54
91.57
97.19
100.00

1=Highly Unsatisfied, 2=Somewhat Unsatisfied, 3=Average/Neutral,
4=Somewhat Satisfied, 5=Highly Satisfied

The tabulation shows 68.5% of respondents indicated an unsatisfactory

experience, with 41% “highly unsatisfied” and 27.5% only, “somewhat unsatisfied.”
Those indicating a neutral or average experience constituted 23% of respondents.

Of the 178 respondents surveyed only 15 respondents, or 8.4%, indicated positive
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levels of satisfaction. This included 5.6% who responded as, “somewhat satisfied,”
and 2.8% who responded, “highly satisfied.” The results show the majority of
respondents were not satisfied with their Summer Work Travel Program
experience.

To further describe the overall SWTP satisfaction scores, a one sample mean

t-test is conducted to test the hypothesis the mean is equal to 3, “neutral/average.”
Table 4.2 One Sample Median Test – Overall SWTP Satisfaction Scores

Variable
Overall

Obs

178

t = -12.3721

H0: mean = 3
HA: mean < 3
Pr (t < t) = 0.000

Mean

2.016854

Std. Err.

.0794648

degrees of freedom =177

Std. Dev.

1.060192

[95% Conf. Interval]
1.860034 2.173674

HA: mean > 3
Pr (t < t) = 1.000

The following hypothesis conclusion can now be stated:

HO: The mean satisfaction score for Overall SWTP is greater than or equal to 3,
“Average/Neutral.”

HA: The mean satisfaction score for Overall SWTP is less than 3, “Average/Neutral.”
This study rejects the null hypothesis that the mean satisfaction score for

Overall SWTP is greater than or equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.” It therefore fails to
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reject the alternative hypothesis the mean < 3 and rejects the hypotheses the mean
> 3. The mean response was 2.02, similar to response 2, “somewhat unsatisfied.”
To illustrate the distribution of responses the following histogram is provided:
Table 4.3 Histogram – Overall SWTP Satisfaction Scores

The distribution of scores shown in the histogram indicates the majority of

responses were “extremely unsatisfactory,” and “somewhat unsatisfactory.” More
“average/neutral” responses were given than positive responses, #4 and #5.
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Research Question 1.1 Educational Exchange
The success of the Summer Work Travel Program in regards to the

educational objective of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act is
determined using summary statistics of the participants surveyed.

Satisfaction survey data was used to analyze the overall impression of

educational exchange for SWTP participants during the years 2012-2013. The first
results displayed are summary descriptions of satisfaction levels of participants
regarding educational exchange in the Summer Work Travel Program.

Table 4.4 Overall Satisfaction Scores – Educational Exchange
Overall Education
Least Satisfied
1
2
3
4
Most Satisfied
5
Totals

Frequency
68
54
34
17
5
178

Percent
38.20
30.34
19.10
9.55
2.81
100.00

Cumulative
38.20
68.54
87.64
97.19
100.00

1=Highly Unsatisfied, 2=Somewhat Unsatisfied, 3=Average/Neutral,
4=Somewhat Satisfied, 5=Highly Satisfied
The tabulation shows 68.5% of respondents indicated an unsatisfactory

experience, with 38.2% “highly unsatisfied” and 30.3% only, “somewhat

unsatisfied.” Those indicating a neutral or average experience constituted 19% of
respondents. Of the 178 respondents surveyed only 22 respondents, or 12.4%,
indicated positive levels of satisfaction. This included 9.6% who responded as,

“somewhat satisfied,” and 2.8% who responded, “highly satisfied.” The results show
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the majority of respondents were not satisfied with the educational exchange
component of the Summer Work Travel Program.

To further describe educational exchange SWTP satisfaction scores, a one

sample mean t-test is conducted to test the hypothesis the mean is equal to 3,
“neutral/average.”

Table 4.5 - One Sample T Test –Educational Exchange Satisfaction Scores
Variable

OverallEd

t = -11.1180

Obs

178

H0: mean = 3
HA: mean < 3
Pr (t < t) = 0.000

Mean

2.08427

Std. Err.

.0823649

degrees of freedom =177

Std. Dev.

1.098885

[95% Conf. Interval]
1.921726 2.246813

HA: mean > 3
Pr (t < t) = 1.000

The following hypothesis conclusion can now be stated:

HO: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Educational Exchange is greater than or
equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.”
HA: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Educational Exchange is less than 3,
“Average/Neutral.”

This study rejects the null hypothesis that the mean satisfaction score for

Educational Exchange is greater than or equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.” It therefore

fails to reject the alternative hypothesis the mean < 3 and rejects the hypotheses the
mean > 3. The mean response was 2.08, similar to response 2, “somewhat
unsatisfied.”

100

To illustrate the distribution of responses, the following histogram is provided:
Table 4.6 Histogram – Educational Exchange Satisfaction Scores

The distribution of scores shown in the histogram indicates the majority of

responses were “extremely unsatisfactory,” and “somewhat unsatisfactory.” More
“average/neutral” responses were given than positive responses, #4 and #5.
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Qualitative Results Research Question 1.1

Question 1 was presented as an open-format question to encourage

participants to engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare

experiences regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding

educational exchange and their academic field of study. The question was presented
as follows:

“Please discuss your satisfaction levels and sentiments regarding the
relationship between your academic field of study and the work assigned to you
by your Summer Work Travel Program sponsor. I will not interrupt the
discussion and there is no time limit.”

THEME 1: Academic Degree Sought Not Highly Considered When Determining
Placement.
Participants consistently indicated their chosen course of study was not cited

explicitly (to the best of their knowledge) in the process where the agents
determined appropriate SWTP sponsor placement.

THEME 2: The lack of consideration for academic concentration and placement
resulted in educational exchange opportunities due to diversity.
While participants indicated they were not consistently placed with others

studying similar subjects, the lack of consistency resulted in academic exchange
among participants due to varying backgrounds.
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Question 2
Question 2 was presented using an open-format where participants were

allowed to discuss the question with no interruption or time limit. The question was
designed to orient participants to a discussion about educational exchange that
occurred specifically in the workplace. Question 2 was presented as follows:

“Describe your satisfaction regarding opportunities for educational exchange in the
workplace, directly or indirectly related to your work.”

THEME 3: Participants were offered little or no formal opportunities for educational
exchange in the workplace.
Participants indicted no direct program or endeavor to facilitate or stimulate

educational exchange by the employing sponsor.

THEME 4: Placement agents rarely presented participants with a variety of choices
and did not discuss how placement determines the degree of applicability to the
participants’ educational fields of study.
THEME 5: The Spillover Effect Due To Cultural Diversity
Participants indicated an indirect benefit of cultural diversity was the way in

which subjects are approached in varying countries as determined through
interaction with other participants.
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Question 3
Question 3 was presented using an open-format where participants were

allowed to discuss the question with no interruption or time limit. The question was
designed to orient participants to a discussion about educational exchange that

occurred specifically outside the workplace. Question 3 was presented as follows:
“Please indicate your satisfaction regarding educational exchange opportunities
outside the workplace.”

THEME 6: The local community was often the source of opportunities for educational
exchange that were not related to the sponsor in any way.
The surrounding community’s composition was continually cited as

providing opportunities for educational exchange to varying degrees, however no
formal extension to the local community was presented to participants.
THEME 7: Free Time is Free Time – “It is what you make of it”

As indicated by experiences with their local communities, participants

indicated their free time could be used to engage in educational exchange endeavors
if participants put forth effort to arrange their own transportation and schedules.
Question 4
Question 4 was presented using an open-format where participants were

allowed to discuss the question with no interruption or time limit. The question was
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designed to gauge the overall impressions about educational exchange and the
Summer Work Travel Program. Question 4 was presented as follows:

“What were your thoughts and satisfaction levels regarding the entire Summer Work
Travel Program experience and educational exchange?”

THEME 8: No Formal Opportunities Presented by Sponsor but Opportunities for
Educational Exchange Were Present.

THEME 9: What Could Have Been – More Information Needed
Participants offered a number of ideas or instances where formal events or

methods could be taken to facilitate cultural exchange. These ideas indicated

opportunities for improvement are widespread and not all would be costly to the
employing sponsor.

Summary of Qualitative Results
The quality of educational exchange in the Summer Work Travel Program

was found to be unsatisfactory by a majority of those interviewed. Themes

developed during the focus group and individuals were cross-reference for

verification. Using the four research questions presented the interviews developed

themes included the lack of participant’s knowledge about the responsibility and

process of aligning placement and educational background. A second theme was the
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lack of formal opportunities for educational exchange presented by sponsors once

the participants were in the United States. A third theme developed reflecting the “it
is what you make of it” attitude adopted by many of the participants, and the

varying degrees of educational exchange related to the geographical location of
employment and access to local resources. A fourth theme identified was the

“spillover” of opportunities for educational exchange due to the cultural diversity

present in or outside the workforce. The final theme developed was the degree to
which access to local contacts, calendars, and community events would have

increased the amount of opportunities for educational exchange participants may
have engaged in.

Secondary Source Results Research Question 1.1
The approach to the secondary analysis was to examine and analyze

individual articles and policy reports. A summary of the content of each article is

provided. The summary describes the key findings from the review conducted to
present sources related to the educational exchange component of the Summer
Work Travel Program.

1) Constable, P. (2011 October 30). Foreign students allege abuses in visa work
program. The Washington Post. p. A4.
The article begins with Aysel Kiyaker, a student from Turkey who paid

$3,000 for her airfare and work visa. Kiyaker states, “My parents agreed to send me
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because it would be a way to improve my English….they told us the job would be

easy and fun and they would have pizza parties for us. After work my whole body
was numb.”

She said one friend was threatened after she complained, and another was

fired for not working fast enough. “After that happened, people were more afraid.”

In detailed formal complaints, the guest-worker group described systematic efforts
to intimidate students who complained and charged that government investigators
had worked in tandem with factory managers.

The article cites an instance of intimidation that has been widely reported by

participants in reference to their sponsors. Participants identify the disadvantages
of reporting due to the leverage of the sponsors who often provide all housing and
transportation accommodations. In addition, many employers made it clear that

negative reports could result in the visa status reversal and immediate deportation,
regardless of the validity of the claims. The students, under increased pressure, do

not issue the feedback to the appropriate sponsors or supervisors that would result
in positive program change.

2) Jordan, M. (2013 March 9). Temp Troubles Visit McDonald’s. The Wall Street
Journal. pp. B1, B4.

Students in Harrisburg, PA, including those from Malaysia, China, Peru and

Chile, said they were attracted by ads on their university bulletin boards and

websites. One ad by a company called Out of the Box Personal Development, in
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Kuala Lumpur, touted, “a unique opportunity to live life in the USA – up close and
personal!” On arrival they were assigned to one of three McDonald’s and some

reported being given so few hours they barely earned any money after their boss
and landlord deducted rent from their paychecks. Others reported working
continuous shifts up to 25 hours without overtime pay.

“Since I got to the States, I have been working just to pay to live in a

basement,” stated Jorge Rios of Argentina, who arrived in mid-December and shared
the one-room space with five other foreigners who work at the same McDonalds. He
said he worked about 25 hours a week earning $7.25 an hour, and Mr. Cheung, his

boss, deducted weekly rent of $75 from his pay. Kah Inn Lee, a 23-year-old student

from Malaysia, said a curtain separated the men’s and women’s beds in the tiny

basement she shared with seven other students in a house owned by Mr. Cheung’s
son. Earning about $250 a week, she calculated she was in the red after paying for
housing and food.

Additional Reports (3) – Education, Labor, & Displacement of U.S. workers
-

Preston, J. (2011 August 17). Foreign Students in Work Visa Program Stage
Walkout at Plant. The New York Times. Accessed online September 22, 2012 at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/18immig.html?_r=2&pagewanted=al
GAO/NSIAD-90-16 – Government Report
Gordon, J. (2011 August 24). America’s Sweatshop Diplomacy. The New York
Times. pp.A5.
The effects of the SWT program on the domestic labor market are vast and

numerous enough to be considered independently in a separate report. The
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Fulbright-Hays Act was not developed to take jobs away from U.S. citizens. This
study noted the 1990 GAO report that stated, “Training appeared to consist

primarily of manual labor in commercial enterprises with no cultural or educational
emphasis placed on the participants’ program activities (GAO/NSIAD-90-16).” This

was reflected in the first news article discussed in this study from the Eastern
European electricians that were classified as trainees (due to their lack of

certification under U.S. law). Although they were highly skilled and subsequently
billed as “electricians for hire at $15 per hour.” The use of trainees as laborers

without any educational or cultural consideration seemed to be the most popular

complaint issued against the SWT program. Its classification of trainees exempts the
companies and organizations from applying for H-1B visas that is controlled by an

annual cap so it does not impede US domestic labor growth. It also exempts
employers from paying the prevailing wage and from filing forms with the
Department of Labor.

The last two articles are from the New York Times and were published in July

and August of 2011. The first is entitled, “America’s Sweatshop Diplomacy” and

documented the 300 J-1 visa workers who went on strike at a Hershey packaging

plant in Pennsylvania during the summer of 2011. Citing meager pay, overnight and
sometimes 24-hour shifts, the students went on strike after lifting heavy crates of
chocolate bars for three months during the summer. The students on strike each

reported paying between $3000 and $6000 to be placed in the United States SWT

program, yet they received only $8 for their work at the plant. While $8 is above the
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minimum wage, the students cited numerous fees, deductions for living expenses,
and transportation costs that left them with an estimated $1 to $3.50 per hour.

Compare this to the report that documented unionized workers were paid $18 to
$30 per hour for doing the same jobs.

Hershey now uses a non-unionized company to hire workers through the J-1

program (this “middle-man” company is termed an umbrella organization). A

similar sponsor, also authorized by the State Department, is cited as offering a

“payroll taxes savings calculator” on its Website such that potential employers can
determine how much they can save by avoiding costs of paying U.S. workers. The
author wrote, “Indeed, the J-1 program is attractive to employers because it is

uncapped and virtually unregulated; companies avoid paying Medicare, Social

Security and, in many states, unemployment taxes for workers hired through the
program (Gordon: 2011).”

The final article also covered the strike at the Hershey plant and was

reprinted by the New York Times from a local Pennsylvania paper near the Hershey
packing plant. This paper sheds light on the sponsoring program, the Council for

Educational Travel, U.S.A., which placed the students with the Eastern Distribution

Center III, who operated the warehouse the students worked in. After the students

complained about the strenuous work and the lack of training or cultural exchange,
the local news agencies reported some of the students’ stories.

Among them were three Chinese students with bruises all over their arms

and chests from lifting the heavy boxes. A Nigerian third-year medical student with
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back pain and aches so intense stated he was having trouble writing and holding a
pencil, and a second-year medical student from Istanbul who invested $3,500 for
the “opportunity.” One of the students was quoted that her eight hour shift that

began at 11pm, “you stand for the entire eight hours…it is the worst thing for your
fingers and hands and your back; you are standing at an angle (Preston, 3: 2011).”

The student remarked that the tipping point was when students discovered

they were paying almost twice what neighbors were paying for worse living

conditions, they had little money left after the $400 per month rent was deducted
from their checks. The medical student stated, “We are supposed to be here for

cultural exchange and education, but we are just cheap laborers.” Another student
remarked, “There is no cultural exchange, none, none (Preston, 1: 2011).
Summary of Secondary Source Results
The news articles responses and reports documented and surveyed for this

study indicated that not only were the students being placed in positions

inconsistent with their educational background, but that the State Department, who
contracted out the placements of students to sponsors, was not aware of the

students work or housing situations. When allegations arose or strikes took place
the first response indicated in each article is a redirection of blame to another

company in charge of the placements. Due to the overwhelming number of SWT

program participants the State Department has outsourced the job of placement of

students to suitable work and living condition as well as the recruitment of students
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abroad. Furthermore there seems to be a significant disconnect between the jobs
offered to students in the ads of sample placements and the actual jobs they find
after they arrive.

Finally, the major theme in all the articles was a focus of the placement

companies and the companies who offered positions. These articles described the

economic advantages of hiring foreign SWT program participants. The objectives of
securing meaningful training and protection for SWT program participants were

clearly not met for many. Most startling is the fact that this study found was that no
sponsor has lost its status since the program’s beginning and only a handful have

even been reprimanded. When questioned about the strike at the Hershey plant and
why students from medical backgrounds were lifting heavy boxes of chocolate bars
for eight hours each day, the recruitment and placement organization, the Council

for Educational Travel, U.S.A., the chief executive of the council stated, “We are not

getting any cooperation…we are trying to work with these kids. All this negativity is
hurting an excellent program. We would go out of our way to help them, but it

seems like someone is stirring them up out there (Preston, 2: 2011).” Given the

objectives of the Summer Work Travel Program, one wonders why “these kids”

were placed in such positions in the first place, especially considering the highly
skilled background of the participants.
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Question 1.2 Cultural Exchange
Quantitative Results
The analysis of cultural exchange is conducted to answer this study’s
research question,

“Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to cultural exchange during their participation periods?”
The cultural aspect of the Summer Work Travel was an important

component due to the historical context of the program’s creation during the rise of
communism. The cultural component of the Summer Work Travel Program is such

that a mutual exchange of cultural ideas and understanding may take place between

the United States and nations around the world. To measure the cultural component
of the Summer Work Travel Program, a set of questions were asked in a survey

distributed to 178 SWTP participants. The results of the satisfaction survey are as
follows:

Table 4.7. Overall Satisfaction Scores – Cultural Exchange

Overall Culture
Least Satisfied
1
2
3
Most Satisfied
5
Total

4

Frequency
71

Percent
39.89

Cumulative
39.89

21

11.80

89.33

67

37.64

11

6.18

8

4.49

178

100.00

77.53
95.51

100.00

1=Highly Unsatisfied, 2=Somewhat Unsatisfied, 3=Average/Neutral,
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4=Somewhat Satisfied, 5=Highly Satisfied

The tabulation shows 77.5% of respondents indicated an unsatisfactory

experience, with 39.9% reporting, “highly unsatisfied,” and 37.6% of respondents
indicating “somewhat satisfied.” Of the 178 total respondents, 11.8% indicated a

neutral or average satisfaction rate. Those indicating a satisfactory level of cultural
exchange totaled 10.7%, of which 6.2% indicated satisfaction rates of “somewhat
satisfied,” and 4.5% indicating satisfaction levels of “highly satisfied.”

To further describe cultural exchange SWTP satisfaction scores, a one sample

mean t-test is conducted to test the hypothesis the mean is equal to 3,
“neutral/average.”

Table 4.8 One Sample T Test – Cultural Exchange SWTP Satisfaction Scores
Variable

OverallC

t = -12.5867

Obs

178

H0: mean = 3
HA: mean < 3
Pr (t < t) = 0.000

Mean

1.977528

Std. Err.

.0812346

degrees of freedom =177

Std. Dev.

1.083805

[95% Conf. Interval]
1.817215 2.137841

HA: mean > 3
Pr (t < t) = 1.000

The following hypothesis conclusion can now be stated:

HO: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Cultural Exchange is greater than or equal
to 3, “Average/Neutral.”
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HA: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Cultural Exchange is less than 3,
“Average/Neutral.”

This study rejects the null hypothesis that the mean satisfaction score for

Overall SWTP is greater than or equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.” It therefore fails to

reject the alternative hypothesis the mean < 3 and rejects the hypotheses the mean
> 3. The mean response was 1.98, similar to response 2, “somewhat unsatisfied.”
To illustrate the distribution of responses the following histogram is provided:
Table 4.9 Histogram – Cultural Exchange Satisfaction Scores

The distribution of scores shown in the histogram indicates the majority of

responses were “extremely unsatisfactory,” and “somewhat unsatisfactory,” rather
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than positive responses, even when response #3, “Average/Neutral satisfaction,”
were included.
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Qualitative Results Research Question 1.2
Question 1
Question 1 was presented as an open-format question to encourage

participants to engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare

experiences regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding
opportunities for cultural exchange. The question was presented as follows:

“Please indicate your level of satisfaction regarding the amount or degree of

cultural diversity present in your workplace while participating in the Summer
Work Travel Program. I will not interrupt the discussion and there is no time
limit.”

Results:
THEME 1: Orientation is Key
The process of orientating/acclimating SWTP participants to their new

surroundings presents the greatest opportunity to organize events to promote

cultural exchange. The lack of participants’ exposures to other participants leaves
participants to engage in cultural exchange activities at their own leisure.

THEME 2: Cultural Exchange Opportunities Were Most Common Outside the
Workplace.
Participants indicate little or no structured events or activities in the

workplace to interact with other cultures aside from work scheduling.
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Question 2
Question 2 was presented as an open-format question to encourage

participants to engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare

experiences regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding
opportunities for cultural exchange. The question was presented as follows:

“Please describe your level of satisfaction regarding any formal or informal
cultural exchange opportunities. I will not interrupt the discussion and there is
no time limit.”

Results:
Participants in both focus groups and individual interviews indicated

informal cultural exchange opportunities occurred more often than formal

opportunities. In some cases the lack of formal opportunities for cultural exchange
prompted adherence to those in similar linguistic backgrounds.

THEME 3: Participants Stick Together

When not introduced or forced to interact with participants of other cultural

backgrounds, participants tended to gravitate and socialize among those

participants they have the most in common with, particularly with respect to
language.

THEME 4: The Participants That Live Together Socialize Together
Question 3
Question 3 was presented as an open-format question to encourage

participants to engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare
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experiences regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding
opportunities for cultural exchange. The question was presented as follows:

“Please describe your level of satisfaction regarding the ability to interact with
the local communities surround your work placement.”

Results:
Participants responded both positively and negatively when asked about

community interaction and cultural exchange. Depending on their location

participants encountered varying degrees of acceptance from local communities,
while others reported local communities who thought SWTP participants were
taking jobs from local citizens.

THEME 5: The Community Opinion of the SWTP Matters
The attitude of the community towards the SWT Program dictates the degree

to which participants felt comfortable interacting with the community. A valuable
insight given was the suggestion of community events to inform the community
about the objectives of the SWTP prior to the participant’s arrival.
THEME 6: Some Cultures Stick Together or Isolate Themselves
Question 4

Question 4 was presented as an open-format question to encourage participants to
engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare experiences

regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding opportunities
for cultural exchange. The question was presented as follows:
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“Describe your satisfaction regarding overall degrees of cultural exchange and
diversity during your participation in the Summer Work Travel Program.”
Results:
Many participants indicated cultural exchange was inhibited by divisions

made by employers for efficiency purposes. The overall conclusion presented was

that “business” often got in the way of cultural exchange opportunities, and this was
often induced by the sponsor.

THEME 7: Business Often Hindered Cultural Exchange
The participants indicated experiences congruence with the conflict between

cost-effective business practices and cultural exchange through hosted or promoted
events that cut into company’s bottom line. This lead to the second major theme:
THEME 8: Business Comes First and Last

Qualitative Summary
The participants interviewed reported unsatisfactory experiences regarding

cultural exchange while participating in the Summer Work Travel Program. A

number of themes were developed using the interview data including the business
orientation of most workplaces where SWTP participants were placed. Organizing
the participants in ways to improve effectiveness or efficiency for business

operations were often cited as obstacles for cultural exchange. These included
grouping participants by language or ethnicity and providing different work
schedules that did not allow interaction among different work groups.
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Another set of themes developed reflected the tendency of particular

cultures to interact only with other members of their group. These groups were
formed both due to cultural background as well as work groupings. Often these

groups worked together and interacted outside of work as well without mixing with
other groups.

A final set of themes was developed regarding cultural interactions with the

participants’ local communities. Many interviewed stated they were either well

received by their local communities, or treated as if they were directly responsible

for the displacement of local job opportunities. Geographical locations also factored
in to the amount of opportunities for cultural exchange as participants found

proximity to public resources determined their ability to interact with U.S culture.
Overall formal events for cultural exchange were either nonexistent or occurred

very rarely, such as the beginning and end of the Summer Work Travel Program, or
coincidentally, before and after the work was sponsors’ first priorities.
Secondary Source Results Research Question 1.2
1) Schneider, P. (2013, June 6). Dells Operators Say Immigration Bill Would Hit
Them Hard. The Capital Times. pp 9.
This article is included in the culture section as an example of a positive

benefit of the Summer Work Travel Program, as the principal would intend.

Referencing the SWT Program, Jim Franz, employee relations manager at Great Wolf
Resorts stated, “There’s a lot more to it than a worker program. People I have
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worked with have benefited greatly. They come thinking the whole country is New
York and California and everyone is a millionaire, they leave with a whole new
perspective and that is a benefit to everyone.”

Summer Work Travel Program reflections include that of Melanie Pursel,

Executive Director of the Greater Ocean City Chamber of Commerce, who stated,
“The Seasonal Workforce Committee provides SWTP students with support and

resources, including greeting the students when they arrive in town and providing

them with a student handbook with basic information like how to find housing and
where the local banks are located.” Coordinated with the Ocean City Seasonal

Workforce Committee, the operations in Ocean City, MD provided the cultural

aspect that is often overlooked when planning for Summer Work Travel Program
participants. As many sponsors have shown however, the creation of a cultural

enrichment programs for SWTP participants cuts into profit-seeking motivations of

employers. The balance achieved in Ocean City is one of the few instances of positive
feedback found while researching the Summer Work Travel Program.

2) Preston, J. (2012 May 5). State Department Revises Foreign Student Job Program
After Abuse Complaints.” The New York Times. pp 13.
“After paycheck deductions, the students said, they were paid so little they could

not afford to travel in the United States, as the program promised.”

Robin Lerner, deputy assistant secretary of state for private sector exchange, said

the department’s goal was, “to bring the program back to its core cultural purposes.”
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US State Department = “the work component has too often overshadowed the core

cultural component that Congress intended.” Students were, “concentrated in single
locations for long hours in jobs that provided little or no opportunity to interact

with U.S. citizens {and were} exposed to workplace safety hazards….subjected to
predatory practices through wage deductions for housing.”

3) Klimasinska, K. (2013 July 12). Foreign-Student Work Plan Cut by U.S. as
Complaints Mount. Bloomberg.com. Accessed online at:
www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-07-12/
In another positive example of the potential mutual benefits of the Summer

Work Travel Program, employer Hugh Fuller has hired foreign students at his

Purple Parrot Grill restaurant in Rehoboth Beach for at least 15 years to supplement
his 72-person seasonal staff. “I’m very proud of my international students,” he said,

adding that for some positions, such as preparing food, he doesn’t get too many local
applicants. “We have certain jobs that, you know, it comes down to, American

people just won’t do.” This article cites the use of foreign students not to fill labor

gaps during high volume seasons but rather to do work others will not do. While the
positive review from Fuller is encouraging, it highlights the lack of coordination

between what a student studies at the university in his home country and the type
of employment in the United States that should be somewhat relative.

5) Jordan, M. (2013 March 9). Temp Troubles Visit McDonald’s. The Wall Street
Journal. pp. B1, B4.
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In an brief article recalling actions taken in response to a McDonald’s

program, Carl Shusterman, a Los Angeles immigration attorney and former

Immigration and Naturalization Service official state, “This is a cheap-labor

program, nothing more,” He added, “Since when is flipping burgers a cultural
exchange?” This compliments the previous reports of placing students in

employment positions that American citizens may be reluctant to do. It contrasts
with the claims that the Summer Work Travel program is used mainly to staff

seasonal-related occupations. If students are utilized simply due to their compliance
with requests American citizens avoid, potential issues may exist if employers were
asked to indicate the cultural or educational aspects of placements set aside for
incoming SWTP participants.

6)Additional Reports (3):
Editorial. (2001) “Importing Foreign Labor: A How-Not-To-Guide.” Engineering
News-Record. Vol. 247 Issue 24, p48.
Zarembka, JM (2002) “America’s Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern-Day
Slavery” in Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy.
London: MacMillion.
McMahon ,C. (2011, July 10). “Problems with J-1 Visas seen across the country.” Sea
Coastal Online. Accessed Sept 2012 at www.seacoastalonline.com/McMahon/J-1/

The first article published in 2001 comes from the Engineering News-Record

and is entitled, “Importing Foreign Labor: A How-Not-To Guide.” This report

describes the tactics of USA-IT, a sponsor and exchange company, which brought in
electrical workers as a cheap labor supply primarily from Eastern Europe. USA-IT

brought in workers and redistributed them to large contractors, one of which was
Integrated Electrical Services (IES). Although its reports and interviews show IES
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and USA-IT as “doing fine” and placing individuals in training positions, due to living
expenses and conditions as well as low pay the International Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers lured over half of the participants, documented at nearly 700

persons, to leave USA-IT and join its forces. When workers were asked why this was
the case they cited the failure of USA-IT to properly cite and document (to the State

Department) clear figures regarding the costs of placements and living expenses.
Furthermore, participants stated a large number of positions reflected

“disappointing work assignments, turning experienced craft workers into swing

labor performing tasks not directly related to the craft (ENR: 2001).” While the State
Department described the potential positions at USA-IT “electrical management,”

the marketing letter from USA-IT contracting its J-1 visa SWT participants out for
training and cultural exchange purposes clearly illustrated its true intent simply

through the title of the letter – “Does your company need qualified electricians at
$15 per hour?”

A second report was published in 2002 in the book Global Woman: Nannies,

Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy. This report, entitled “America’s Dirty

Work: Migrant Maids and Modern-Day Slavery,” opened with an introduction worth
repeating for the purposes of understanding the exploitation of many J-1 visa SWT

participants; “Imagine you are locked away in a strange home. You do not speak
your captor’s language. On the rare occasions when you are escorted off the

premises, you are forbidden to speak to anyone. You are often fed the leftover food
of the children you are required to watch while completing your around-the-clock
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household duties. You have never been paid for your labors, and the woman of the

house physically abuses you (Zarembka 2002).” This narrative continues to explain
the conditions four nannies that entered the U.S. after conditions placed on their

country of origin by the World Bank and IMF forced them to find work elsewhere.
“Modern-day slavery, trafficking, and migrant domestic worker abuse result from
the illegal manipulation and deception of hopeful immigrants.” This statement

echoes the tone of the report overall and describes additional workers forced to

work as sex slaves or forced to beg on the streets after losing jobs promised to them

when considering working in the U.S. The article goes on to state that “psychological
coercion” is the major problem among placements in childcare that are in homes,
many of which are never documented. The article concludes with the suggestion
that networks of same-language partners be created to compare conditions and

wages, as well as a call for a more rigorous reporting and evaluation mechanism that
would discover abuses sooner than the yearly report requirement (which is done by
the sponsor themselves).

In another article written by Charles McMahon in 2011 additional problems

with the J-1 visa holder placement are documented. McMahon writes a description

of a 20-year-old Turkish college student having difficulties (alongside others living
with him) finding employment after being fired from his job in New Hampshire.
Again primary concerns were the living conditions and costs demanded by

placement companies, alongside complaints of not being able to work the promised
number of hours at the placement job and thus being evicted for failure to pay rent
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(rent that was set by the program inconsistent with market value). The most
disturbing part of the article is the fact that like many others, the students in

question had to pay visa fees, costs of living, and entrance fees to participate in the
Summer Work Travel Program prior to their entrance in the United States, leaving

them with little money if the promises heard when abroad do not become a reality.
McMahon cites an Associated Press investigation published earlier in 2011 that

stated, “Participants paid thousands of dollars to come to the country, only to learn
jobs they were promised didn’t exist.” Furthermore the participants “share beds in
crowded houses or apartments, charged so much for lodging and transportation
that they took home no pay (McMahon 2: 2011).” Another citation is of an AP

investigation from 2005 in which it was reported two Ukraine J-1 students were
beaten and forced to work in strip clubs in Detroit. Upon contacting the State
Department McMahon was told the root of the problem is often the sponsors

themselves, who report available jobs that either do not exist or are markedly

different than described. When asked to comment on the allegations made by the
Associated Press regarding publicized emails between Thai students and their

sponsor, the YMCA of New York, detailing twelve students required to pay $400 per
month to live together in a mobile home in the Florida Panhandle infested with

cockroaches and rodents, the official said he was unable to comment on the case as
it was under “active review.
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Research Question 1.3 Promotion of Peace
Quantitative Results
The promotion of peace was explicitly featured in the Mutual Educational

and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 as its authors envisioned the SWTP such that it
might “provide demonstrations of peaceful practices” between nations.

This section seeks to present the descriptive results of the third and final

objective of the first research question. It seeks to answer research question 1.3,

“Do participants in the Summer Work Travel Program indicate satisfactory
levels/exposure to the promotion of peace during their participation periods?
Satisfaction survey data was used to analyze the overall impression of the

promotion of peace for SWTP participants during the years 2012-2013. The first
results displayed are summary descriptions of satisfaction levels of participants
regarding the promotion of peace in the Summer Work Travel Program.
Table 4.10 Overall Satisfaction Scores – Promotion of Peace
Overall Peace
Least Satisfied

1
2
3
4
Most Satisfied
5
Totals

Frequency
68
52
41
11
6
178

Percent
38.20
29.21
23.03
6.18
3.38
100.00

Cumulative
38.20
67.42
90.45
96.63
100.00

1= Highly Unsatisfied 2=Somewhat Unsatisfied, 3=Average/Neutral,
4=Somewhat Satisfied, 5=Highly Satisfied
The tabulation shows 67.4% of respondents indicated an unsatisfactory

degree of the promotion of peace during their SWTP participation. Of the 67.4%,
38.2% indicated responses of “highly unsatisfied,” while 29.2% of respondents
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indicated their satisfaction level to be “somewhat unsatisfied.” 23% of respondents
indicated their satisfaction level to be “average or neutral,” while 9.5% offered

responses fitting in levels described as “satisfied.” Of the 9.6% of satisfied responses

offered, 6.2% indicated being “somewhat unsatisfied,” while 3.4% offered responses
of “highly satisfied.” The results show that a majority of respondents indicated

unsatisfactory levels regarding the promotion of peace during their Summer Work
Travel Program experience.

To further describe the promotion of peace SWTP satisfaction scores, a one

sample mean t-test is conducted to test the hypothesis the mean is equal to 3,
“neutral/average.”

Table 4.11 One Sample Median Test – Promotion of Peace Satisfaction Scores
Variable

OverallP

t = -12.5867

Obs

178

H0: mean = 3
HA: mean < 3
Pr (t < t) = 0.000

Mean

2.073034

Std. Err.

.0808705

degrees of freedom =177

Std. Dev.

1.078947

[95% Conf. Interval]
1.913439 2.232628

HA: mean > 3
Pr (t < t) = 1.000

The following hypothesis conclusion can now be stated:

HO: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Promotion of Peace is greater than or
equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.”
HA: The mean satisfaction score for SWTP Promotion of Peace is less than 3,
“Average/Neutral.”
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This study rejects the null hypothesis that the mean satisfaction score for the

promotion of peace is greater than or equal to 3, “Average/Neutral.” It therefore

fails to reject the alternative hypothesis the mean < 3 and rejects the hypotheses the
mean > 3. The mean response was 2.07, similar to response 2, “somewhat
unsatisfied.”

To illustrate the distribution of responses the following histogram is provided:
Table 4.12 Histogram – Promotion of Peace Satisfaction Scores

The distribution of scores shown in the histogram indicates the majority of

responses were “extremely unsatisfactory,” and “somewhat unsatisfactory,” rather
than positive responses #4 or #5.
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Qualitative Results Research Question 1.3
Question 1
Question 1 was presented as an open-format question to encourage participants to

engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare experiences

regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding examples of
the promotion of peace. The question was presented as follows:

“Describe your level of satisfaction regarding the promotion of peaceful ideals

directly expressed during your participation in the Summer Work Travel
Program. I will not interrupt you and there is no time limit.”
Results:
THEME 1: Promotions of Peace Were Found In USA Culture
The promotion of peace exhibited through participants’ comparisons of their

foreign communities to their communities when living in the USA. The promotion of
peace was found to be indirectly satisfied through the various experiences
participants engaged in over their four-month period in the USA.
Question 2

Question 2 was presented as an open-format question to encourage participants to
engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare experiences

regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding examples of
the promotion of peace. The question was presented as follows:
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“Please describe any actual demonstrations of peaceful practices you observed
while participating in the Summer Work Travel Program, whether they were
directly or indirectly observed/experienced. I will not interrupt you and there is
no time limit.”
Results:
Participants reflected on the promotion of peace as an aspect of culture. Discussion
among interviewees became a comparison of conflict management in the United

States and examples of how situations would be handled differently in their home
countries.

THEME 2: Conflict Management Techniques Exhibit Demonstrations of the Promotion
of Peace.
THEME 3: The General Level of Non-Violence was a Demonstration of Peace in General
to Which Participants Were Not Accustomed.
Another indirect result of living in the USA, participants commented on the

variations in crime and punishment and the response from local municipal forces as
a form of “promotion of peace” as it was typically less violent than how participants
indicated similar circumstances would be addressed back home.
Question 3

Question 3 was presented as an open-format question to encourage participants to
engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare experiences

regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences regarding examples of
the promotion of peace. The question was presented as follows:
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“Please describe your satisfaction regarding the overall levels you experienced
related to the exemplification of peaceful practices or a peaceful society. I will
not interrupt you and there is no time limit.”
Results:
Most responses recorded would fit under the benefits of interaction with

participants’ local communities while participating in the Summer Work Travel
Program.

THEME 4: Cultural Differences Often Promote Peace without any Help From Sponsors.

Qualitative Summary
The promotion of peace as an objective of the Summer Work Travel Program

is difficult to quantify as the peace component of U.S. culture is compared to those
cultures of various participants. Main themes developed include the reflection of

peaceful practices of local communities, including conflict management techniques
and reporting structures if problems occur. Many participants indicated that the
reflection of peace in U.S. culture was more impacting than events or

demonstrations by sponsors. Finally, participants noted the “expectation” of

peaceful practices noticed in local communities. This was consistently contrasted to
practices of participants’ home countries. The component of the promotion or

exemplification of peace while participating in the Summer Work Travel Program is
evident yet not developed formally by sponsors.
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Secondary Source Results Research Question 1.3
1) Stein, K. (2013 September 14). Work Travel challenges in Door County. Door
County Advocate. pp. 2.

This Door County, Wisconsin article features Nadiia Bondarieva, a 19-year-

old Ukrainian student who worked at three Sister Bay businesses, who stated she

lived in a two-bathroom house with nine other students. She said the hardest part

about the arrangement were the days when most of the students had to be at work
at 9 a.m. and there was a scramble for the bathrooms.

She also disclosed that other students she spoke with or worked with ended

up living in different towns than the ones in which they worked; some of the

students biked 10 or 15 miles to and from work each day because they didn’t have

cars and Door County doesn’t have much public transportation. The article draws a

distinction between those areas that offer a wide variety of cultural and educational

activities because of their diverse cultural makeups, and those communities that use
Summer Work Travel Program Participants that are simply to rural or widespread
geographically to foster environments that would satisfy the cultural aspect of the

Summer Work Travel Program. It also speaks to the ability of participants to travel

or interact with others outside their own culture if public transportation is limited,
unlike in major cities where attractions and events are easily accessible.

2) Jordan, M. (2013 March 9). Temp Troubles Visit McDonald’s. The Wall Street
Journal. pp. B1, B4.
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This article describes the experience of Argentine college student Jorge Rios,

who spent $3000 to participate in cultural-exchange program but found himself, “at

the mercy of a McDonald’s Corp. franchisee who was his employer and landlord.”

During the week of March 9th 2013, he and 15 other students demonstrated outside
a McDonald’s after filing complaints with the State Department and Labor

Department saying they were exploited at fast-food outlets in the Harrisburg, Penn.
area and housed in substandard conditions.

Citing the protest, Arizona Senator John McCain said this week in Congress

that working with labor to revamp visa programs has emerged as one of the

toughest issues in discussions over a framework to provide legal status for the 11

million immigrants living in the U.S illegally. Los Angeles immigration attorney and
former Immigration and Naturalization Service official Carl Shusterman

summarized his frustrations with increasing protests due to labor conditions

regarding the Summer Work Travel Program. Shusterman remarked, “This is a

cheap-labor program, nothing more” as well as, “Since when is flipping burgers a
cultural exchange?”

Summary Secondary Results
The articles above do not directly cite examples of the promotion of peace

but do indicate the processes through which participants are exposed to peaceful

practices. Perhaps the most popular example is the protest at the Hershey packing

plant. While this protest brought attention to the Summer Work Travel Program as a
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whole, the manner in which students expressed their concerns, by peacefully
protesting, is a method of conflict resolution that not effective in many other

cultures. Many participants interviewed repeatedly cited the peaceful practices in
U.S. culture, particularly if problems arise. Although most participants never

exercised the suggested methods for conflict resolution, the adoption of a peaceful
protest by the students at Hershey set an example for other participants to

peacefully detail their complaints. It also reflects a choice by those students at
Hershey to use a peaceful method rather than resorting to violence or causing
damages at the workplace.

The first article details the problems of participants in rural communities

lacking robust public transportation. While the article adopts a negative viewpoint,

it cites instances of transportation such as buses where students would see peaceful
practices and examples of conflict resolution in person between U.S. citizens. Those
participants placed in urban environment find immersion in the local U.S culture. It
should be noted the promotion of peace is embedded and directly linked to the
cultural component of the Summer Work Travel Program.
Summary
Research Question 1
The first research question sought to determine if the Summer Work Travel

Program met its legislative objectives as outlined in the Mutual Educational and
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. These objectives were defined as educational
exchange, cultural exchange, and the promotion of peace.
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To address these research questions quantitative, qualitative, and secondary

source analyses were performed. The quantitative results used the median score of
educational variables to determine the satisfaction levels of the participants. The

results included a rejection of the null hypothesis that the mean satisfaction score
would be higher than the average survey response for educational exchange,

cultural exchange, and the promotion of peace. The qualitative analyses resulted in
twenty independent themes about the three objectives and participants’

experiences. These themes confirmed the quantitative results of unsatisfactory

SWTP of all objectives. Finally, secondary source analyses were performed for all

the three objectives. The conclusions of these sources confirmed the independently
generated results from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses.

Question 2 – SWTP Participant Demographics and SWTP Satisfaction Rates
The second primary research question asked, “What aspects of the Summer

Work Travel Program participants affect program success?”

To address this question a secondary research question was asked:

2.1 “How do the identified participants’ aspects affect Summer Work Travel Program
success?”

These effects are discussed using two measures adopted from agency theory,

“preference asymmetry,” and, “information asymmetry.” To represent this
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refinement the following research questions are presented to answer research
question 2.1:
2.1a

“Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate information asymmetry
between the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program
sponsors?”

2.1b

“Do the identified participants’ aspects indicate preference asymmetry between
the U.S. State Department and Summer Work Travel Program sponsors?”

To determine the effect the participants’ demographic data had on program

satisfaction scores, all demographic variables were regressed in a logistical

regression to determine those that were statistically significant. The regression

analysis was performed using all descriptive variables to determine whether any of
these variables influenced satisfaction scores regarding the participants’ responses
to their satisfaction levels of the STWP overall, educational exchange experienced
during SWTP participation, cultural exchange experienced during SWTP

participation, and finally examples of the promotion of peace during SWTP
participation. The results of these regressions are as follows:
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Table 4.13 Demographic Variables and
Overall Summer Work Travel Program Experience
Ordered Logistic Regression
Log Likelihood =

-187.65714

Number of Obvs.
LR chi2 (11)
Prob>chi2
Pseudo R2

178
59.5
0
0.1368

Demographic Variables and Overall SWTP Experience
[95% Conf.
Overall
Odds Ratio Std. Err.
z
P>[z]
Interval]
Age Range
21-23
0.718
1.053
-0.230 0.821 0.041 12.698
24-27
0.022
0.044
-1.920 0.054 0.000 1.076
28+
1.951
3.418
0.380 0.703 0.063 60.464
Gender - Male
1.652
0.499
1.660 0.096 0.915 2.985
0.547
0.268
-1.230 0.218 0.209 1.430
Prior Part - No
Degree Comp
Middle
1.907
2.752
0.450 0.654 0.113 32.246
End
41.650
67.907 2.620 0.009 3.478 569.264
0.896
0.415
-0.240 0.813 0.361 2.223
USA contact - No
Placement
University
2.523
0.833
2.800 0.005* 1.320 4.818
Government
3.461
1.485
2.890 0.004* 1.492 8.025
Sponsor Direct
3.510
1.991
2.21 0.027* 1.156 10.667
To interpret whether any predictive variables exists among the descriptive

variables at a 95% significance rate, the P > [z] statistic was consulted. With a value

of <0.05, the model indicated it contains predictor variables. Consulting the P-values
given, it is determined the variables of intermediary placement agent (IPA) has
significance. Specifically when compared to the base response of using an
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independent intermediary placement agent, the variables of university affiliated

IPAs, government affiliated IPAs, and IPAs directly related to the sponsor indicated
interaction.

Using the Odds Ratio measurement this study concludes the proportional odds ratio
for a one unit increase in university affiliated IPAs, the odds of higher Overall

Satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and middle Overall satisfaction

scores are 2.523 times greater, given the variables are held constant. Similarly, the
proportional odds ratio for a one unit increase in government affiliated IPAs, the

odds of higher Overall Satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and middle
Overall satisfaction scores are 3.461 times greater, given the variables are held
constant. The final IPA related directly to the sponsor indicates for a one unit

increase, the odds of higher Overall Satisfaction scores versus the combined lower
and middle Overall satisfaction scores are 3.510 times greater, given the variables
are held constant. It was therefore determined the intermediary placement agent

variable was a statistically significant predicator of overall SWTP satisfaction scores.
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Table 4.14 Satisfaction Levels and Educational Exchange during SWTP
Participation
Ordered Logistic Regression
Log Likelihood =

Number of Obvs.
LR chi2 (11)
Prob>chi2
Pseudo R2

-200.03974

178
87.76
0
0.1799

Satisfaction Levels – Educational Exchange
OverallOdds
[95% Conf.
Education
Ratio
Std. Err.
z
P>[z]
Interval]
AgeRange
21-23 1.30157 1.57152
0.22
0.827 0.12210 13.874
24-27 4.84960 7.94752
0.96
0.335
0.1953
120.40
28+ 0.11619 0.180619 -1.38 0.166 0.00552
2.445
Gender - Male
0.89892 0.265837 -0.36 0.719 0.50350
1.604
PriorPart - No
2.00760 0.969062 1.44
0.149
0.7794
5.170
DegreeComp
Middle 0.43440 0.516736 -0.7
0.483
0.0422
4.471
Table 4.14 (Continued)
End
USAcontact - No
Placement
University
Government
Direct - Sponsor

0.01683
1.12019
2.69245
6.37816
6.21462

0.027281
0.506564
0.856590
2.93059
3.31608

-2.52
0.25
3.11
4.03
3.42

0.012
0.802

0.002*
0.000*
0.001*

0.0007
0.4617
1.4432
2.5917
2.1838

0.4035
2.717
5.022
15.69
17.68

To interpret whether any predictive variables exists among the descriptive

variables at a 95% significance rate, the P > [z] statistic was consulted. With a value
of <0.05, the model indicated it contained predictor variables. Consulting the Pvalues given, it was determined the variable intermediary placement agent has
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significance. Specifically when compared to the base response of using an

independent intermediary placement agent, the variables of university affiliated

IPAs, government affiliated IPAs, and IPAs directly related to the sponsor indicate

interaction. The variable of Degree Completion is also found to be other than zero,
indicating those in the “end” of their degree completion represent an interactive
variable.

Using the Odds Ratio measurement this study concludes the proportional

odds ratio for a one unit increase in the variable degree completion – end, the odds
of higher educational exchange satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and

middle educational exchange satisfaction scores are 0.017 times greater, given the

variables are held constant. Regarding university affiliated IPAs, the odds of higher
educational exchange satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and middle

educational exchange satisfaction scores are 2.693 times greater, given the variables
are held constant. Similarly, the proportional odds ratio for a one unit increase in
government affiliated IPAs, the odds of higher educational exchange satisfaction

scores versus the combined lower and middle educational exchange satisfaction

scores are 6.378 times greater, given the variables are held constant. The final IPA
related directly to the sponsor indicates for a one unit increase, the odds of higher
educational exchange satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and middle
Overall satisfaction scores are 6.215 times greater, given the variables are held

constant. It was therefore determined the intermediary placement agent variable
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was a statistically significant predicator of SWTP educational exchange satisfaction
scores.

Table 4.15 Satisfaction Levels and Cultural Exchange during SWTP
Participation
Ordered Logistic Regression
Log Likelihood =

-175.40741

Number of Obs.
LR chi2 (11)
Prob>chi2
Pseudo R2

178
111.28
0
0.2408

Cultural Exchange – SWTP Satisfaction Scores
Overall Culture
Odds
Std.
[95% Conf.
EX
Ratio
Err.
z
P>[z]
Interval]
AgeRange
2.524711
3.1275
0.75
0.455 0.2227 28.61869
24-27 1.640717
2.6508
0.31
0.759 0.0691 38.93145
28+ 0.25103
0.39369 -0.88 0.378 0.0116 5.428387
Gender - Male
0.6215561 0.19052 -1.55 0.121 0.3408 1.133438
Prior Part - no
1.711411
0.82934 1.11
0.268 0.6620 4.424288
Degree Comp
Middle 0.6312
0.76604 0.38
0.705 0.0584 6.811038
End 1.124856
1.3445
0.1
0.922 0.1080 11.70925
USAcontact - No
2.852422
1.3636
2.19
0.228 1.1175 7.280483
Placement Type
University 2.378325
0.7744
2.66 0.008* 1.2563 4.502244
Government 2.720316
1.1916
2.28 0.022* 1.1527 6.419262
4.8135
4.2
Sponsor Direct 9.136457
0.000* 3.2533 25.65843
To interpret whether any predictive variables exists among the descriptive

variables at a 95% significance rate, the P > [z] statistic was consulted. With a value
of <0.05, the model indicated it contained predictor variables. Consulting the P-

values given, it is determined the variables of intermediary placement agent has
significance. Specifically when compared to the base response of using an
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independent intermediary placement agent, the variables of university affiliated

IPAs, government affiliated IPAs, and IPAs directly related to the sponsor indicate
interaction. The variable of Contacts or Family in the USA prior to SWTP

participation is also found to be other than zero, indicating an interactive variable.
Using the Odds Ratio measurement this study concludes the proportional

odds ratio for a one unit increase in the variable no family or contacts in the USA

prior to SWTP participation, the odds of higher cultural exchange satisfaction scores
versus the combined lower and middle cultural exchange satisfaction scores are
2.852 times greater, given the variables are held constant. Regarding university

affiliated IPAs, the odds of higher cultural exchange satisfaction scores versus the

combined lower and middle cultural exchange satisfaction scores are 2.378 times

greater, given the variables are held constant. Similarly, the proportional odds ratio
for a one unit increase in government affiliated IPAs, the odds of higher cultural
exchange satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and middle cultural

exchange satisfaction scores are 2.720 times greater, given the variables are held
constant. The final IPA related directly to the sponsor indicates for a one unit
increase, the odds of higher cultural exchange satisfaction scores versus the

combined lower and middle cultural exchange satisfaction scores are 9.137 times
greater, given the variables are held constant. It was therefore determined the

intermediary placement agent variable was a statistically significant predicator of
SWTP cultural exchange satisfaction scores.
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Table 4.16 Satisfaction Levels and the Promotion of Peace during SWTP
Participation
Ordered Logistic Regression
Log Likelihood =
Overall Peace
AgeRange
21-23
24-27
28+
Gender - Male
PriorPart - no
DegreeComp
middle
end
USAcontact no
Placement
University
Government
Sponsor Direct

-201.52409

Number of Obs.
LR chi2 (11)
Prob>chi2
Pseudo R2

178
78.12
0
0.1623

Promotion of Peace – Satisfaction Scores
Odds
[95% Conf.
Ratio
Std. Err.
z
P>[z]
Interval]

1.171493
6.182499
0.1222264
0.9263976
1.70758

1.473086
10.37193
0.19417
0.27274
0.81449

0.13
1.09
-1.32
-0.26
1.12

0.900
0.278
0.186
0.795
0.262

0.0996327
0.2307621
0.0054312
0.5202206
0.6704524

13.77455
165.6394
2.750628
1.649709
4.349048

0.9453554

0.43305

-0.12

0.902

0.3851835

2.320184

0.4631759
0.8167766
2.303371
4.791418
6.519124

0.57261
0.66261
0.72810
2.14331
3.59092

-0.62
-0.25
2.64
3.5
3.4

0.534
0.803
0.008*
0.000*
0.001*

0.041061
0.1665544
1.239636
1.993888
2.214738

5.224717
4.005443
4.279898
11.51403
19.18917

To interpret whether any predictive variables exists among the descriptive

variables at a 95% significance rate, the P > [z] statistic was consulted. With a value
of <0.05, the model indicated it contained predictor variables. Consulting the P-

values given, it is determined the variables of intermediary placement agent has
significance. Specifically when compared to the base response of using an

independent intermediary placement agent, the variables of university affiliated
145

IPAs, government affiliated IPAs, and IPAs directly related to the sponsor indicate
interaction.

Using the Odds Ratio measurement this study concludes the proportional

odds ratio for a one unit increase in university affiliated IPAs, the odds of higher
promotion of peace satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and middle

promotion of peace satisfaction scores are 2.303 times greater, given the variables
are held constant. Similarly, the proportional odds ratio for a one unit increase in
government affiliated IPAs, the odds of higher promotion of peace satisfaction

scores versus the combined lower and middle promotion of peace satisfaction

scores are 4.791 times greater, given the variables are held constant. The final IPA
related directly to the sponsor indicates for a one unit increase, the odds of higher
promotion of peace satisfaction scores versus the combined lower and middle

promotion of peace satisfaction scores are 6.519 times greater, given the variables

are held constant. It can therefore be determined the intermediary placement agent

variable is a statistically significant predicator of overall SWTP satisfaction scores. It
was therefore determined the intermediary placement agent variable was a

statistically significant predicator of SWTP promotion of peace satisfaction scores.
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Hypotheses - Question 2
The following are results of the hypotheses presented in the research methods
section:
2a.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for university placements than independent placements

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for university placements than independent placements
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for government placements than independent placements
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for government placements than independent placements

Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for sponsor-direct placements than independent
placements
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for sponsor-direct placements than independent
placements
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

2b. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for males than females.
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for males for females.
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.
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2c. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those with no prior knowledge of the SWTP versus
those with prior knowledge of the SWTP.
HA Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those with no prior knowledge of the SWTP versus
those with prior knowledge of the SWTP.
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

2d. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those at middle of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those at middle of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those in the end of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those in the end of degree completion versus those at
the beginning of degree completion.
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

2e. H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for those with no contacts in the USA than those with
contacts in the USA.
HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for those with no contacts in the USA than those with
contacts in the USA.
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2f.

Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for age group 21-23 than age group 18-20.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for age group 24-23 than age group 18-20.
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for age group 24-27 than age group 18-20.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for age group 24-27 than age group 18-20.
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

H0: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are not statistically
significantly higher for age group >=28 than age group 18-20.

HA: Summer Work Travel Program satisfaction scores are statistically
significantly higher for age group >=28 than age group 18-20.
Result = This study fails to reject the null hypothesis and rejects the
alternative hypothesis.

Using the results of the ordered logistical regression intermediary placement

agent selection is found to be statistically significant when compared to satisfaction
scores for the Summer Work Travel Program overall, the educational exchange

aspect of the SWTP, the cultural exchange aspect of the SWTP, and the promotion of
peace in the SWTP.
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This led to further analyses to determine instances of “preference

asymmetry” and “information asymmetry” among the U.S. State Department and

SWTP sponsors using the independent placement agent variable, as utilization of
placement agents is reflective of SWTP sponsors’ decision-marking mentality. To
determine the presence of information and preference asymmetry, the following
principal component analyses were conducted to form two composite variables,
“INFO,” and “PREFS”:

Variable Frequency Distributions
To establish frequency distributions of the variables tested in the ordered logistical
regressions below, the following is presented:

Table 4.17 Placement

Placement
1
2
3
4
Total

Frequency
72
63
27
16
178

150

Percent
40.45
35.39
15.17
8.99
100.00

Cum.
40.45
75.84
91.01
100.00

0

.5

Density
1

1.5

2

To illustrate the distribution of responses, the following histogram is provided:

1

2

3

4

Placement

Table 4.18 Age Range
Age Range
18-20
21-23
24-27
=>28
Total

Frequency
87
45
36
10
178

151

Percent
48.88
25.28
20.22
5.62
100.00

Cum.
48.88
74.16
94.38
100.00

0

.5

Density
1

1.5

2

To illustrate the distribution of responses, the following histogram is provided:

3

2

1

4

AgeRange

Table 4.19 Gender
Gender
Female
Male
Total

Frequency
91
87
178

Percent
51.12
48.88
100.00

Cum.
51.12
100.00

0

2

Density
4

6

8

To illustrate the distribution of responses, the following histogram is provided:

1

1.2

1.4

1.6
Gender

152

1.8

2

Table 4.20 Knowledge of Prior SWTP Participation
PriorSWTP
Yes
No
Total

Frequency
144
34
178

Percent
80.90
19.10
100.00

Cum.
80.90
100.00

0

2

4

Density
6

8

10

To illustrate the distribution of responses, the following histogram is provided:

1

1.2

1.4
PriorPart

1.6

2

1.8

Table 4.21 Status of Academic Degree Completion
DegreeComp
Beginning
Middle
End
Total

Frequency
89
50
39
178

153

Percent
50.00
28.09
21.91
100.00

Cum.
50.00
78.09
100.00

0

1

Density

2

3

To illustrate the distribution of responses, the following histogram is provided:

1.5

1

2
DegreeComp

2.5

3

Table 4.22 Contacts in USA
USA Contacts
Yes
No
Total

Frequency
141
37
178

Percent
79.21
20.79
100.00

Cum.
79.21
100.00

0

2

Density
6
4

8

10

To illustrate the distribution of responses, the following histogram is provided:

1

1.2

1.4
1.6
USAcontact

154

1.8

2

Research Question 2.1a Information Symmetry
Table 4.23 Principal Component Analysis, INFO Composite Variable
Construction
Principal components/correlation
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)

Number of Obs.

Number of comp.
Trace
Rho

=
=
=
=

2
9
0.5752

Component

Eigenvalue

Difference

Comp1

4.17512

3.17335

0.4639

0.4639

.725824

.0097725

0.0806

0.6559

.651334

.0593691

Comp2
Comp3
Comp4
Comp5
Comp6
Comp7
Comp8
Comp9

1.00177
.716052
.591965
.499617
.385469
.252844

.275948

.0647178
.0923477
.114148
.132625
.
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Proportion
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0.1113
0.0796
0.0724
0.0658
0.0555
0.0428
0.0281

Cumulative

0.5752
0.7354
0.8078
0.8736
0.9291
0.9719
1.0000

Table 4.23 (Continued)
Varimax Rotation - Component Loadings
Variable
TravelCost
TravelInfo
Expectations
LivingQuality
HousingCosts
Supervisor1
Supervisor2
FeedbackAll
AllCosts

Comp1

Comp2

0.4663
0.4614
0.4045
0.4283
0.4153

.3175
0.6669
0.3642
0.4663
0.4264

Promax Rotaton – Component Loadings
Variable
TravelCost
TravelInfo
Expectations
LivingQuality
HousingCosts
Supervisor1
Supervisor2
FeedbackAll
AllCosts

Comp1

Comp2

0.4687
0.4623
0.4015
0.4349
0.4220

Unexplained

.2981
.3761
.3249
.4991
.5386
.4333
.5341
.5013

Unexplained
.3175

0.6734
0.3606
0.4647
0.4244
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.2981
.3761
.3249
.4991
.5386
.4333
.5341
.5013

Table 4.23 (Continued)
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
Variable

kmo

TravelCost

0.8781

Supervisor1
Supervisor2

0.9032
0.9005

TravelInfo

0.8168

Expectations
LivingQuality
HousingCosts

0.8337
0.8449
0.8736

FeedbackAll

0.9044

AllCosts

0.8533

0.8626

Overall

This principal component analysis predicts the variable “INFO.”

This variable is then regressed against intermediary placement agent (IPA) use.
Table 4.24 SWTP Participant Demographic Variables and Information
Symmetry
Source

Model
Residual
Total

SS

289.091131
449.905407
738.996539

df

MS

11 26.281012
166 2.71027354
177 4.17512169
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Number of obs
F( 11, 166)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

178
9.70
0.0000
0.3912
0.3509
1.6463

Table 4.24 (Continued)
INFO
Placement
University
Government
SponsorDirect
AgeRange
21-23
24-27
>28
Gender - M

PriorPart - No

DegreeComp
Middle
End

Coef.
1.625165
2.753334
2.823934
2.232489
2.359664
1.73377
-.094547
.4997112
-3.436478
-4.392971

USAcontact - No .0796912
_cons .0937041

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

4.44
6.30
4.90

0.000
0.000
0.000

.9021113
1.890923
1.686363

1.241228
1.520201
1.477864

1.80
1.55
1.17

0.074
0.123
0.242

-.2181398 4.683118
-.6417557 5.361084
-1.184063 4.651602

1.219654
1.444824

-2.82
-3.04

0.005
0.003

-5.844512 -1.028445
-7.245571 -1.540371

.366222
.4368057
.5761727

.2551364
.4163037

.4055408
.4689916

-0.37
1.20

0.20
0.51

0.711
0.232

0.844
0.953

2.348218
3.615745
3.961505

-.5982776 .4091835
-.3222212 1.321644

-.7209915 .8803739
-.805479 .9

To interpret whether any predictive variables exists among the descriptive

variables at a 95% significance rate, the P > [z] statistic was consulted. With a value
of <0.05, the model indicated it contained predictor variables. Consulting the P-

values given, it is determined the variables of intermediary placement agent and

degree completion are statistically significant. Specifically when compared to the

base response of using an independent intermediary placement agent, the variables
of university affiliated IPAs, government affiliated IPAs, and IPAs directly related to

the sponsor indicate interaction. Similarly, when compared to those indicating their
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academic progress of degree completion as “beginning” were found to be

statistically significant when compared to those indicated the progress of their
degree completion as “middle” or “end.”

Using the Odds Ratio measurement this study concludes the proportional

odds ratio of higher information symmetry when using a University IPA is 1.83
times higher than when using an Independent IPA, given the variables are held

constant. Similarly, the proportional odds ratio of higher information symmetry

when using a Government IPA is 2.75 times higher than when using an Independent
IPA, given the variables are held constant. The final IPA related directly to the

sponsor indicates the proportional odds ratio of higher information symmetry when
using a IPA directly affiliated with the Sponsor IPA is 2.82 times higher than when
using an Independent IPA, given the variables are held constant. It was therefore

determined the intermediary placement agent variable was a statistically significant
indicator of information asymmetry between SWTP administrators.

The second statistically significant variable, progress of degree completion,

indicated the proportional odds ratio of higher information symmetry when

indicating progress of degree completion was “middle” compared to those at the

“beginning” of degree completion is 3.44 times lower, given the variables are held

constant. Similarly, those indicating their progress of degree completion to be “end”
compared to those at the beginning of degree completion indicated levels of

information symmetry to be 4.39 lower, given the variables are held constant. It was
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therefore determined the degree completion variable was a statistically significant
indicator of information asymmetry between SWTP administrators.

In conclusion, the following results answer research questions 2.1a:

H0: Demographic variables of the Summer Work Travel Program participants’ were
found to not be statistically significant when compared to measures of
information symmetry.
HA: Demographic variables of the Summer Work Travel Program participants’ were
found to be statistically significant when compared to measures of information
symmetry.
In conclusion, this study rejects the null hypothesis that no statistical significance
exists between participants’ demographic variables and measures of information
symmetry.

Qualitative Results Information Asymmetry
The interviewees were asked to recount their experiences regarding the role

of any agents involved in their placement during the process of obtaining

sponsorship while abroad and then again once in the United States with respect to
the information they provided for participation. The questioning produced the
following category; 1) Information Asymmetry – Who Asked, Who Knew?
Information Flows

Results of the focus group interviews are displayed in chart form, and reflect

the overall sentiments towards each component. The themes developed were from
individual interviews, as well as those focus group interviews, and are presented
after the question posed to the research group.
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For the discussion about information flows, the interview question asked

participants to recall their experiences reflecting instances of “asymmetric

information flows” between their sponsors and the U.S. State Department. To add
further clarification to the question, participants were asked of instances where
informational flows served the interests of their sponsor/employer versus the

interests of the overall SWTP administrator, the U.S. State Department. The question
was presented as follows:

Question 1- Who Asked, Who Knew?
Question 1 was presented as an open-format question to encourage

participants to engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare

experiences regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences reflecting

instances of “information asymmetry” as described to the group detailed above. The
question was presented as follows:

“Please recall and indicate your satisfaction regarding information you gave to
determine your placement or information you provided once in the United
States. How well was the information used to enhance your participation? I will
not interrupt you and there is no time limit.”

Results:
THEME 1: Information was not utilized when it did not serve the interests of the
intermediary placement agent and by proxy the sponsor.
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Participants’ experiences indicated a lack of knowledge about the process of

selection and placement, the options available under program guidelines, and

general knowledge about the structure and objectives of the Summer Work Travel
Program. Information given to participants was indicated to contain biases to lead

them to make decisions that benefit cost-saving measures of USA sponsors. Primary

examples included participants’ choices (if a choice was given) of placement, and the
method by which housing and amenities would be provided.

THEME 2: Information Was Often Collected for No Particular Purpose Other than
Procedure.
Participants often indicated data collection procedures in their home

countries by intermediary placement agents or government officials had no impact
on their placement and was seemingly not used to enhance the participants’
experiences.

Qualitative Summary
The participants’ discussions about the role of information and their

experiences with determining placement opportunities often served only the

interests of those sponsors funding the intermediary placement agents. When asked
whether information flows served the best interests of the U.S. State Department,
interviewees expressed a wealth of information describing their educational

background, preferences, and even their medical histories that were never shared
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with the sponsors or the U.S. State Department, and was only recorded by

intermediary placement agents. Other participants indicated the collection of data
that was never integrated into the process of determining placement. A final

response related to information flows to participants from sponsors or the U.S State
Department indicated that information regarding feedback or reporting of

conditions often went only to their employers or sponsors and excluded the State
Department. Overall conclusions about the interviews were that the majority of

informational flows benefited the agents at the peril of the principal, and often at the
expense of the participant’s experience in the SWTP.

Secondary Source Results Information Asymmetry
The principal can observe the outcome but not necessarily the actions of the

agent. Monitoring and oversight may provide the principle with the ability to
monitor actions of the agent at the expense of efficiency. The degree of

informational asymmetry determines the program’s success with respect to the

objectives of principal (program effectiveness) versus those of the agents (efficient

and/or convenient labor forces). The following secondary sources about preference
asymmetry were categorized by the following topics:

1) Informational flows to/from Agent and Agent Proxies, and 2) Informational
flows/monitoring to/from Principal.
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Informational flows to/from Agent and Agent Proxies
1) Preston, J. (2012 February 3). U.S. bans recruiter for exploiting students. The
International Herald Tribune. pp. 14.
In a study conducted by the Center for Immigration Services, Kammer

calculated sponsors earned more than $100 million annually in fees. He stated the
Summer Work Travel Program was governed by a “flabby regulatory regime” that
required no effort to recruit Americans and no test of employers’ claims to need

foreign workers. The report demonstrated the lack of information to and from the
principal – The US State Department, as well as the lack of oversight by the
principal.

2) Klimasinska, K. (2013 July 12). Foreign-Student Work Plan Cut by U.S. as
Complaints Mount. Bloomberg.com. Accessed online at:
www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-07-12/
Business owners stated one of the main advantages of hiring foreign students

was their availability for the entire season from June to September. American

students often have to return to school by mid-August, said Christopher Darr,
personal manager at Seaside Amusements Inc.’s amusement park Funland in

Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. The articles also discussed the lack of oversight of the J-

1 visa. Immigration attorneys stated the J-1 visa program did not face the same

oversight as other temporary-worker programs, such as the H-1B, commonly used

to bring skilled workers to the USA, or the H-2A, for seasonal agricultural laborers.

3) Jordan, M. (2013 March 9). Temp Troubles Visit McDonald’s. The Wall Street
Journal. pp. B1,B4.
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This article featured photos of students protesting outside a McDonald’s

restaurant due to housing and workplace abuses. A McDonald’s spokeswoman said

the company knew about franchisees in seasonal or low-population areas that used
guest workers but stated the company did not know how many workers were
recruited each year. The article demonstrated the lack of involvement of the

principal in placement, citing that the employer often did not know or care to
discover how students were brought to them for employment.

4) Anonymous. (2013 May 28). Students ‘trapped’ into cheap labor in US. The
Global Times. Published and access online May 28, 2013 at:
www.globaltimes.cn/SummerWork
This article referenced the process through which Chinese college students

are initially exposed to the Summer Work Travel Program. The article highlighted

the difference in presentation of the Summer Work Travel Program abroad versus
its U.S. congressional intent more openly covered in US recruitment publications.
The article stated, “Thousands of Chinese college students are hoaxed by China-

based education agencies to work in the US as minimum wage laborers during the
summer, allowing such intermediaries to take advantage of a US government

program to bring in questionable profits.” A student from Nanjing University was

informed by the agency handling his SWTP that he would be interning at Six Flags
Park in Los Angeles, but he ended up spending his days picking up trash.
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Several students at a Beijing University complained that they were cheated

into paying their way to Seattle to serve as cheap labor. They told The China Youth
Daily that they were forced to share a room in the ghetto with more than 10

students. They were allegedly paid less than a dollar per hour to perform laborintensive work. US lawyers said that because the students’ complaints did not

involve physical or psychological harm or present human rights violations, the
students’ best option was to solve the problem through consultation.

The article also featured a placement agent who had positive reviews. He

stated, “We’re very careful; we don’t accept too many students and we check in with
them regularly and ensure that we have people in the US available to help

them….but not every intermediary follows these procedures, which can lead to
various problems.” Clearly the article highlighted the difference between what

perhaps should be done when placing students versus the reality of most placement
methods.

Informational flows/monitoring to/from Principal
1) Preston, J. (2012 February 3). U.S. bans recruiter for exploiting students. The
International Herald Tribune. pp. 14.
The article covered the removal of CETUSA, a nonprofit organization that

sponsored more than 5,000 students in 2011. The company could lose at least 5

million dollars in annual fees for the summer program. The company also allegedly
created businesses providing health insurance to students. State Department
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officials reviewed CETUSA’s participation in three other academic exchanges. Under
formal rules, the company could still reapply for sponsorship after two years.

When reached for comment, Program Director Rich Ruth said his department

was increasing its oversight staff for the program by 15 people. It currently had

about 40 employees that monitored almost 125,000 students participating annually
in the Summer Work Travel Program.

Saket Soni, director of the National Guestworker Alliance, the labor group

that helped organized the Palmyra protest at the Hershey packing plant in 2011
demanded that the State Department take action against the sponsor. The NGA

group stated the decisions to revoke CETUSA’s status was, “a blow against a larger

trend of labor recruiters using guest workers to hollow out industries and undercut
wages all over America.”

Mr. Soni and other critics were skeptical that the State Department would

make deep changes in the program. As economist Jerry Kammer from the Center of

Immigration Studies agreed, stating, “The fundamental problem is that it provides a
basket of incentives for employers to ignore American kids and hire foreign kids,
instead.” The article pointed out that despite the egregious actions reported in

increasing numbers during the previous decade, CETUSA would be the first sponsor
to have its membership revoked. It also noted the preferences of the principal

cannot be satisfied by the agent unless the incentives offered for agent’s who behave
opportunistically at the peril of the Summer Work Travel Program are minimized.
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2) Weiss, M. (2011 June 20). Student Visa Program: New Rules, Same Problems.
Huffington Post. pp.7-8.
State Department spokesman John Fleming stated the rules already on the

books allowed sanctions ranging from written reprimands to a revocation of

sponsors’ designation. However, the State Department also acknowledged that no
Summer Work Travel sponsor had been removed from the program for its

treatment of students, despite years of complaints of exploitation and deplorable
living and working conditions, according to documents obtained by the AP.

“You can have all the rules and regulations in the world, but if you don’t have

enforcement, the rules are worthless. They’re not worth the paper they’re written

on” stated George Collins, Okaloosa Florida sheriff’s inspector who has complained
to the State Department for 10 years regarding SWTP abuses.

The State Department response in the Federal Register states, “This past

summer the Department received a significant increase in the number of complaints
from foreign governments, program participants, their families, concerned

American citizens (Fed. Reg. 4-26-11).” However as the article noted, the AP found
that while law enforcement and others had complained to the State Department
about J-1 abuses for some time, the State Department didn’t start tracking

complaints until 2010 – after the AP requested the documents using the Freedom of
Information Act. Once the agency began keeping a log of complaints, the list grew
quickly.
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The AP investigation documented the abuse of hundreds of students in more

than a dozen states. The article also mentioned the AP obtained emails between

several Thai students and their sponsoring organization, the International YMCA,
based in New York. The emails said 12 foreign students were each paying $400 a
month – a total of $4,800 – to live in the Florida Panhandle in a mobile home
infested with cockroaches and rodents.

The article stated, “The Thai students complained to U.S. Rep. Jeff Miller, R-

Florida, saying they were afraid of a third-party labor broker, Ivan Lukin, who
arranged for their housing and jobs. They said Lukin threatened them with

deportation when they complained, and that the State Department and YMCA did

little to help them. ‘We are afraid of Mr. Lukin and fear for our personal safety, but

the YMCA dismissed our concerns, even after we informed them of our fears,’ one of
the students who wrote to Miller.”

When the AP asked about Lukin, the State Department said in an email the

agency cut ties with people or businesses that violated established procedures.

However, the Florida police had warned the State Department as far back as 2007
that Lukin was subjecting students to crowded living conditions in violation of
housing codes, according to emails obtained by the AP.
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3) Additional Reports - Inadequate Regulations - 1990 GAO report, 2005 GAO
report

The 1990 GAO report stated, “Regulations governing J visa programs are too

vague and not comprehensive enough to ensure that participants and their activities
are consistent with the intent and purpose of the 1961 act (and) provide little

guidance as to what constitutes legitimate educational and cultural exchanges

(GAO/NSIAD-90-61).” What is needed is a more concise definition of training and
educational opportunities such that the legislation cannot be interpreted in a

multitude of ways depending on available job placements. Furthermore even when

participants were told of their placement the conditions were often overstated in

order to justify housing costs and the low wage paying jobs. Thus it is the conclusion
of this study that more consideration needs to be given to the background of the

applicant such that a program is selected that best suits the student’s academic and
training goals as well as future goals and aspirations. This is not to say students

should be held in the highest regard and placed unfairly in competitive positions in

their desired field. Students should at the very minimum be placed in the same field
as their academic studies in their home country.

4) Additional Reports – Oversight Protocols - 1990 GAO report, 2005 GAO report

Mentioned in three of the reports reviewed was the degree of management

and oversight in the program. The 1990 GAO report stated, “USIA lacks adequate
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information on participant activities, does not enforce requirements that program
sponsors provide periodic information on participant activities, has no systemic

process to monitor sponsors’ and participants’ activities, and does not adequately
coordinate the program internally or with other agencies having visa

responsibilities (GAO-06-106).” Although USIA was dissolved and moved back in the

State Department in 1999, the lack of requirements still exists in the program today.
Sponsors are only required to report on conditions of their programs once a year

and no data is collected directly from the participants. This is an example of a “onesided” report as the sponsor is highly unlikely to report negatively about their

activities. Why exit interviews or any sort of data collection process is not carried
out upon the completion of the program has not been addressed by the State

Department. Furthermore, even the annual reports from the sponsors are not
independently audited.

Although the reports each detailed the neglect of sponsors, program

directors, and even the agency responsible for reading the yearly reports, it is

perhaps this last discovery that summarizes the broad lack of oversight in the
program. Each year an estimated 1,460 annual reports are received by the

Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau. The Bureau admitted it lacked the staffing
to read all of the reports. Compounding this neglect is a statistic regarding the field

reports conducted by the State Department; “In the past 4 years (2005 report), State
officials made visits to only 8 of its 206 SWT sponsors, which means on average only
1% of sponsors received a visit (GAO-06-106).” This indicated the tremendous
171

growth of the program in the last decade, and also indicated the lack of personnel

positioned to handle the growth. If the State Department cannot conduct reviews or
find suitable and independent third parties to conduct the reviews it should limit

the number of sponsors that receive federal money and authorization. Furthermore,
the original legislative intent of the Fulbright-Hays Act was to use the finances from
the “sale of war properties” to carry out the cultural and educational exchange
program. Therefore the money should be budgeted accordingly for additional
accountability and quality personnel.
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Research Question 2.1b Preference Symmetry
Table 4.25 Principal Component Analysis, PREFS Composite Variable
Construction
Principal components/correlation
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)

Number of Obs.
Number of comp.
Trace
Rho

Component

Eigenvalue

Difference

Comp1
Comp2
Comp3
Comp4
Comp5
Comp6
Comp7
Comp8
Comp9

4.37793
1.34164
.90483
.80181
.79033
.656559
.599778
.58874
.483487

3.03629
.436808
.10302
.0114801
.133771
.0567816
.0110379
.105253
.0285883

Varimax Rotation - Component Loadings
Variable
PayLevel

WorkConditions

PlacementMethods
TravelAbility

WorkplaceEXP
WorkSchool

AcademicDiversity
EducationalOpps
CulturalEX

CulturalDiv

Comp1

Comp2

0.5437

0.4645
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2
11
0.5200

=
=
=

Proportion
0.3980
0.1220
0.0823
0.0729
0.0718
0.0597
0.0545
0.0535
0.0440

Unexplained

.5461
0.6210
0.3017
0.5566
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Cumulative
0.3980
0.5200
0.6022
0.6751
0.7470
0.8066
0.8612
0.9147
0.9586

.3904

0.3894

0.3665

=

.6325
.7204
.3991
.5718
.3971
.5154
.5461
.4435

Table 4.25 (Continued)
Promax Rotaton – Component Loadings
Variable
PayLevel

WorkConditions

PlacementMethods
TravelAbility

WorkplaceEXP
WorkSchool

AcademicDiversity
EducationalOpps
CulturalEX

CulturalDiv

Comp1

Comp2

Unexplained

0.5790

.3904

0.3932

.5461
.6325
.7204

0.6437

0.3671
0.4731

.3991
.5718
.3971
.5154
.5461

0.5713

.4435

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
Variable

kmo

TravelCost

0.8781

Supervisor1
Supervisor2

0.9032
0.9005

TravelInfo

Expectations
LivingQuality
HousingCosts
FeedbackAll
AllCosts
Overall

0.8168
0.8337
0.8449
0.8736
0.9044
0.8533

0.8626
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A principal component analysis is used to predict the variable “PREFS.” This variable
is then regressed against intermediary placement agent (IPA) use.

Table 4.26 SWTP Participant Demographic Variables and Preference
Symmetry
Source

SS

df

MS

Number of obs
F( 11, 166)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

Model
222.409528 11 20.219048
Residual 469.665257 166 2.82930878
Total

692.074786 177 3.91002704

PREFS
Placement
University
Government
DirectSponsor
AgeRange
21-23
24-27
>28

Gender - M

PriorPart-No

DegreeComp
Middle
End

USAcontact-No
_cons

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

=
=
=
=
=
=
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7.15
0.0000
0.3214
0.2764
1.6821

[95% Conf. Interval]

1.043822 .3741778
1.972761 .4462949
2.522153 .5886895

2.79
4.42
4.28

0.006
0.000
0.000

.3050614
1.091615
1.359869

1.782583
2.853906
3.684437

2.702814 1.268193
3.847884 1.553225
2.457936 1.509969

2.13
2.48
1.63

0.035
0.014
0.105

.1989474
.7812614
-.523283

5.20668
6.91457
5.43916

-3.87236
-5.42082

-3.11
-3.67

0.002
0.000

-6.33271
-8.33539

-1.41202
-2.50625

.0976649 .260679
.6670747 .4253475

-.2501
-.3478

1.24615
1.476212
.4143508
.2748351

0.37
1.57

-0.60
-1.25
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0.708
0.119

0.547
0.214

-.417008
-.172713

-1.0681
-.88533

.6123385
1.506863

.5679578
.1999151

To interpret whether any predictive variables exists among the descriptive

variables at a 95% significance rate, the P > [z] statistic was consulted. With a value
of <0.05, the model indicated it contained predictor variables. Consulting the P-

values given, it is determined the variables of intermediary placement agent and

degree completion are statistically significant. Specifically when compared to the

base response of using an independent intermediary placement agent, the variables
of university affiliated IPAs, government affiliated IPAs, and IPAs directly related to

the sponsor indicate interaction. Similarly, when compared to those indicating their
academic progress of degree completion as “beginning” were found to be

statistically significant when compared to those indicated the progress of their

degree completion as “middle” or “end.” A third independent variable, age range,

was found to be statistically significant. Those that indicated being in the 21-23, and
24-27 age ranges were found to report higher levels of preference asymmetry than
those in the 18-21 age range.

Using the Odds Ratio measurement this study concludes the proportional

odds ratio of higher preference symmetry when using a University IPA is 1.04 times
higher than when using an Independent IPA, given the variables are held constant.

Similarly, the proportional odds ratio of higher preference symmetry when using a

Government IPA is 1.97 times higher than when using an Independent IPA, given the
variables are held constant. The final IPA related directly to the sponsor indicates
the proportional odds ratio of higher preference symmetry when using a IPA

directly affiliated with the Sponsor IPA is 2.52 times higher than when using an
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Independent IPA, given the variables are held constant. It was therefore determined

the intermediary placement agent variable was a statistically significant indicator of
preference asymmetry between SWTP administrators.

The second statistically significant variable, progress of degree completion,

indicated the proportional odds ratio of higher preference symmetry when

indicating progress of degree completion was “middle” compared to those at the

“beginning” of degree completion is 3.87 times lower, given the variables are held

constant. Similarly, those indicating their progress of degree completion to be “end”
compared to those at the beginning of degree completion indicated levels of

preference symmetry to be 5.42 lower, given the variables are held constant. It was
therefore determined the degree completion variable was a statistically significant
indicator of preference asymmetry between SWTP administrators.

The third statistically significant variable, age range, indicated the

proportional odds ratio of preference symmetry of those aged 21-23 compared to

those aged 18-21 was 2.70 higher. The second age group, those 24-27, indicated the

odds ratio of preference symmetry to be 3.85 times higher than those in the age

range 18-21. The oldest age range, those 28 years old and above, were not found to
be statistically significant when compared to the base group, those aged 18-21. It

was therefore determined the intermediary placement agent variable was a
statistically significant indicator of preference asymmetry between SWTP
administrators.
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In conclusion, the following results answer research questions 2.1b:

H0: Demographic variables of the Summer Work Travel Program participants’ were
found to not be statistically significant when compared to measures of
preference symmetry.

HA: Demographic variables of the Summer Work Travel Program participants’ were
found to be statistically significant when compared to measures of preference
symmetry.

In conclusion, this study rejects the null hypothesis that no statistical

significance exists between participants’ demographic variables and measures of
preference symmetry.

Qualitative Results Preference Asymmetry
Interviewees were asked to recount their experiences about the asymmetry

of preference of both the agent and the principal. Interviewees were asked to
explain the dichotomy between the two entities. Two rounds of questioning

produced the following results as categorized below; 1) Preference Asymmetry –
Serving the Agent; 2) Preference Asymmetry – Serving the Principal.

The results of the focus group interviews are displayed in chart form (Table

57), and reflect the overall sentiments towards each component. The themes were
developed from the individual interviews, as well as those focus group interviews,
and are presented after the question is posed.
178

The objectives of the Summer Work Travel Program, as well as its

authorizing legislation, were reviewed with the interviewees. They were told of the

structure and processes related to recruitment for SWTP participation and the roles
of intermediary placement agents. Preference asymmetry towards the principal

was described as actions or preferences that helped satisfy those aforementioned
program objectives. Preference asymmetry towards the agent was described as

actions or preferences that reflected actions that were not in congruence with the
satisfaction of SWTP goals.

Question 1
Question 1 was presented as an open-format question to encourage the

participants to engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare

experiences regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences reflecting

instances of “preference asymmetry” as described to the group detailed above. The
question was as follows:

“Please recall your experience while participating in the Summer Work Travel
Program and whether it served the interests explained to be those of the
Sponsor or the Principal. I will not interrupt and there is no time limit.”
Results:
THEME 1: The Principal Would Not Be Happy….
As participants were introduced to the principal/agent characterization of

the U.S. State Department and SWTP sponsors and the goals of the underlying

legislation, most concluded that their overall experience was not in congruence with
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the objectives of the MECE Act of 1961, or were not facilitated to satisfy identified
objectives even though indirect benefits often resulted through participation.

THEME 2: Even if Preferences Are Oriented Towards Sponsor, the Satisfaction of SWTP
Objectives Was Still Possible – If Participants Put Forth the Effort.
While participants were generally unfamiliar with the outlined objectives of

the MECE Act of 1961, a majority of participants indicated they found the

community and USA to be conducive to the objectives, and although SWTP

employing sponsors seldom made efforts to satisfy these objectives, participants
themselves were able to engage in educational and cultural exchange to various
degrees depending on their own personal activities and effort levels.

Question 2
Question 2 was presented as an open-format question to encourage

participants to engage in a discussion with one another, specifically to compare

experiences regarding different sponsors, placements, and experiences reflecting

instances of “preference asymmetry” as described to the group detailed above. The
question was presented as follows:

“Please recall your experience while participating in the Summer Work Travel
Program and whether it served the interests explained to be those of the US
State Department.”

THEME 3: Expectations of Program Favored the Principal, Reality of Program Favored
its Agents
THEME 4: Preferences of Principal Were Made Expensive to Satisfy
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Participants indicated the majority of activities that were encountered during

their participation were presented in the form of out-of-pocket costs and not

integrated into upfront expenses specified before travel to the USA. Participants
often reported having too little money to participate in these endeavors (or find
transportation to activities), or reported having to spend more money than

anticipated. These extra costs forced participants willing to engage in such activities

to spend the money they made while employed in the USA or to request money to be
sent for home, often resulting in limited funds available for travel during the final
month of their visa.

Qualitative Summary
The interviews produced conclusions about unsatisfactory preference

asymmetry levels in favor of the sponsors. The themes identified were related to the
expectations of the Summer Work Travel Program before the participants arrived in
the USA versus the reality of the program they encountered upon their arrival. In
general, the participants concluded the way the SWTP was presented served the
preferences of the principal while the reality of their experiences served those

preferences of the agents. Other participants indicated that cultural and educational
exchange still took place, but required effort by the participants to invest their free

time or finances to participate in these activities. Many indicated the overall amount
of hidden costs imposed by the sponsors did not allow them to travel. The SWTP’s

181

cultural exchange component is critical to meeting the intended objectives of the
program.

Secondary Source Results Preference Asymmetry
Instances of Preferential Action towards Agent Preferences
1) Kammer, J. (2012 February 6). “Abuses in Summer Work Travel Program
Extend far Beyond Hershey and CETUSA.” Center for Immigration Studies.
Accessed at http://www.cis.org/print/krammer/
This article began by quoting a cable intercepted from the Russian Fraud

Prevention Unit sent from the U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg, Russia. It stated,

“During this year’s Summer Work and Travel season, FPU (the Fraud Prevention
Unit at U.S. consulate in S. Petersburg, Russia) paid particular attention to

Rospersonal, a SWT agency new to our area. Initially, we discovered that the agency
was providing its students with job offers through the Alliance Abroad Group at US
companies that no longer existed. Further investigation found that they were also

selling fake university IDs and student record books for clients who were not bona
fide students but nevertheless were looking for a way to go to the U.S.”

Following this report the US State Department acknowledged it was involved

in, “an investigation with DHS and FBI regarding a Eurasian Organized Crime group
operating in Colorado and Nevada that is suspected of using 28 Summer Work and

Travel exchange students including two female students from Russia to participate
in financial fraud schemes.” Both correspondences were dated 2009, one year

before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a thorough review of the Summer
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Work Travel Program. It further linked fraudulent behavior to the 2010 AP report of
a broker for topless bars recruiting and using J-1 SWTP participants to staff

locations in Los Angeles as well as Las Vegas. While these entities were not directly
tied to sponsoring organizations, they were determined to have some degree of
“affiliation.”

The article served as an example of the sponsors’ demand for cheap sources

of labor for positions not advertised. It identified the lengths intermediary

placement agents, proxies of sponsors, took to undercut bureaucratic oversight or
monitoring protocols, including the requirement that all Summer Work Travel
Program participants be university students currently enrolled (as fraudulent

student ID cards and records were provided for those wishing to find a way to the
U.S.).

2) Klimasinska, K. (2013 July 12). Foreign-Student Work Plan Cut by U.S. as
Complaints Mount. Bloomberg.com. Accessed online at:
www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-07-12/
In this article Steven Camarota, director of research of the Center for

Immigration Studies, illustrated reasons foreign students displace domestic workers
for seasonal jobs. He cited the practice of foreign students signing up for summer
jobs several months earlier than their American counterparts to reserve

employment opportunities. The Summer Work Travel Program participants were
also cheaper, he stated, “because employers don’t have to pay Social Security or
Medicare taxes for them.” Like similar articles, Camarota cited the various

incentives employers have to hire SWTP participants versus domestic workers and
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also other foreign visa holders – including those issued for seasonal work such as
the H-1B and H-2B visas.

The article was another indication of the need for reform of admittance to the

Summer Work Travel Program. It spoke to the efforts intermediary placement

agents must undertake to make a profit, as they benefit only when participants are
secured job placements and therefore pay visa and travel fees to participate in the
Summer Work Travel Program.

3) Jordan, M. (2013 March 9). Temp Troubles Visit McDonald’s. The Wall Street
Journal. pp. B1, B4.

This article reported the experience of Argentine college student Jorge Rios,

who spent $3000 to participate in cultural-exchange program but found himself

“working for a McDonald’s Corp. franchisee who was his employer and landlord.”

During the week of March 9th 2013, he and 15 other students demonstrated outside
a McDonald’s after filing complaints with the State Department and Labor

Department saying they were exploited at fast-food outlets in the Harrisburg, Penn.
area and housed in substandard conditions.

Citing the protest, Arizona Senator John McCain stated in Congress that

working with labor to revamp visa programs has emerged as one of the toughest
issues in discussions over a framework to provide legal status for the 11 million

immigrants living in the U.S illegally. Los Angeles immigration attorney and former
Immigration and Naturalization Service official Carl Shusterman summarized his

frustrations with increasing protests due to labor conditions regarding the Summer
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Work Travel Program. Shusterman remarked, “This is a cheap-labor program,

nothing more”. He also noted, “Since when is flipping burgers a cultural exchange?”
4) Stein, K. (2013 September 14). Work Travel challenges in Door County. Door
County Advocate. pp. 2.

This Door County, Wisconsin article featured Nadiia Bondarieva, a 19-year-

old Ukrainian student who worked at three Sister Bay businesses, who stated she

lived in a two-bathroom house with nine other students. She said the hardest part

about the arrangement were the days when most of the students had to be at work
at 9 a.m. and there was a scramble for the bathrooms.

She also disclosed that other students she spoke with or worked with ended

up living in different towns than the ones in which they worked. Some of the

students biked 10 or 15 miles to and from work each day because they didn’t have
cars and Door County did not have much public transportation. The article drew a

distinction between those areas that offer a wide variety of cultural and educational
activities because of their diverse cultural makeups, and those communities that
used Summer Work Travel Program Participants that are simply to rural or

widespread geographically to foster environments that would satisfy the cultural
aspect of the Summer Work Travel Program. It also spoke to the ability of

participants to travel or interact with others outside their own culture if public

transportation is limited, unlike major cities where attractions and events are easily
accessible.
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5) Mohr, H. (2010 October 7). US State Department urged to ban housekeeping jobs
from troubled student exchange program. The Associated Press. Reprinted by
VancouverDesi.com. Accessed at www.vancouverdesi.com/news/
The Southern Poverty Law Center stated it has interviewed hundreds of

program participants in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and the Florida Panhandle.
The organization said that in 2011 it found students working as housekeepers at a

casino in Mississippi where pay was based on how many rooms they cleaned a day.

The SPLC said the company that arranged the students’ jobs and housing charged so
much for rent that one participant reported taking home $189 for 67 hours of work
or less for $3 an hour.

This brief article featured a sponsor who used efficiency measurements to

dock or reduce the participants’ pay. This, in turn, left SWTP participants with little
money to travel or live comfortably during their stay.

6) Hill, C. E. (2012 July 25). For Foreign Youth on Visas, No Problem Finding
Vermont Jobs. VTDIGGER.com. Retrieved October 29, 2012, from
http://vtdigger.org/2012/07/25/for-foreign-youth-on-visas-no-problemfinding-vermont-jobs/
In a comprehensive piece featuring J-1 students who worked in local

Vermont stores and reasons the companies employed them, Mario Janssen, program
director of State Department-designated sponsor trainee and intern programs for
the J-1 visa, stated that American employers like the program because of payroll
savings of roughly 15% over the cost of hiring Americans. Additional incentives

included the fact that employers do not need to pay Social Security or Medicare or
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provide unemployment insurance. Furthermore, the J-1 visa does not require U.S.

citizenship and Immigration Services pre-approval, making J-1 visas more attractive
to employers than their H-1B or H-2B counterparts. Also unlike H-1B or H-2B visas,
J-1 visa holders are not required to be paid industry-standard wages. As attorney

Leigh Cole stated,” The industry of J-1 sponsors will help you place someone (unlike

the other options).”

7) OIG Audit Report 00-CI-028

Due to the circumvention of regulations sponsors can employ year-round

guest workers for comparatively low wages compared to their U.S. counterparts,
including the lack of any insurance or protective measures. In addition, the

sponsoring agencies can set the price of housing accommodations well above the
market price and establish program fees at its own determined rate. While the

average fee for program participants ranged from $400 to $2000 SWT participants

on average paid more than $1000 to secure what they presumed would be enriching
experiences leading to the furthering of their career and to cultural understanding.
The 2000 report cited many non-profit and for-profit entities as existing simply to

make money from program fees, some of which were reported as obtaining

“considerable financial gain (OIG Audit Report 00-CI-028).” This report did not

cover those umbrella organizations that placed students in positions they were told
were available and thus received a small processing fee.
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Instances of Preferential Action towards Principal Preferences
1) Gelles, J. (2011 November 8). State Department puts curbs on student visa
program. The Philadelphia Inquirer. pp. A13.

This 2011 article stated that some Summer Work Travel participants earned

as little as $1 an hour, the AP has found, and wound up in homeless shelters during
their U.S. stays. After the Hershey workers’ protest, the U.S. Labor Department

stated it had opened two investigations into the company’s warehouse. In a public

notice Monday, the State Department stated it was taking further steps because “the

number of program complaints received this year continues to remain unacceptably
high.” Complaints included improper work placements, fraudulent job offers, job
cancellations, inappropriate work hours, and problems regarding housing and
transportation.

There appeared to be little exploitation that had yet to occur in regards to

intermediary placement agents and employers utilizing Summer Work Travel

Participants. The ability of such preferential actions to persist over time illustrated

the lack of effective oversight and access to informational flows on the behalf of the
programs administering agency, the U.S. State Department.

2) Klimasinska, K. (2013 July 12). Foreign-Student Work Plan Cut by U.S. as
Complaints Mount. Bloomberg.com. Accessed online at:
www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-07-12/
Students covered travel costs, insurance, housing and fees for U.S. sponsors
and contractors in their home countries. They relied on the sponsors and U.S.

employers to get jobs, help with affordable housing and cultural programs, such as
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baseball games or sightseeing tours. While the article detailed sponsor misbehavior,

the main reason for inclusion in this study was the various activities highlighted that
are the sponsor’s responsibility. These responsibilities existed to satisfy the

Congressional intent of legislation authorizing the Summer Work Travel Program;
however, sponsors were concerned with efficiency and cost and extracurricular
activities outside work were in direct contrast to profit-seeking motivations.

2) Willey, P. (2012 September 22). WSC was told housing foreign workers was
not appropriate. Williston Herald. pp. 2.
North Dakota University System’s chancellor Hamid Shirvani denied the

renewal of a contract permitting J-1 SWTP participants to stay on Williston State
College’s campus. Williston State College President Ray stated the contract with

United Work and Travel was not renewed because, “we found that United Work and
Travel were not providing all documentation necessary for the workers.” In a letter
regarding the rejection of the contract renewal Shirvani wrote, “This contract has

not served the interests of WSC students and there are risks and potential liability

associated with the arrangement. Housing transient workers in a campus building in
close proximity to WSC student housing and permitting those workers access to

facilities designed and intended for use by WSC students raises legitimate safety and
security concerns.”

The housing agreement placed SWTP participants in a residence named

Dickson Hall where WSC students were not being housed during the school year due
to mold issues. Linda Donlin, director of media relations for the University System,
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stated, “Our feeling was if (Dickson Hall) is not a suitable facility for students, it’s not
suitable for workers either…. We were worried about a potential liability issue, and
we wouldn’t want that to happen to anyone.”

The article highlighted an instance where an independent party was able to

prevent future Summer Work Travel Program participants from being subjected to
substandard living conditions, even though the sponsor repeatedly requested a
second decision. It was a rare instance for an entity offering a service for

participants placed safety concerns above financial motives, without regard to the
disappointment to sponsors.

3) Lochner, M. (2012 July 26). Seafood industry to lose over 4,000 foreign
workers. Anchorage Press News. Accessed online September 6, 2012, at:
www. Anchoragepressnews.com/new/seafood-industry-to-lose-over-4000foreign-workers/

The State Department banned the use of J-1 visa workers being placed in the

food packing or manufacturing sectors of the Alaskan seafood industry which left
local companies looking for more workers to fill the void. As Tom Sundle, Ocean

Beauty Seafoods spokesman stated, “The answer is, we just don’t know what we’re
going to do yet.” Others however had already decided to recruit more workers

locally to replace the foreign workforce, including Copper River Seafoods. “We have
no plan to pursue and foreign labor going forward. [Instead] the company is

automating some of its plant operations and hiring more Alaskians,” stated Robin

Richardson, Copper River Seafoods’s chief business development officer. Regarding
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the idea to use other foreign work visas instead of the J-1 visa, such as the H-1B or
H-2B visas, citizenship attorney Margaret Stock stated, “These program are highly
regulated, very expensive to use, and extremely bureaucratic….it’s also virtually

impossible to use them without a skilled lawyer (unlike the J-1 programs, where an
employer and an employee don’t need to have a lawyer involved).”

Richardson stated that during the time Cooper River Seafoods used J-1

students, the company always paid J-1 student the same wages as their American

counterparts. The company also took the students on tourism trips throughout the

state and fulfilled the cultural exchange component that is a requirement under the
program.

While many employers cited the increased costs of local labor, Cooper River

Seafoods embarked on a recruitment campaign to meet staffing requirements. It

was a reflection of the positive change (including raising wages to attract the local
workforce) that served the interest of the State Department to promote cultural

exchange in the Summer Work Travel Program. Instead of finding other ways to

utilize cheap labor forces, at least one company met the challenge of employing local
workers without sacrificing its profits.
Summary Research Question 2
The second research question sought to determine whether any aspects of

the data collected held a statistical significance when compared to the legislative
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satisfaction scores of each identified objective. A regression was performed with all

demographic variables and overall SWTP satisfaction, SWTP educational exchange
satisfaction, SWTP cultural exchange satisfaction, and SWTP promotion of peace
satisfaction, respectively. The results concluded the variable intermediary
placement agent to be statistically significant.

To further determine how intermediary placement agents interacted with

satisfaction score variables, two themes from agency theory were operationalized.
These two themes, “information asymmetry,” and, “preference asymmetry,” were
created using a principal factor analysis and were regressed against the

participants’ demographic variables. The quantitative results indicated the levels of

asymmetry to be statistically significant when compared to intermediary placement
agent, age range, and state of degree completion.

The qualitative component of the study produced five independently

generated themes from interviews conducted with SWTP participants. These five
themes were found to be consistent with the quantitative results. The secondary

source analysis produced a number of conclusions that confirmed instances of both
information and preference asymmetry between the “principal,” the U.S. State

Department, and “agents,” SWTP sponsors. The confirmation of the independently
generated results from three methods of analysis produces the conclusion
opportunism exists in the SWTP most commonly in terms of intermediary
placement agent type used by participants.
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Summary – Results
The first research question sought to determine the extent to which the

Summer Work Travel Program satisfies its legislative objectives. These objectives,

taken from the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, were defined
as “educational exchange,” “cultural exchange,” and the, “promotion of peace.” The
study used a quasi-experimental concurrent triangulation research design to

address the satisfaction of these objectives by collecting quantitative data through

surveys, qualitative data through interviews, and collecting secondary source data
through targeted searches for relative documents from both formal and informal
media sources. Its quantitative analyses included coding survey responses to

tabulate satisfaction scores, which were then tested using a one-sample median

hypothesis test. Results of hypotheses testing yielded unsatisfactory results for all
legislative objectives analyzed.

Qualitative themes developed through analysis of interview responses were

found to confirm the dissatisfaction found through quantitative analyses.
Specifically asked about the three aforementioned legislative objectives,

interviewees cited indirect actions or occurrences related to the SWTP that reflected
educational exchange, cultural exchange, or the promotion of peace, yet also cited a
lack of formal events conducted by SWTP sponsors that would further satisfy

objectives. Themes from secondary source analyses also confirmed the lack of

formal events offered by SWTP sponsors, highlighting the lack of educational and
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cultural value of placements. The promotion of peace was found to be the least

unsatisfactory objective, and conclusions from all three forms of data collection and
analyses indicated the indirect exemplification of democracy through participant
interactions with the U.S. judicial system, governmental tolerance of the public

demonstrations of dissatisfaction, and conflict-management practices in general to
differ from those experiences in their respective home countries.

The first portion of the second primary research question sought to

determine whether aspects of the SWTP or its participants were statistically

significant when regressed with legislative objective satisfaction scores. Using data
collected through surveys, the variables of age, sex, degree completion, contacts in
the USA, prior knowledge of the SWTP, and intermediary placement agent used to
enter the SWTP were tested against educational exchange, cultural exchange, and
promotion of peace satisfaction scores. The results indicated the variable

intermediary placement agent to be statistically significant, indicating those using

independent intermediary agents to enter the SWTP resulted in lower satisfaction
scores consistently across all three objectives. Using qualitative and secondary

source data sources, similar themes validating the quantitative results were found,

as intermediary placement agent type was cited as a gateway for participants to be
exposed to the opportunities of the SWTP and form initial understandings and
expectations for participation. The impressions of those using independent

intermediary placement agents were found to consistently be more ambiguous and
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biased than those described by participants using alternative intermediary
placement agents.

The second portion of the second primary research question sought to

identify opportunism among the U.S. State Department and those SWTP agents

tasked with implementing the Summer Work Travel Program as defined in agency
literature by using composite variables to represent information asymmetry and

preference asymmetry. These variables were constructed by conducting a principal
factor analysis on those survey questions indicating a preference the State

Department would delegate to a sponsor, and those survey questions representing
informational flows to and from the U.S. State Department or SWTP sponsors. Six
components of the SWTP and its participants were used to regress “information
symmetry” and “preference symmetry” to determine statistical significance.
Quantitative analyses produced results indicating that age, status of degree

completion, and intermediary placement agent used to enter the SWTP were all

statistically significant predictors of symmetry levels. The results for information
symmetry indicated those using independent intermediary placement agents to
reflect higher degrees of asymmetry when compared to government-affiliated,

university-affiliated, and sponsor-affiliated intermediary placement agents. The

results for preference asymmetry indicated participants older than the 18-20 base

group indicated higher degrees of asymmetry, as did those closer to the completion
of their academic degrees. Similar to the information symmetry results,

intermediary placement agent type was found to be statistically significant. Again
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those using an independent intermediary placement agent to enter the SWTP

indicated higher levels of asymmetry than those utilizing university-affiliated,
government-affiliated, or sponsor-affiliated intermediary placement agents.

The results of the qualitative analysis and the analysis of secondary sources

confirmed the results from the quantitative analyses. During the qualitative

collection procedures, a common distinction made were between normative and

positivist perspectives of Summer Work Travel Program operations. Participants

often cited how the SWTP was presented to them versus the reality of the program
and its ability to meet its objectives, coupled with individual explanations of

shortcomings. These statements were found to be part of the broader theme of

profit-seeking groups implementing and operating a public service program whose
goals and objectives are often at odds with the cost-saving and efficiency-based

models that characterize for-profit organizations. Qualitative and secondary source
data confirmed the concerns of those interviewed participants, often citing the
program as having grown to an unmanageable capacity where profit-seeking

businesses have taken advantage of lackluster oversight and monitoring by the U.S
State Department to utilize participants as a source of cheap labor.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The discussion chapter begins with a comparison this study’s results with

those of existing reports concerning the Summer Work Travel Program. It then
discusses its results with respect to agency and transaction cost theory. For

comparison, secondary sources are summarized briefly with respect to their

resulting themes. These sources were initially discussed in more detail in the
literature review of this study.

Results - Previous SWTP Reports
Governmental reports over the years 1990-2005 have stated that the

Exchange Visitor Program, including the Summer Work Travel Program, has

repeatedly resulted in participants’ involvement in unauthorized activities, reflects
mismanagement of participants’ expenses and administrative fees, and has little or

no oversight of the program sponsors’ performances (GAO 1990, 2005). Additional

reports from the Government Accountability Office cited inappropriate use of the J-1
cultural exchange visa used to employ foreign participants in positions not

consistent with the goals of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of

1961 (GAO-90-61). This concern about placements inconsistent with educational or

cultural exchange has been expressed in a number of popular news articles,

especially those from 2011 that covered the protest at a Hershey packaging plant in
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Palmyra, PA (Star-Ledger 2011, Kramer 2012, NYT 2012). Despite the frequency of
sources citing inappropriate placements, there have also been positive responses

regarding the Summer Work Travel Program. Employers, including owners within
Vermont’s hospitality industry, have cited the dependability and reliability of J-1

workers, Ocean City’s Seasonal Workforce Commission has employed SWTP

participants since the 1970s, and Maryland’s Rehoboth Beach’s Purple Parrot Grill,

whose owner Hugh Fuller details SWTP participants’ extra effort and willingness to
undertake tasks that other workers often avoid (Klimasinska 2013).

A second set of results includes widely cited reports from the Southern

Poverty Law Center and the Center for Immigration Services. Reports from the
Southern Poverty Law Center include documentation of more than 1,700 J-1

workers from more than 46 countries that sought free meals during the summer of
2010 in Ocean City, Maryland, presumably due to exploitatively high costs of

participation and housing while in the SWTP. The SPLC report entitled, “Culture
Shock: The Exploitation of J-1 Cultural Exchange Workers” documents the

experiences of many participants suffering from inflated or deceitful descriptions of
potential work placements and the harsh reality of the SWTP they encountered

upon their arrival. The second source is the popular report entitled, “Cheap Labor as
Cultural Exchange: The $100 Million Summer Work Travel Industry,” published by
the Center for Immigration Studies. This report issued a scathing criticism of the

SWTP, claiming the State Department has, “provided lax regulation and permissive

oversight” causing the program to spin out of control, in some cases, “into the hands
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of abusive employees, unscrupulous sponsors, and predatory third-party agencies

overseas (CIS 2013, pp.2).”

The final set of results presented for comparison comes from the Florida Law

Review entitled, “The Wonderful World of Disney Visas.” This report by Kit Johnson
details Disney’s use of the J-1 visa to staff its resorts while offering an International

College Program to meet the educational and cultural requirements of the MECE Act.
As students are required to participate in educationally beneficial work placements,
the International College Program would seemingly meet this requirement. Upon

investigation it was found participants did not need to qualify in any capacity such
as a relevant field of study in order to enter the program. Student’s “academic
training” within the International College Program is positioned as part of a

“concurrent source of study that an academic training participant can undertake,”
however it is not academic itself, but rather simply labor that is termed as a

“academic training,” and is in theory coupled with academic coursework students
later take at their respective foreign universities (Johnson 2011, p.946).”

The results of the aforementioned reports are summarized here and then

compared to the results of this study’s analyses. They are presented in a context of
the process through which students enter and participate in the SWTP. This

comparison is conducted to confirm or disconfirm the consensus of existing reports
regarding the Summer Work Travel Program and its parent program, the Exchange
Visitor Program, and leads to a discussion of this study’s limitations and its
contributions towards future research.
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The conclusions from existing literature of the Summer Work Travel Program can
be summarized by those recommendations offered by the GAO and the Southern
Poverty Law Center. Main conclusions include a lack of rigor and objective

description of the SWTP when potential participants express interest. It was

reported SWTP participants select their desired placements using a list of sponsors
provided to them by intermediary placement agents, which may or may not be

inclusive of all potential placements. Both sources report a majority of participants
are not adequately prepared for the reality of the SWTP. This reality includes the

costs of travel to and from the USA, housing and basic amenity costs, and costs of

activities that would directly correlate with cultural and educational enrichments.
Upon arrival to the USA, participants describe a variety of “orientation”

events, from a complete lack of coordination regarding initial travel from arrival
destinations to job sites to regionally held orientation conferences. During

participation in the SWTP, the existing literature cites job placements as not

educationally relevant or even legal, while employers cite participant’s dedication,
dependability, and willingness to undertake tasks that domestic employees avoid.
The existing literature produces a number of concerns regarding the

administration of the SWTP by the U.S. State Department. These concerns fall into
two main categories. The first concern is that the SWTP has become the largest

foreign work placement program and should be administered and monitored by the
Department of Labor rather than the State Department, as the Department of Labor
could better address the financial incentives that lead to predatory behavior by
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employers. The second main concern is the lack of regulation and oversight

conducted by the U.S. State Department, particularly after participants arrive in the
USA.

The existing literature of SWTP operations details the current system of

monitoring by potential site visits as inadequate. Reports document a need for a
revised monitoring system that integrates coordinators such as those found in

Fulbright Program able to address participant concerns and monitor placement
quality during students’ participation rather than retroactively.

The results of this study can be said to confirm those results of the

aforementioned independent studies. This study found participants’ introductions

to the SWTP, particularly with respect to intermediary placement agents, was often
biased by limited selections presented according to the employer of the placement
agent. Participants also documented work and living conditions reported by

intermediary placement agents were substantially different upon their arrival to the
USA. Once in the USA, this study indicated participants found both the educational
and cultural degrees of exchange to be severely lacking. Many participants

confirmed the results of existing literature regarding the educational relevancy of

placements, citing the absence of any attempt to match degree of study with work

placement before or during their participation in the SWTP. Students also reported

only indirect cultural exchange opportunities, confirming existing reports of cultural
exchange limited by financial restrictions due to wage garnishing for unexpected
expenses. While not a major theme in existing literature, this study found the
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promotion of peace to be the most positive experience of the three MECE Act

legislative objectives. This was attributed to differences in how the U.S government

addresses public dissatisfaction and differences in the judicial processes of the USA
and those of participants’ respective home countries.

Lastly, this study’s discussion of the implications of transaction cost and

agency theory confirms the lack of oversight and monitoring reported by the

Government Accountability Office. Site visits were determined to rarely take place
and participants did not indicate instances of program reform during their

participatory time periods. Participants also cited a lack of feedback opportunities

offered by the State Department. A resulting theme of this study is the integration of
participant feedback to guide the restructuring of program operations. With respect
to those findings of the Southern Poverty Law Center, this study recommends the

adoption of existing databases used for other visa programs for use in the SWTP to
gather and analyze participant feedback. Finally, existing literature regarding the
SWTP administrative composition cites the growing number of participants and
sponsors, but the process of SWTP sponsorship designation is not discussed. A
conclusion offered by this study is the introduction of competition by utilizing
competitive contracting for sponsorship status.
Results - Agency & Transaction Cost Theory
The second section of this discussion considers the results of this study with

respect to the application of agency and transaction cost theories. As both theories
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are summarized in the literature review of this study, this section presents the
major themes from this study’s results most germane to the theories’ core

components. Results are presented again with respect to students’ progressions

through the SWTP. The first result of this study relevant to agency theory begins

with participants’ initial exposure to the SWTP. The use of intermediary placement

agents by SWTP sponsors is determined in this study to represent a form of adverse

selection, perhaps most popularly attributed to Akerlof’s discussion of a “market for

lemons” in the used car industry. Void of any information to indicate the potential of
SWTP sponsors’ to implement the SWTP in such a manner as the U.S. State
Department would prefer, the U.S. State Department potentially selects

organizations for SWTP sponsorship that misrepresents their intentions or abilities.
As the awarding of SWTP sponsorship to organizations is merely a process of

qualification, the “free-rider” problem described by Alchian-Demsetz (1972) exists
as exploitative sponsors potentially enter the SWTP program alongside adequate

sponsors. This situation can be attributed to the lack of competition for sponsorship
status and the lack of monitoring and measurement once sponsorship is awarded.
This study concludes this lack of monitoring to be particularly harmful to the
principal when sponsorship status is submitted for renewal by participating

organizations, as a lack of information regarding performance can lead to continued
utilization of subpar sponsors that better understand the criteria (or lack thereof)

used to determine renewal status by the principal. This repeated selection process
under the high degrees of uncertainty leads to the adaptive sequential decision
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problem discussed by Williamson wherein the principal must determine whether its
initial selection was correct and exogenous conditions led to subpar agent

performance or if the agent is indeed opportunistic and undeserving of sponsorship
status (Williamson 1985).

The concept of moral hazard, brought forth from insurance literature to

agency theory by Jenson (1983) and Eisenhardt (1989), is present in the results of
this study. To illustrate the congruence of this study’s results with the concept of
moral hazard, Holmstrom’s definition of moral hazard is worth repeating here.

Moral hazard refers to, “any situation in which one person makes the decision about
how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly

(Holmstrom 1979).” This describes the administrative interactions of the principal

and agents in the SWTP as the agents, SWTP sponsors, often reflect varying degrees
of effort in satisfying those legislative objectives outlined by the State Department

found in the MECE Act of 1961. Due to the nature of delegation in the Summer Work
Travel Program and the composition of its actors (public and private entities), the

responsibility for program shortcomings attributable to agents’ actions falls on the
shoulders of the State Department. As the SWTP is a public program with non-

pecuniary objectives such as the promotion of peace and goodwill, the most absent

component found in agency literature are those mechanisms by which performance
is measured.

As agency theory is characterized by information asymmetry and the

delegation of authority, a large portion of scholarly literature focuses on addressing
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the uncertainty that characterizes principal-agent interactions. As Barzel states, “it

is not the act of cheating that is costly but rather the resources devoted to cheating

and those resources devoted to its prevention that distinguishes the outcome from

that obtained in a Walrasian world (Barzel 1985, p.8).” The costs of transacting give
rise to this study’s policy recommendations regarding the adoption of competitive
contracting to reduce the costs of ex-post measurement. Governing by contract is

the policy recommendation of this study as the current structure of the SWTP does
not adequately mitigate the hazards of the exchange between the U.S. State

Department and organizations seeking SWTP sponsorship. One primary conclusion

regarding this delegation is the remodeling of the recruitment process such that the

authority is removed from sponsors that this study shows exhibit a proclivity to use
predatory independent placement agents.

The concept of signaling is discussed in transaction cost literature as well as

agency literature by Williamson (1985) and Spence (1974) respectively. This

study’s results lead its policy conclusions to adopt measures that correspond with
the two forms of signaling identified by Spence: contingent contracts and

exogenously costly signals. The use of contingent contracts is recommended for
contract design regarding sponsorship renewal as there is no direct monetary
appropriation from principal to agent. The “exogenously costly signals”

recommended by this study include the adoption of the SEVIS database and

integration of participant feedback into the measurement of agent performance.

Adequate use of the SEVIS database includes the adoption of monitors to regularly
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verify and react to data reports, a cost that falls upon the U.S. State Department. The
recommended program modifications for the adoption of the SEVIS database and
other “signaling” devices or strategies are presented to address the previously
discussed instances of both moral hazard and adverse selection.
The Summer Work Travel Program & Public Policy
The second section discusses the Summer Work Travel Program in a larger

public policy context. This section focuses first upon the growing public/private

dynamic that characterizes the provision of public services in the modern era. The
section concludes with the application of agency theory to public policy programs
similar to the Summer Work Travel Program involving differing administrative
actors.

From Reagan’s Grace Commission to the National Performance Review under

Clinton, to the President’s Management Agenda under G.W. Bush, the

transformation of government work has been a main theme of modern governance
in the 21st century. When discussing programs such as the Summer Work Travel

Program in a broader public policy context, it is beneficial to distinguish the type of
restructuring the SWTP has been subject to. The Summer Work Travel Program is
an example of outsourcing, or contracting out, as the government retains all

responsibilities for service provision - educational exchange, cultural exchange, and

the promotion of peace, but contracts out the operation of the program to only the
private sector. While scholars (Schooner 2003, Bloom 2005, Gansler & Lucyshyn
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2006, Minow 2009) have compared this public/private framework to privatization

or “competitive sourcing,” the SWTP contains an inherently governmental function,
the use of J-1 cultural visas to regulate participation in the program, and unlike

competitive sourcing, must utilize the private sector to employ its participants. The
implementation and operation of the Summer Work Travel Program is outsourced

to the private sector, while the U.S State Department retains the responsibility for its
administration.

The administrative actors unique to the Summer Work Travel Program

represent a fundamental discord in the private provision of public services. While

services provided by the government must be effective, this effectiveness must be
accompanied by transparency of methods to ensure accountability to the public.

When similar services are provided by private organizations, the resulting services
may or may not be of similar quality to those produced by the public organization.

However, the methods used to achieve these results are obfuscated, often due to the
cost-saving methods utilized to serve the private organization’s financial motives.

Thus, foundational differences between the public and private provision of similar
programs can achieve widely differing results, particularly when studied from the
perspective of the participants themselves, who are most aware of the quality of
methods employed. The Summer Work Travel Program includes the private

provision of employment while in the United States for a period of three months, yet
the responsibility of visa coordination and the legislative goal of satisfaction
remains with the U.S. State Department. The relationships of the program’s
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administrative actors are compounded by the introduction of intermediary

placement agents. These intermediary placement agents introduce an additional

level for consideration as the motives of these agents have been found to vary with
respect to the demands of employing SWTP sponsors, with actions ranging from

providing effective and relevant placements for students to simply meeting staffing
requirements issued by the employing SWTP sponsor.

In instances where a multitude of diverse administrative actors implement

and operate a public program such as the SWTP, particularly when the

responsibility for all actions is retained by the government, the importance of
accountability is paramount. While ultimately the U.S. State Department is

accountable for all SWTP results, the monitoring of individual operations and
respective actors during the program’s operation is integral for program
improvement and is the first primary concern of this study.

Accountability is a byproduct of successful program design and effective

evaluation. Two basic methods of accountability are relevant to the SWTP:

accountability through contracting rules and the terms of the contract, and

accountability through oversight. An accountability definition for the SWTP can be

summarized using that put forth by Jerry Mashaw, who defines accountability is the
ability to, “specify at least six important things; who is liable or accountable to
whom; what they are liable to be called to account for; through what process

accountability is to be assured; by what standards the putatively accountable

behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding that those
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standards have been breached (Mashaw 2006, pp. 118).” While it is possible to

determine “who” is accountable to “whom,” the “what” they are accountable for is
not clearly stated in the sponsorship contract design, nor are the standards by
which they assessed adequately rigorous.

The first method of establishing accountability, the use of contracting among

administrators, develops the criteria and methods the monitoring of program

operations takes place. Without such contractual agreements, there is little the State
Department has to gauge sponsor quality in terms of the performance data
available.

Void of competition, SWTP sponsorship has become a sign-up process, with

monitoring of actions by the State Department existing only in the form of potential
site visits. This has made program assessment extremely difficult, as the evaluator

does not have access to data that indicates or measures SWTP sponsor performance.
This leaves program administrators to respond retroactively to instances of

program failure, rather than comprehensively measure performance during

program operations to address instances of opportunism or program abuse before
they occur.

The implementation of a contract and a competitive process for sponsorship

designation are integral for the cultivation and retention of SWTP sponsors able to
satisfy the legislative objectives and provide positive experiences for SWTP

participants. In accord with the secondary data and the preliminary research

conducted for this study, the benefits of SWTP sponsorship are numerous, yet
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competition for these benefits is nonexistent. This correlates with the exponential
growth of the program between 2000 and 2011. The method of determining

organizations best suited for sponsorship designation should be operationally

defined during the process of contract design by the U.S. State Department, as the
contract should specify both the methods and criteria by which future rounds of

contract negotiations will take place. Currently the Summer Work Travel Program

does not utilize a competitive process for sponsorship designation. The SWTP also
does not specify specific criteria or comprehensive methods through which

performance is measured, as contracts are revoked or organizations sanctioned only
retroactively.

The second concern is the ability to assess and improve the SWTP program

versus addressing individual components that characterize the operation of the
SWTP. This concern can be explained best using the “core” versus “periphery”

function/component distinction popular in organizational literature (Westwood,

Gavin, Khan, & Frenkel 2004). While peripheral components of the SWTP such as its
employing sponsors may be replaced, sanctioned, or encouraged if data were

available to measure performance, the core component, the SWTP, could also be
revised to accommodate data results and policy recommendations. This study’s

conclusions serve as an example of this potential. If the U.S. State Department were
aware the intermediary placement agents used to enter the program had a

tremendous impact on the participants’ experiences (a peripheral function), then
the government could alleviate this issue by amending program operations such
210

that sponsors must recruit participants themselves or remove the recruitment

process by categorizing it under those tasks the U.S. State Department provides.
Thus a program recommendation could, given appropriate monitoring and

measurement data, suggest the amendment of a core or peripheral function. In its

current form, the SWTP is only able to sanction sponsors retroactively, restricting

the ability of program administrators to improve the very program whose success

they are accountable for. A lack of monitoring and the resulting lack of data to form

policy recommendations hinders the Summer Work Travel Program’s effectiveness
to address issues or program shortcomings at its core (the SWTP’s design) and its
periphery (the implementation of the SWTP by sponsors).

The third and final concern of the Summer Work Travel Program in a public

policy context is the lack of competition that characterizes contracting with

potential SWTP sponsors. While the effects of a lack of competition in the SWTP
have been cited previously, the benefits of competition for similarly structured
governmental programs is discussed here to emphasize the importance of its
inclusion in program design. In the greater public policy context, the term

“competitive sourcing” has moved to the center of the debate on methods of

delegation of responsibility for public programs scholars (Schooner 2003, Bloom

2005, Gansler & Lucyshyn 2006, Minow 2009). Competitive sourcing differs from

programs similar to the SWTP as it allows both public and private organizations to
bid for contracts (or sponsorship status in the SWTP), with no presumption of

which organization can best meet the outlined objectives. The SWTP, due to its
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program design, excludes public organizations from employing SWTP participants,
and thus any competition of SWTP sponsorship designation within the private
sector. For the SWTP and similar programs, the specification of objectives in

contractual agreements is paramount for the establishment of accountability, the

measurement of performance, and for future rounds of contract negotiations, as the
competitive process allows the U.S. State Department to learn more about the

actions and methods of its sponsors over time. The participatory numbers of the
Summer Work Travel Program illustrate the demand for SWTP participants by
sponsors. As the objectives of the SWTP are ambiguous, a competitive process

through which potential sponsors outline methods to satisfy these objectives allow
the U.S. State Department to better determine in initial contracting rounds those
organizations that are willing to put forth the desired effort to make the SWTP

successful versus those potential sponsors who seek a cheaper source of labor. In

subsequent contracting negotiations, competition produces valuable information for
the U.S. State Department to gauge sponsor performance.

In a public policy context the Summer Work Travel Program represents a

governmental program that suffers from both design flaws and operational
mismanagement. Void of any comprehensive methods of monitoring SWTP

sponsors’ performance, the U.S. State Department can only address program
shortcomings in a retroactive fashion. The Summer Work Travel Program

represents a governmental program whose participation numbers have outgrown

its administrative capacity, rendering the program potentially exploitable. Due to its
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unique integration of the private sector to satisfy public objectives such as the

promotion of peace or democratic ideals between the USA and foreign nations, the
program requires extensive and comprehensive methods to ensure the sponsors’

operations are aligned with SWTP legislative objectives. This leads to a discussion of
specific recommendations for the improvement of the Summer Work Travel
Program drawn from the results of this study.

Summer Work Travel Program Recommendations
The following recommendations are presented for the Summer Work Travel

Program and are drawn from the results of this study. The main recommendation

for the SWTP program is the construction or redesign of SWTP operations to focus

on accountability. By establishing accountability for program objective satisfaction,

the actions of the agent are more observable to the principal, providing information

to measure performance as defined in contract negotiations. This should reduce the
degree of administrative informational asymmetry between SWTP sponsors and the
U.S. State Department, curtailing opportunism through repeated contract

negotiations as agent effectiveness is established. The development of appropriate
methods to ensure accountability in the Summer Work Travel Program requires
revised contracts, effective methods of measurement of sponsor performance,
improved methods of data collection, and a revised system for monitoring
operations during student’s participation in the SWTP.
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The second policy recommendation for the Summer Work Travel Program is to

address the use of intermediary placement agents by SWTP sponsors. The use of
independent intermediary placement agents was determined to reflect both

informational and preference asymmetry in this study. The function conducted by
these placement agents, foreign student coordination with SWTP sponsors,

placement opportunism can be reduced by integrating the function back into the
duties performed by the U.S. State Department through use of foreign embassies

already tasked with J-1 visa approval. These recommendations are further discussed
in the order they were presented below.
Accountability and the SWTP
The issue of accountability of SWTP operations has been a popular criticism

as instances of program abuse have been publicized (GAO 1990, 2005). This study

found the methods and mechanisms through which accountability is established to
be lackluster or altogether absent in the SWTP. Three specific accountability

concerns are presented alongside respective policy recommendations. The first
consideration is the need for competition through contracting for SWTP

sponsorship. The second is the need for measurement criteria to be developed and
specified in sponsorship contracts. The third consideration is need for additional
data and more comprehensive methods of monitoring sponsor performance.

The benefits of implementing a competitive process to determine Summer

Work Travel Program sponsorship have been cited numerous times in this study.
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The first policy recommendation for the Summer Work Travel Program is to make
SWTP sponsorship designation a competitive process through the use of

competitive contracting. Contracts should be awarded on a competitive basis to be
determined by the U.S. State Department and potential SWTP sponsors need to be
aware of the criteria through which their submissions are evaluated. It is the

recommendation that this competitive process include the requirement sponsors
detail methods through which they will facilitate educational exchange, cultural

exchange, and the promotion of peace. Sponsors would submit detailed plans that
include formally arranged events for participants, allowing the U.S. State

Department to compare plans in terms of potential effectiveness. In subsequent

rounds for renewal of sponsorship status, these plans can be consulted to justify

reinstatement or removal of SWTP sponsorship. Potential sponsors would submit

“bids” for contracts that contained detailed reports of the methods to achieve goal

satisfaction, intended work placements and assigned tasks, number of participants
to be employed, and any staff or designated coordinator to assist participants with
assimilation to U.S.

The second policy recommendation for the Summer Work Travel Program is

the use of contracts to specify criteria by which sponsor performance shall be

measured. Measurability has been an issue that has plagued the Summer Work

Travel Program during its growth between 2000 and 2011. As the program has
grown, so too has the need for definitive measurements of the sponsors

performance. This study recommends that criteria be developed by the U.S State
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Department to outline both the specific measurements to take place and the

methods through which they will occur. Sponsors should be aware of their expected
performance when applying for sponsorship status, as subsequent rounds of

negotiation for sponsorship status should reflect previous measurement outcomes.
Recommended methods of measurement of performance include feedback from

data from the participants after their first and final months of participation in the
SWTP. Measurement would also include unannounced site visits as well as

consideration of the efforts undertaken to present participants with beneficial
opportunities outside of the workplace (such as activities offered during

participants’ free time including recreational and culturally relevant trips).

The third policy recommendation for the Summer Work Travel Program is to

increase both its frequency and number of methods used to monitor the sponsors’
activities. Although unannounced site visits have been the primary method of

evaluation, in reality they seldom occur. This highlights the limited abilities of the

staff in the U.S. State Department that are charged with overseeing the SWTP. While
the hiring of independent contractors is an option, case studies have shown such

individuals can be subject to opportunism and “capture” by those they are hired to

monitor (Mass. LSP). Thus, it is the recommendation that the State Department use

SWTP participants to monitor sponsor activities. The infrastructure already exists in
the SEVIS database used to collect information about participants. By allowing

participants to login and upload information about their experiences in the form of

feedback to the SEVIS database, a central information hub can be created to monitor
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SWTP sponsors as they operate in the Summer Work Travel Program. An example of
such implementation would be to develop regional electronic portals (websites) all
SWTP participants could log into, select their sponsor by region, and submit

feedback after the first and last month of their participation. This should be required
for all SWTP participants, however participants should also be able to log into the

sites at any time during their participation and share feedback, concerns, or make

inquiries. Regional coordinators can be utilized to monitor data as it is submitted, to
investigate claims of abuse or exploitation, and to coordinate with participants
regarding any questions they have or assistance they may need.
Intermediary Placement Agents & the SWTP
The second major recommendation of this study is to integrate the

actions undertaken by intermediary placement agents back into the duties of

sponsors or the U.S. State Department itself. This study’s results show that when
compared to intermediary placement agents affiliated with a university or the

government, and particularly when affiliated directly with the sponsors, the use of

independent intermediary placement agents results in lower satisfaction scores and
higher instances of both informational and preference asymmetry. The integration
of recruitment responsibilities needs to be stated in the contract between the U.S.

State Department and SWTP sponsors. It should either require sponsors to recruit
participants directly, or be held accountable for those placement agents they may
delegate this responsibility to.

217

An additional option would be to integrate the recruitment of potential SWTP

participants into the responsibilities of the U.S. State Department. As foreign

embassies are already responsible for the issuance of the J-1 visa by which students

enter the United States, these officials could be utilized to confirm participants have
been presented with an accurate description of the Summer Work Travel Program,

its objectives, and specifics regarding their work placement. This would represent a
shift from the active recruiting system SWTP sponsors utilize today allowing

intermediary placement agents to present a potentially biased description of the
SWTP and participants’ experiences. Instead a passive system through which

interested participants contact U.S. embassies directly for program details and

required documents could be constructed to ensure participants are given objective
descriptions of the realities of the SWTP as well as view feedback from previous
participants (as U.S. embassy officials could access the aforementioned regional

databases to show potential participants feedback from other students previously
employed in the locations the participant may desire to be placed in).
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of this study begin with the timeframe in which the study was

conducted. After participation numbers were capped in 2011, a number of program
revisions were called for by independent agencies, perhaps most frequently the

Government Accountability Office (GAO reports 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006). As
policy recommendations, committee hearings, and staffing changes are made, the
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administrative makeup and overall composition of the Summer Work Travel

Program also changed. New policy changes must be evaluated both with respect to

previous program shortcomings and also with those policy alternatives available for
program reform. While suggested program amendments such as those offered by
this paper may be integrated into the program in the future, the degree to which
they are successfully implemented remains to be seen and should be monitored

closely. It should not be assumed that, when regulations to curtail opportunism are

implemented, sponsors would not find it cost-effective to invest in alternative forms
of program exploitation in order to keep their participation costs low.

The second limitation of the study is the sampling procedures. While

extensive efforts were made to get responses from a representative sample of the
population of the current year (2012), descriptive statistics are only available for
the previous year (2011). Thus, while 95% of the previous year’s sponsors were
represented in this study, new sponsors were not available during the data

collection process. There are also limitations to the validity of responses given in

this study. While all responses were confirmed through concurrent triangulation
research design, there was no method of independently verifying that all

participants answered only for themselves and their own experiences and were

indeed the participants they claimed to be, as all interviews were kept anonymous.
The consistency and research design of this paper were designed to minimize the
potential for bias in data collection; however, this limitation should be noted.
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A third limitation pertains both to this study’s data collection methods and

the overall process of information collection for all J-1 visa holders. The SEVIS

database used to maintain records of foreign visa statistics is not accessible to

researchers for academic purposes. In addition, the database does not contain

information regarding the specific location of participant placements or job type.

Thus, the SEVIS database is severely limited for determining placement trends or
individual job type satisfaction rates, a statistic that would improve the U.S.

Department’s ability to eliminate those job placements not found to be suitable for
the program or educationally relevant for participants’ academic backgrounds.
Suggestions for Future Research - SWTP
Future research regarding the Summer Work Travel Program needs to focus

on the degree to which successful changes are implemented and integrated into
Summer Work Travel Program operations. As the program continues to receive

public attention and thus the attention of policymakers and administrators linked to
the SWTP, future research should detail the process through which change is
adopted and implemented. The Summer Work Travel Program serves as an
excellent example of a legacy government program that has grown

disproportionately as employers capitalize on the benefits it offers in the form of

cost-savings. The process through which reform is discussed and the interactions

between competing interest groups who may prefer the program in its current state
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versus those who want program reform and improved conditions provide insight
into the 21st century policymaking process.

A second avenue for future research is the data collection process for those

entering the United States under the J-1 cultural exchange visa. Currently used to
track visas given for twelve exchange programs, the SEVIS database falls short of

collecting useful information on participant entry into the USA, particularly from the
perspective of the participants. The database nonetheless represents an immensely
beneficial tool for visa entry and exit analyses; however, vital information such as

the number of placements per U.S. state is absent as data is inadequately maintained
by administrators.

A third research endeavor is the effective use of feedback scores to measure

agent performance in the Summer Work Travel Program. Research pertaining to the
appropriate combination of U.S. State Department monitoring and feedback from
participants should be conducted to determine the best methods and criteria by

which to establish standards for Summer Work Travel Program sponsors. These

research endeavors may include the improved contract design between principal
and agent in the SWTP. As this study recommends a focus on outputs rather than

inputs due to the variety of sponsor types and locations, optimal contract design will
require considerations for a variety of situations and actions that can be applied to
all sponsors’ activities and programs and be fairly assessed. The design of

communication systems to allow feedback from participants and sponsors alike in a
timely manner is of future interest, as participants represent a variety of cultural
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backgrounds and various levels of comfort with the English language. This means
that future research may assess the best methods to help participants receive
immediate assistance without fear of recourse from employers as well as to
adequately understand and measure participants’ responses about their
experiences, and culturally sensitive/unique needs or concerns.

A fourth area that future research regarding the Summer Work Travel Work

Program may take is the role of the SWTP as a foreign policy tool. It would be
beneficial to measure the rates of visa distributions over time with respect to
foreign policy and relations with foreign nations. Is the Summer Work Travel
Program biased in its selection of participants with respect to US foreign

relations/engagements? Does the Summer Work Travel Program mutually benefit

the United States as well as those foreign participants? Is the program used as tool
to spread the values of democracy more than to present foreign students

opportunities to exchange values and knowledge with others? These questions all

represent future research endeavors concerning the Summer Work Travel Program
this study illustrates have yet to be addressed.

Suggestions for Future Research - Agency Theory
This study adopted agency theory to frame the relationship between the

administrative actors of the Summer Work Travel Program. Unlike the classic

principal-agent model, the administrative relationship between the principal, the
U.S. State Department, and agents, SWTP sponsors, has created a secondary
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principal-agent relationship between SWTP sponsors and those intermediary
placement agents employed by sponsors to fill participation quotas. Thus the

principal-agent model that best characterizes the Summer Work Travel Program is a
nested principal-agent relationship where SWTP sponsors are both agents and

principals. The second contribution to principal agent literature from this study’s
results is the use of modern technology, such as the SEVIS database, to minimize

monitoring costs and information asymmetry between principal and agent. While
previous studies have focused on contract design to align agent actions with the
interests of the principal, this study suggests an additional method to reduce
information asymmetry- a low-cost, accessible, digital medium that allows

secondary parties to more easily submit feedback. This method of reducing

asymmetrical informational flows can complement the redesign of contracts

between principal and agent to reduce agent opportunism. As information sharing
methods and platforms continue to grow and thus entry and adoption costs are

lowered, information asymmetry between principal and agent can be addressed
through a growing variety of mechanisms to collect more data than previously

possible. While contract design and monitoring are both recommendations for

SWTP redesign, solely the principal is traditionally tasked with monitoring. This

study suggests monitoring of SWTP sponsors be conducted by the principal, the U.S.
State Department, as well as those participants that are directly affected by agents’

actions. Future research of principal-agent relationships in public policy can benefit
from integrating not only the principal but additional stakeholders to monitor the
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actions of agents with delegated authority through information collection and
dissemination.
Conclusions
This study focused on the Summer Work Travel Program during the years

2012-2013. It was conducted using a quasi-experimental concurrent triangulation

research design incorporating quantitative, qualitative, and secondary sources. Data
was collected over a one-year period. The data collected represented 95% of the

sponsor population was collected using surveys, individual and group interviews,

and a variety of secondary sources. The study’s research questions sought to

determine the adherence of the Summer Work Travel Program to the goals of its

authorizing legislation, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.
The research questions also sought to identify aspects of the SWTP and its

participants that were statistically significant when regressed against objective
satisfaction scores. It used two composite variables to determine potential

informational asymmetry and preference asymmetry between administrative
actors.

The literature review of this study presented a discussion of outsourcings

and privatization trends regarding government programs and services. It focused on
the Summer Work Travel Program specifically and its administrative components
with respect to principal agent theory. The literature review discussed the core
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tenets of principal agent theory as it expanded from insurance literature across the
economics discipline to the organizational sciences, political science, and public

administration. The study sought to determine its applicability to public policy and
governmental programs removed from corrective pressures identified in previous
works such as political, judicial, and economic pressures. Highlighting the unique
aspects of the Summer Work Travel Program, the study performed regressions
using SWTP program and participant variables to determine the presence of

information asymmetry between principal and agent and preference asymmetry
between principal and agent.

The findings included the limited success of the Summer Work Travel

Program in meeting its legislative objectives of educational exchange, cultural
exchange, and the promotion of peace. Results also indicated the presence of

asymmetry between the SWTP principal and its agents to unsatisfactory degrees. A

vital missing component was the methods of determining agent performance using

participant feedback data and the SEVIS database, which has been underutilized as a
central point for data collection and upkeep. Further conclusions focused on

corrective measures to realign agent actions with the direction and preferences of
the SWTP principal, the U.S. State Department.

Policy suggestions addressed the need for accountability to become a

primary concern for future SWTP administration. Contract negotiations between
potential SWTP sponsors and the U.S. State Department and the introduction of
competition for sponsorship designation were suggested. Another policy
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recommendation was the dissolving of intermediary placement agents by

reassigning the responsibility explicitly to sponsors directly or by integrating

participant recruitment back into the U.S. State Department and those foreign

embassies that issue J-1 cultural visas. A number of suggestions for future research
included revised design of contract bidding processes, integration of feedback data

and monitoring/observations by the U.S. State Department and participants through
utilization of the SEVIS database, and the criteria for measurement and monitoring
methods to be specified in initial contract offerings to potential SWTP sponsors.
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APPENDIX A – SURVEY QUESTIONS
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APPENDIX B – LETTER OF CONSENT

Letter of Informed Consent (emailed)

Title: The Summer Work Travel Program: A Survey of Participant Satisfaction.
Investigators: Mark Arthur Reardon, PhDc
Clemson University

Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to provide basic measurements regarding
participants’ experiences while participating in the Summer Work Travel Program.
The survey focuses on experiences related to educational exchange, cultural
exchange, and demonstrations of peaceful practices.
Procedures: I am asking you to answer questions to determine your satisfaction
with experiences while participating in the Summer Work Travel Program. The
survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

Risks to Participation: There are no anticipated risks associated with participation
in this study. Names are not asked or recorded for the purposes of this study.
Benefits to Participants: You can expect no direct benefits by participating in this
study except the satisfaction of providing accurate and honest information that may
be useful to others in the future. The results of this survey will be used to open the
discussion on measuring and improving the Summer Work Travel Program.
Alternatives to Participation: Your participation in this research is voluntary and
you may stop participating at any time without consequence or penalty. You may
indicate that you do not want to participate by leaving the survey incomplete.

Confidentiality: Any personally identifiable information obtained from you during
this study will remain confidential, or will be disclosed only with your permission
unless required by law. You are in agreement that any information not identifiable
to you resulting from the study may be presented at meetings and published so that
the information can be helpful to others.
Questions/Concerns: Should you have any questions or concerns, please contact
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Mark Arthur Reardon at markr@g.clemson.edu or by telephone at 919-360-8216.
Consent: By signing this form, you are indicating that you agree to participate in the
research project described above. You are indicating that you are 18 years of age or
older and have participated in the Summer Work Travel Program. The researcher
will provide you with copy of this signed form.
________________________________

Participant’s Name (Printed)

and

Researcher’s Name (Printed)

and

Mark Arthur Reardon

_____________________

Date (mm/dd/yyyy)

_____________________

Date (mm/dd/yyyy)
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APPENDIX C – QUALITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE
Questions yielding qualitative results:
Education
1. “Please discuss your satisfaction levels and sentiments regarding the

relationship between your academic field of study and the work assigned to
you by your Summer Work Travel Program sponsor. I will not interrupt the
discussion and there is no time limit.”

2. “Describe your satisfaction regarding opportunities for educational exchange
in the workplace, directly or indirectly related to your work.”

3. “Please indicate your satisfaction regarding educational exchange
opportunities outside the workplace.”

4. “What were your thoughts and satisfaction levels regarding the entire

Summer Work Travel Program experience and educational exchange?”

Culture

1. “Please indicate your level of satisfaction regarding the amount or degree of
cultural diversity present in your workplace while participating in the

Summer Work Travel Program. I will not interrupt the discussion and there
is no time limit.”

2. “Please describe your level of satisfaction regarding any formal or informal

cultural exchange opportunities. I will not interrupt the discussion and there
is no time limit.”
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3. “Please describe your level of satisfaction regarding the ability to interact
with the local communities surround your work placement.”

4. “Describe your satisfaction regarding overall degrees of cultural exchange
and diversity during your participation in the Summer Work Travel
Program.”

Promotion of Peace
1. “Describe your level of satisfaction regarding the promotion of peaceful

ideals directly expressed during your participation in the Summer Work
Travel Program. I will not interrupt you and there is no time limit.”

2. “Please describe any actual demonstrations of peaceful practices you

observed while participating in the Summer Work Travel Program, whether
they were directly or indirectly observed/experienced. I will not interrupt
you and there is no time limit.”

3. “Please describe your satisfaction regarding the overall levels you

experienced related to the exemplification of peaceful practices or a peaceful
society. I will not interrupt you and there is no time limit.”

Information Asymmetry

1. “Please recall and indicate your satisfaction regarding information you gave

to determine your placement or information you provided once in the United
States. How well was the information used to enhance your participation? I
will not interrupt you and there is no time limit.”
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Preference Asymmetry
1. “Please recall your experience while participating in the Summer Work

Travel Program and whether it served the interests explained to be those of
the Sponsor or the Principal. I will not interrupt and there is no time limit.”
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APPENDIX D – INTERVIEW DATES AND SECONDARY SOURCES

Interview Dates:

Interview Date
6.01. 2013
6.05.2013
6.15.2013
6.20.2013
6.25.2013
7.01.2013
7.15.2013
7.21.2013
7.24.2013
8.01.2013
8.04.2013

Interview
Location
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City
New York City

Secondary Sources:

Interview Length

# of Interviewees

~1.5 hours

12 –focus group#1

Avg.14 mins
Avg. 16 mins
Avg. 13 mins
Avg. 11 mins
Avg. 10 mins
Avg. 14 mins
Avg. 12 mins
Avg. 12 mins
Avg. 11 mins
~2 hours

14
17
11
14
12
13
5
4
4
17-focus group#2
113 interviewees
TOTAL

Type of Media-Source
Mainstream Newspapers

Publication Dates
08.26.2002 – 09.27.2012

Number of Reports
22

Informal Media

2009-2012

37

Government Reports
Legislative Reports

Promotional Materials

1998 – 2011
2001-2012
2005-2012
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11
7

52 (websites)
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